



Royal University of Law and Economics

Final Report on

**Cambodia's Independent Rules-Based
Foreign Policy in the Contemporary
Context of the Russia and Ukraine
Crisis: A Cambodian Perspective**

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ABSTRACT

Foreign policy plays a massive and crucial part to maintain and protect the nation's interest while balancing the stability of peace, political and social, economic, and so on. Furthermore, many states around the globe are strengthening their foreign policy as it is the most important mechanism to push development and create various alliances that bring many positive benefits to their country. In addition, the emergence of the war in Ukraine, in which Russia aggressively invaded Ukraine is a complicated global issue that has many impacts on the globe and also opportunities for the states to show off their capability to solve the matter.

Cambodia is also one of the countries that got impacted by the prolonged war and political turbulence before being able to earn stability and peace today. What the government of Cambodia has done with its foreign policy to date, especially during the Russia-Ukraine war, it appears that Cambodia's grand strategy rests on five pillars such as (1) protect national independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity, and neutrality; maintain peace, security, order, and social unity, (2) foster more friendship abroad based on the spirit of national independence, (3) promote economic diplomacy, (4) continue to support and strengthen multilateralism, (5) enhance the quality, efficiency, and capacity of Cambodian diplomat.¹ The Cambodian government exercised the country's independent rule-based foreign policy towards the crisis by staying neutral and non-aligned with either Russia or Ukraine.

Furthermore, the effort of Cambodia to contribute to solving the war on the international stage, such as at the United Nations General Assembly, especially as Cambodia was a chair of the ASEAN Summit in 2022, bring Cambodia a reputation and maintain friendly ties with various states even though there still have some challenges that occur.

¹ MFAIC, "Cambodia's Foreign Policy Direction," Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, <https://www.mfaic.gov.kh/Page/2021-02-08-Cambodia-s-Foreign-Policy-Direction>. Last access July 20, 2023.

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BIBLIOGRAPHY

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ASEAN	Association of South-East Asian Nations
ASEAN Para Games	Association of South-East Asian Nations Para Games
DPR	Donetsk People’s Republic
EBA	Everything-but-Arms
EU	European Union
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
H. E	His Excellency
LPR	Luhansk People’s Republic
MFA.IC	Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NIDIR	National Institute of Diplomacy and International Relations
OECD	Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
PM	Prime Minister
SEA Games	South-East Asian Games
SMO	Special Military Operation
UK	United Kingdoms
UN	United Nations
UNC	United Nations Charter
UNGA	United Nations General Assembly
US	United States of America
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

INTRODUCTION

Background of Study

For years, Cambodia had been undeniably affected by great powers' competition and influence, which dramatically made Cambodia fall into the deep of war matters that had suffered several declines including external political instability, unsustainable peace, economic shock, and the complexity of diplomatic relations. For this reason, Cambodia has been putting at all costs to protect its sovereignty and territory integrity and against all kinds of action.

On the other hand, currently, Russia and Ukraine have been continuously sparking a war since 2022 that delivers several detrimental impacts, worsening and deteriorating directly toward Cambodia, particularly Cambodia is becoming a vulnerable country under their political power to be forced to take sides in putting in difficult positions. Great powers such as the US, and China are always playing a role in the current global challenges and also staying behind in the current Ukraine war that takes part in exacerbating intense world politics to become more doubly complicated.

Indeed, the global political situation is going to approach closer to the tension of the Russia-Ukraine war which leads all states in the world is situating in the intensive circle of taking sides between Ukraine and Russia for each individual political interest. Whereas, Cambodia's politics is having no political power that can even absorb into the ideological trap of superpowers. In this regard, Cambodia has its own independent rule-based foreign policy, abides by and is designated to exercise under the wise leadership of the royal government of Cambodia, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation that has initiatively established this policy to neutralize its position pragmatically and with flexibility that considers both laws and conditions. Cambodia's foreign policy processing in the late

decade of the era 2023 is playing a potential role in orienting and indicating its neutrality towards the international arena and within the wave of the Russia-Ukraine war matters.

This research paper will critically depict Cambodia's Independent Rules-Based Foreign Policy in The Contemporary Context of the Russia and Ukraine Crisis in terms of A Cambodian Perspective. This topic will be analyzed by deepening the surface of the Russia and Ukraine war of whether Cambodia's foreign policy can balance and maximize its strategic policy within the war context to become more effective or not toward both that Cambodia will get involved in addressing and alleviating the tension of war by principally adhering to the five main tasks of Cambodia foreign policy direction.

Statement of Problem

The current world order has been at the edge of turbulence, embarking on moving towards deteriorated instability caused by the Russia-Ukraine war that pushes the entire world. Most of the nations in the world have been impacted in various areas ranging from politics, and economics, to social problems including migration and food security. In this connection, it is very important for each and every nation to join hands together accordingly to find a better way to resolve the matter. In this connection, the decision of each nation on the international stage is very crucial, it might lead to building a further reputation for the particular state or it might drag down the state. Cambodia in this context, has been putting all of its efforts into its foreign policy in order to ensure its stand with the international community and respect international law and norms. To be able to understand Cambodia's main position, it is necessary to look into detail the effectiveness and challenges of its policy.

Research Question

The emergence of Cambodia's foreign policy is appearing simultaneously with Russia's invasion of Ukraine matter which is the period that Cambodia is required to embrace

its foreign policy to cover and fend off any global tension. Therefore, this research will mainly focus on researching the question of “How does Cambodia’s Independent Rules-Based Foreign Policy toward the Russia and Ukraine war benefits the country on the contemporary global stage? The thesis will also focus on the Sub-research question of “What are the Challenges in implementing foreign policy?”

Research Objective

The effectiveness and quality of foreign policy are centered around the win-win political strategy of every state in the international arena, so it is very important that all states including Cambodia are able to accurately orient their policy in line with the circumstances of the change of the new world order. In this regard, the main purpose of the research is to analyze deeply how flexible Cambodia makes its decisions through its foreign policy when it comes to international issues, particularly after Russia launched its military invasion of the territory of the sovereign nation of Ukraine. The other objective of the research paper is to further elaborate on some challenges of implementing such a policy. Both two mentioned objectives are the main ingredients to analyze whether the current actions and decisions of the government of Cambodia on the war in Ukraine would bring the nation the best interests or loss.

Research Methodology

This thesis is mainly using secondary sources. There are various sources of information, such as journals, articles, news, and collection of points of view from scholars and researchers including well-known authors that analysts on the foreign policy of Cambodia during the current war with Russia-Ukraine that prove that the thesis is a qualifier and more well-grounded. This paper is also done based on many reliable sources, such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, Ministry of Information, Ministry of

Commerce, ASEAN, European Union, United Nations General Assembly, U.S Department of State, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, and so on.

Structure of Research

This research paper is divided into five chapters. The basis and initial part are Chapter 1 containing seven points which are an introduction, statement of problem, research question, research objective, research methodology, scope and limitation of the research, and literature review. The next part is Chapter 2, Cambodia's Independent Rule-Based Foreign Policy which consists of two main points that provide more details about Cambodia's Relations with Russia and Ukraine, and Cambodia's Independent Rule-Based Foreign Policy towards the Russia-Ukraine War. The next point is Chapter 3, Significant Timelines of the Russia and Ukraine Conflicts has four main points that talk about the Root Cause of the War, the Launch of Russia's Military Intervention in Ukraine, the New Updated Situation of the Russia-Ukraine War, and the Impacts of the Quarrel to the Globe. Another point is Chapter 4, Cambodia's Rule-Based Foreign Policy toward Russia-Ukraine Conflicts: The Nation Benefits in the Global Arena and the Impact of Cambodia, in which there are two main points that is about the Nation Benefits and the Impacts of the Cambodia Foreign Policy. The last chapter is Chapter 5, Future Analysis of Cambodia's Independent Rule-Based Foreign Policy comprises three main points that talk about the Analysis of Cambodia's Current Foreign Policy, Analysis of Cambodia's Foreign Policy Under the Current view of Russia and Ukraine War, and the Recommendation. The final part is about the Conclusion.

Scope and Limitation of the Research

This research paper is limited its scope by focusing mainly on how Cambodia implemented its foreign policy, particularly when Russia officially launched its military attack on Ukraine's territory starting from February 2022 till the Present. However, in order to

analyze the matter deeply, the thesis extended its research on the foreign policy of Cambodia, particularly from 2016 to the Present since 2016 was the time when the current Minister of foreign affairs of Cambodia assumed his office and start to implement new and effective foreign policy. The foreign policy that Cambodia has followed plays an essential role and contributes to making the nation become more developed and bringing fame to the country.

Literature Review

In this literature review, the way how Cambodia adjusts its independence rule-based foreign policy, particularly during the Russia-Ukraine war that is a global issue will be discussed. Furthermore, the impact of the war and the challenges of Cambodia adopting its foreign policy during the ongoing war will also be further analyzed.

In a literature published by Konrad Adenauer Stiftung in a book called “Cambodia’s Foreign Relations in Regional and Global Contexts”:² stated the foreign relations of Cambodia push the nation to become more interaction with other states and international institutions, while the foreign policy is the source of the drowning of cooperation and development and also have shaped the economic, political and so on to Cambodia.² In a literature by David R. Marples, who is a Distinguished University Professor at the Department of History and Classics of Alberta in a book “Ukraine in Conflict an Analytical Chronicle”: Crimea: Recapping Five Months of Change in Ukraine, page 46, mentioned that the west unable to predict the next move of Putin and the position of NATO to support the eastern borderland member state, while there is no doubt about the Russian President Putin initiatives and the west responding towards Russia.³ Additionally, he stated that

² René Gradwohl, “Preface”, in a published book of “Cambodia’s Foreign Relations in Regional and Global Contexts”, DETH Sok Udom, Sun Suon, Serkan BULUT (Eds.), Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, page xv.

³ David R. Marples, “Crimea: Recapping Five Months of Change in Ukraine”, in a published book of “Ukraine Crisis an Analytical Chronicle,” University of Alberta, page 46.

[Putin has made it plain that in his view, Ukraine is not a foreign country. One can take that further.... It is an anomaly that derived from what the Russian leader perceives as the greatest tragedy of the twentieth century: the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991.]⁴

This research paper, on the other hand, will combine some ideas of the above-mentioned publication, coupled with newly develop ideas listed in each chapter, to further analyze the effectiveness of the current Cambodia foreign policy and its position on the international stage in the present contemporary international world that undoubtedly facing several critical issues, in particular, the Russia and Ukraine war.

To sum up, Cambodia's foreign policy helps Cambodia to have more cooperation and relations with various states. Also, it maintains and balances the stability of peace in the kingdom and promotes Cambodia's reputation. However, there are still some challenges and consequences to Cambodia, especially as the war in Ukraine is occurring and still continues with unclear predictions when it could end.

⁴ Ibid.

CHAPTER 1. CAMBODIA'S INDEPENDENT RULE-BASED FOREIGN POLICY

When it comes to the conduction of foreign affairs, Cambodia as a small developing state faces considerable challenges in the conduct of its foreign policy. In fact, its foreign relations approach has been criticized for its lack of neutrality and independence and is seen to be leaning heavily towards great power.⁵ Phnom Penh's close alignment with Beijing has raised eyebrows among countries in the region and among China's competitors such as the United States and the European Union.

Cambodia must proactively engage key strategic partners in Southeast Asia and in the wider Indo-Pacific region. Cambodia may need to reconsider its close alignment with China. No doubt, China's role in Cambodia's socioeconomic development is considerable, however, China's growing influence in Cambodia has raised concerns among Cambodians, countries in the region, and other powers that seek to contain China's influence in Cambodia and Southeast Asia.⁶ Cambodia, which has endured decades of civil warfare, is learning the importance of reducing its reliance on other nations and developing strong strategic alliances with other superpowers to advance domestic interests.⁷ Along with other ASEAN nations, Cambodia confronts a difficult time creating a balanced and stable foreign policy despite increased security severity in the main disagreement, notably between Washington and Beijing, due to intensifying rivalry and persistent demands on security in the area.

In order to achieve Independent Rule-based Foreign Policy, the Cambodian Prime Minister outlined the country's five foremost foreign policy priorities at the beginning of

⁵ Sochan Ry, "Foreign policy tack discussed as Ukraine conflict prolongs," Phnom Penh Post, <https://www.phnompenhpost.com/national-politics/foreign-policy-tack-discussed-ukraine-conflict-prolongs>. Last access April 20, 2023.

⁶ Khmer Times, "China's Influence in Cambodia," Khmer Times, <https://www.khmertimeskh.com/25255/chinas-influence-in-cambodia/>. Last access June 5, 2023.

⁷ Britannica, "Cambodia - Lon Nol's Government, Communist Party of Kampuchea, and Khmer Rouge Regime," Britannica, <https://www.britannica.com/place/Cambodia/Civil-war>. Last access June 5, 2023.

2020: preserving independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity, and neutrality; as well as ensuring peace, security, social order, and social cohesion.⁸

As the ASEAN chair for the third time in 2022, Cambodia's diplomatic resilience was put to the test by the conflict in Ukraine, Myanmar's political unrest, tensions across the Taiwan Strait, COVID-19, and US-China rivalry.⁹ Cambodia, which is located in the center of Southeast Asia, will continue to tread carefully with international powers in order to preserve its sovereignty and pursue an independent foreign and security policy. As part of its "independent, rules-based foreign policy," Cambodia will defend international law and multilateralism.

The independent pillar denotes Cambodia's will to pursue an independent foreign policy that promotes the interests of its citizens and the wider region. In order to address disagreements among members during one of ASEAN's most turbulent years, Cambodia exercised its independence and leadership as the 2022 ASEAN chair.¹⁰

The rules pillar highlights Cambodia's efforts to carry out a consistently neutral and non-aligned foreign policy in accordance with Article 53 of its constitution.¹¹ It also reflects Phnom Penh's determination to preserve international law, which is essential to the existence of tiny governments like itself.¹² The resolutions passed by the congress of the ruling Cambodian People's Party and H.E. Prak Sokhonn's following speech to the National Assembly both support this.¹³

⁸ Khmer Times, "Cambodia's Foreign Policy: Hedging or bandwagoning," Khmer Times <https://www.khmertimeskh.com/501092904/cambodias-foreign-policy-hedging-or-bandwagoning/>. Last access April 20, 2023.

⁹ Khmer Times, "Cambodia's foreign policy: Sovereignty, self-reliance and diversification," Khmer Times, <https://www.khmertimeskh.com/50586127/cambodias-foreign-policy-sovereignty-self-reliance-and-diversification/>. Last access June 5, 2023.

¹⁰ Bong Chansamabth, "Cambodia edges towards an independent foreign policy," East Asia Forum, <https://www.Eastasiaforum.org/2023/02/14/cambodia-working-towards-independent-foreign-policy/>. Last access April 21, 2023.

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Press OCM, "CONSTITUTION OF THE KINGDOM OF CAMBODIA," PRESS OCM, <https://pressocm.gov.kh/en/-archives/9539>. Last access June 05, 2023.

¹³ Supra note 7.

Being "on the right side of history" is a political cliché, but it does not entirely describe Cambodia's situation. It is principally influenced by its geographical situation as a small state situated between larger, more powerful neighbors and by its painful history of outside intrusion. Prime Minister Hun Sen's unwavering conviction that "war cannot end war" and that peace is necessary for all other aspects of national prosperity is also a product of the country's protracted civil war.¹⁴ Cambodia pursues an independent foreign policy direction that specifies neutrality and non-aligned foreign policy.¹⁵ It is the foreign policy that upholds Cambodia's core interests, guarantees sovereignty and peace, and boosts economic ties, by undertaking the following five main tasks:

- First, protect national independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity, and neutrality, and maintain peace, security, stability, order, and social unity: Cambodia will continue to uphold its independent decision-making in both domestic and foreign policy aspects in politics, economy, trade, and investment.¹⁶ Cambodia has firmly embraced independence, sovereignty, and neutrality as core elements for preserving the stabilization that Cambodia's government has laid down to implement in accordance with the constitution.
- Second, fostering more friendships abroad based on the spirit of national independence: Cambodia is also committed to further contributing to the enhancement of the people-oriented and people-centered ASEAN Community, maintaining and consolidating ASEAN unity and centrality, and through ASEAN, promoting and strengthening relations with external partners for socio-economic growth and development conducted based on two fundamental principles which are adherence to

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Supra note 7.

¹⁶ MFAIC, "Cambodia's Foreign Policy Direction," Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, <https://www.mfaic.gov.kh/Page/2021-02-08-Cambodia-s-Foreign-Policy-Direction>. Last access March 31, 2023.

consensus in all decision-making process and non-interference in internal affairs of others.¹⁷

→ Third, Promote economic diplomacy: Cambodia has been promoting its economy through multi and bilateral trades, agreements, and negotiations with various states around the globe: In contribution to the realization of the government's vision of transforming Cambodia into a high-middle-income country by 2030 and a high-income nation by 2050, the shifting focus from the practice of traditional diplomacy to diplomacy that places economy, culture, and tourism at its cores will significantly contribute to the attraction of foreign investment, diversification of investment sources, the expansion of export markets for Cambodian products, tourists attraction, and the promotion of Cambodian culture on the world stage.¹⁸

→ Fourth, continue to support and strengthen multilateralism: In the governance of world affairs, and actively engage in global efforts in addressing challenges that threaten peace, security, rule-based international order, and sustainable development. Cambodia will continue to actively contribute to the maintenance of peace in the world by dispatching its forces to participate in UN peacekeeping missions, professionally carrying out humanitarian actions, strictly adhering to international laws and regulations, and building good relations with the local community and people.¹⁹

→ Fifth, enhance the quality, efficiency, and capacity of Cambodian diplomats: Promoting internal reform in both physical and non-physical infrastructure has become a priority to prepare a diplomatic corps that is professional, patriotic, active,

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Supra note 13.

¹⁹ Supra note 4.

and capable.²⁰ Investing in human resource development, as well as professionalism through the establishment and strengthening roles of the National Institute of Diplomacy and International Relations (NIDIR), becomes more necessary and significant to serve the core interests of Cambodia.

1.1. Cambodia's Relations with Russia and Ukraine

1.1.1. Cambodia's Relations with Russia

The relations between Cambodia and Russia have had a long diplomatic relationship for 65 years.²¹ Both countries had strong ties since the Soviet era. As dating to the past, during the years of 1956 and 1970, was the year in which Cambodia and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), or Russia presently, had a climax relationship.²² During that time Cambodia was under the rule of King Sihanouk, who managed Cambodia to become an independent state that would help the Cambodian people to live in peace and prosperity.²³ Further, as both countries got along well, Russia not only helped Cambodia to boost the economy by signing the trade agreement but also supported Cambodia in being a member of the United Nations too.²⁴ On the other hand, Russia also condemned Lon Nol's military coup of 1970, which was another political party that opposed King Sihanouk, to reaffirm its loyalty to Cambodia.²⁵ Therefore, the relations between Cambodia and Russia developed their ties and built a strong connection from that time.

²⁰ Supra note 4.

²¹ Touch Sok, "Cambodia and the USSR/Russia: Fifty-five Years of Relations," Cambridge University Press, <https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/abs/aseanrussia/cambodia-and-the-ussrussia-fiftyfive-years-of-relations/715B59CF3C035F9FF4293C0EEE9F7B23>. Last access April 30, 2023.

²² Dhyani Anuj, "Cambodia's Hardstand against Russia," Modern Diplomacy, <https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2022/12/09/-cambodias-hardstand-against-russia/>. Last access April 21, 2023.

²³ Supra note 18.

²⁴ Phea Kin, "An overview of 65 years of Cambodia-Russia relations," Khmer Times, <https://www.khmertimeskh.com/50857737/an-overview-of-65-years-of-cambodia-russia-relations/>. Last access April 21, 2023.

²⁵ Phnom Penh Post, "65 years of Cambodia-Russia relations: An overview," Phnom Penh Post, <https://www.phnompenhpost.com/opinion/65-years-cambodia-russia-relations-overview>. Last access April 30, 2023.

However, not so long the relations between the two countries were unstable when an internal political conflict occurred in Cambodia from 1970 to 1979.²⁶ Cambodia was in a turmoil situation when Lon Nol conducted a coup to overthrow King Sihanouk when the king was visiting the Soviet Union.²⁷ Additionally, as Cambodia's politics had changed due to the transformation of a new government, Russia had a hard position because there were two different embassies that were hosted in Moscow, and both embassies represented different sides (one represented King Sihanouk's government and another represented Lon Nol's regime). Hence, from 1979 to 1991, the relations between Cambodia and Russia started to recover again and had a healthy relationship.²⁸ Thus, throughout the time, the USSR provided essential economic and military aid, including technical assistance to Cambodia as well as contributed to helping Cambodia to build the country to be better. Nevertheless, from 1991-1993, the relations between the two countries were in a critical situation after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the USSR.²⁹ Hence, the relations between the two countries were not strong since there was an obstacle to the post-Soviet transition, such as the reform of politics, civil war, redrawing of political boundaries, and so on. Nonetheless, since 1993, the relations between Cambodia and Russia have strengthened again and even enhanced politics, diplomacy, economics, etc. The preliminary moment that Russia showed how they strongly maintain friendly relations with Cambodia was when, back in the period of the Cold War, the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) was the one that was faithful to Cambodia when it was isolated by the West.³⁰

²⁶ Britannica, "Cambodia - Lon Nol's Government, Communist Party of Kampuchea, and Khmer Rouge Regime," Britannica, <https://www.britannica.com/place/Cambodia/Civil-war>. Last access April 30, 2023.

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ Supra note 22.

²⁹ Supra note 22.

³⁰ Phnom Penh Post, "Russia remains an indispensable partner of Cambodia and ASEAN," Phnom Penh Post, <https://www.phnompenhpost.com/opinion/russia-remains-indispensable-partner-cambodia-and-asean>. Last access April 21, 2023.

Nonetheless, with the outbreak of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the relations between Cambodia and Russia seem to be unstable as Cambodia had voted and supported its stance on Ukraine.³¹ However, it is not an obstacle for Cambodia and Russia to maintain their strong ties. In order to have a more fruitful relationship, Russia has numerous bilateral and multilateral corporations and agreements with Cambodia. Therefore, the relations between both countries for a very long time indicated that Russia had a deep bond with Cambodia as Russia helped Cambodia in the most difficult time and shared solidarity, prosperity, and stability with Cambodia. Both countries had relations with each other for a long time and shared the meaning of history together.³²

1.1.2. Cambodia's Relations with Ukraine

Cambodia and Ukraine established diplomatic relations on 23 April 1992.³³ Even though both countries have far geographical and historical ties, both countries still maintain friendly relations with each other. Furthermore, backing in the past, regarding the political relations of Cambodia with Ukraine, there was no top-level engagement or contact with each other, but only the interaction of the representatives at the United Nations and ASEAN secretariat from both countries.³⁴ Other than that, there was also bilateral cooperation on trade, cultural, and humanitarian. Also, Ukraine provided the scholarship to the students of Cambodia in the 1980s too and is still doing so up to the current time.³⁵

Besides, as the war broke out in Ukraine because of the invasion from Russia, the ongoing war made Cambodia and Ukraine have a strong relationship. As the reason for the

³¹ Strangio Sebastian, "How Has the Russia-Ukraine War Impacted Cambodia's Foreign Policy?" The Diplomat, <https://the-diplomat.com/2022/12/how-has-the-russia-ukraine-war-impacted-cambodias-foreign-policy/>. Last access June 5, 2023.

³² Supra note 2.

³³ MFAIC, "Indo-Pacific | Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine," Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, <https://mfa.gov.ua/en/about-ukraine/bilateral-cooperation/asia-and-oceania-countries>. Last access April 23, 2023.

³⁴ Supra note 29.

³⁵ MFAIC, "Telephone conversation between Samdech Akka Moha Sena Padei Techo HUN SEN, Prime Minister of the Kingdom of Cambodia and His Excellency Volodymyr Zelensky, President of Ukraine, 01 November 2022," Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, <https://www.mfaic.gov.kh/posts/2022-11-02-Press-Release-Telephone-conversation-between-Samdech-Akka-Moha-Sena-Padei-Techo-HUN-SEN--Prime-Minister-of-the-Kin-08-30-26>. Last access April 23, 2023.

war, Cambodia has shown its regret and sympathy towards Ukraine as the war emerged, in which many people suffered, died, and had serious damage to infrastructures.³⁶ Additionally, according to the Khmer Times had an interview with Mr. Dmytro Kuleba, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine on Friday 2022, he also mentioned that Ukraine is working on the establishment of an embassy in Cambodia and vice versa, which indicate that Ukraine and Cambodia would be strengthening their relations stronger and more convenience in the future.³⁷ In his interview, he also mentioned building business relations, improving trade and political conduct between each other, and sharing the experience of the country that has digitalization too.³⁸ Therefore, the relations between Cambodia and Ukraine would be more developed, and there might be more interaction and connection of relations between Cambodia and Ukraine in numerous fields, mainly related to facilitating trade and political relations.

Furthermore, according to the press release from the MFAIC, the Prime Minister of Cambodia made the first phone call with Ukraine's President, H.E. Volodymyr Zelenskyy on the 1st of November, he conveyed and expressed his sympathy and concern with Ukraine as Cambodia also went through and suffered from the war too.³⁹ Additionally, during the phone call, Cambodia's Prime Minister offered the deminers to help train Ukraine's deminers as there were many mines that were caused by the war for the humanitarian mission.⁴⁰ In addition to this, the Ukrainian deminers are trained by Cambodian deminers at Mine Action Technical Institutes, which is hosted by the Cambodian Mine Center in cooperation with Japan.⁴¹ According to the press release from MFAIC on 29th of May, there was the second phone call

³⁶ Supra note 23.

³⁷ Khmer Times, "Big boost for Ukraine-Cambodia ties," Khmer Times, <https://www.khmertimeskh.com/501183944/big-boost-for-ukraine-cambodia-ties/>. Last access April 24, 2023.

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ Supra note 31.

⁴⁰ Sopheng Cheang, "Cambodian experts begin training Ukrainian deminers," AP News, <https://apnews.com/article/politics-ukraine-government-cambodia-land-mines-3a2f95a038e5d9ceb3a3d54e5b383bf5>. Last access May 31, 2023.

⁴¹ Supra note 26.

between Cambodia's Prime Minister and Ukraine's President on 29th of May regarding the expressed appreciation of Cambodia's support, position on the war, and Co-sponsorship of the United Nations General Assembly's Resolutions.⁴² Along with this, Ukraine's President thanked Cambodia for helping train Ukraine's deminers last January.⁴³ Also, Ukraine's President stated that he hopes the cooperation of Cambodia's experts to train Ukraine deminers will continue.⁴⁴

1.2. Cambodia's Independent Rule-Based Foreign Policy Toward Russia-Ukraine War

The war between Russia and Ukraine is a hot issue that many states are trying to resolve. In addition, Cambodia is one of the countries that also plays a significant role to help reduce the tension of the war and find solutions to make the war end by trying to support peaceful negotiation.⁴⁵ Furthermore, Cambodia also uses its foreign policy, which we call **"Rule-based Foreign Policy"** to address the opposition to the Russian invasion of Ukraine. For instance, as Russia invaded Ukraine, Cambodia's Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, H.E. Prak Sokhonn used the rule-based foreign policy to oppose Russian aggression towards Ukraine. Additionally, in February 2023, the MFAIC posted a press release that was emphasized by H.E. Prak Sokhonn, which stated that **"Cambodia continues to pursue an independent rule-based foreign policy that upholds its core interests, guarantees sovereignty and peace, and boosts economic ties,"**⁴⁶

⁴² Supra note 31.

⁴³ Fresh News Asia, "Ukrainian President Zelenskyy Thanks Cambodia's Humanitarian Assistance in Helping Train Ukraine's Deminers," Fresh News Asia, <https://m.en.freshnewsasia.com/index.php/en/localnews/36728-2023-05-29-14-35-01.html>. Last access June 4, 2023.

⁴⁴ Chandara Samban, "Ukraine's Zelenskyy grateful to Kingdom," Phnom Penh Post, <https://m.phnompenhpost.com/national-politics/ukraines-zelenskyy-grateful-kingdom>. Last access June 4, 2023.

⁴⁵ Soth Koemsoeun, "Politics of war: Cambodia does not take sides in Ukraine-Russia conflict," Khmer Times, <https://www.khmertimeskh.com/501034687/politics-of-war-cambodia-does-not-take-sides-in-ukraine-russia-conflict/>. Last access June 5, 2023.

⁴⁶ MFAIC, "Cambodia continues to pursue an independent rule-based foreign policy that upholds its core interests, guarantees sovereignty and peace, and boosts economic ties," Emphasized Deputy Prime Minister Prak Sokhonn," Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, <https://www.mfaic.gov.kh/posts/2023-02-01-Press-Release--Cambodia->

On the other hand, as the war between Russia and Ukraine has emerged, Cambodia has its own foreign policy called “**The 7-Points of Cambodia Foreign Policy**”. Those 7 points containing Cambodia:

1. **DOES NOT support the use of force or the threat of the use of force in international relations:** According to Prime Minister Hun Sen, Cambodia denies the use of force or threats of force and refuses to back any of the parties involved in the crisis in both Ukraine and Russia. He also stressed that “If we show support to any side, we’d be pouring petrol on the fire.”⁴⁷ Cambodia is a small country that used to be invaded by neighboring countries. But we have never been in a position to invade others, so Cambodia will not accept an invasion of any nation by a powerful aggressor”.⁴⁸ He added that “The decision not to condemn or side with any party is coming from a position of not wanting to see conflict. We don’t want to see war or invasion by a big country on a smaller one.”⁴⁹
2. **DOES NOT support the aggression against independent-sovereign states:** Cambodia has reiterated its position on the conflict between Russia and Ukraine and informed Ukraine that it disagrees with aggression against sovereign states. According to Prime Minister Hun Sen, he stated that “Cambodia has been through war and been invaded,” and “Cambodia understands the feelings of the Ukrainian people. Cambodia's position on the

[continues-to-pursue-an-independent-rule-based-foreign-policy-that-upholds-its-core-interes-18-12-32](#). Last access April 19, 2023.

⁴⁷ Sochan Ry, “Kingdom rejects meddling in Ukraine 'proxy war': PM,” Phnom Penh Post, <https://www.phnompenhpost.com/national-politics/kingdom-rejects-meddling-ukraine-proxy-war-pm>. Last access June 5, 2023.

⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹ Supra note 43.

war in Ukraine is to adhere to and respect the principles enshrined in the UN Charter and international law.”⁵⁰

3. **DOES NOT support secession or separatist movements:** Following Russia's invasion of Ukraine on February 24th, Cambodia's Prime Minister Hun Sen said that the kingdom refuses to endorse war. He additionally stated that Cambodia does not support separatism, which is perhaps a reference to Russia's recognition of two self-declared states in Ukraine's Donbas on February 21st. He added that “Our stance from beginning to end is not to support the use of force from one side to the other. This is our official stance. This is what we want, which I have spoken about at the United Nations and other international programs”.⁵¹
4. **DOES NOT support the annexation of a sovereign state:** Cambodia preserves its stance of opposing the annexation of a country's territory and the use of force to achieve it, Prime Minister Hun Sen stated on October 1st, only hours after Moscow declared the inclusion of four Ukrainian areas. Hun Sen stated that when the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation requested guidance on the issue, he highlighted Cambodia's position: the country rejects the Russian action and opposes carving a country's territory to create a state as well as the use of force or the threat of force against a nation.⁵²
5. **DOES NOT interfere or support any activity that interferes with the internal affairs of other countries:** Regarding the Cambodian Foreign

⁵⁰ Yalirozy Teng, “Cambodia Stands by Ukraine Support,” Cambodianess, <https://cambodianess.com/article/cambodia-stands-by-ukraine-support>. Last access June 5, 2023.

⁵¹ Yalirozy Teng, “PM Hun Sen Weighs in on Russian Invasion of Ukraine, Does Not Support War or Separatism,” Cambodianess, <https://cambodianess.com/article/pm-hun-sen-weighs-in-on-russian-invasion-of-ukraine-does-not-support-war-or-separatism>. Last access June 5, 2023.

⁵² Cambodianess, “Cambodia Stands against Russian Annexation of Ukraine's Regions,” Cambodianess, <https://cambodianess.com/article/cambodia-stands-against-russian-annexation-of-ukraines-regions>. Last access June 5, 2023.

Minister, H.E. Prak Sokhonn promoted both broad human rights implementation and respect for each country's sovereignty. He added that “Human rights must be understood and approached in a holistic manner without double standards, with due respect to national sovereignty and the principle of non-interference,”⁵³

6. DOES NOT allow the existence of any foreign military base in Cambodia:

Cambodia is against allowing any foreign soldiers, including the Chinese military, to be stationed on its land. Prime Minister Hun Sen stated in his most recent reaction to a recent US charge that “I would like to stress [again] that no foreign troops, Chinese or not, are allowed to be present on Cambodian soil”. He reiterated that “the constitution prohibits any foreign country from constructing a military base or establishing a military presence within Cambodian territory.”⁵⁴

7. DOES NOT side with any country or group against another country or

group: In fact, Cambodia has made it visible in the dispute between Ukraine and Russia that it believes solely in a consultative process to settle the situation and that it would not be taking sides in a war that is being **"Europeanized"** given the EU's significant participation.⁵⁵

As Russia invaded Ukraine, Cambodia did not stand still but also condemned Russia's aggressive invasion of Ukraine.⁵⁶ However, before Cambodia made an act at the first stage of the war, it was assumed that Cambodia was likely to restrain any vote on Russia's invasion of

⁵³ Sarath Sorn, “Cambodian Foreign Minister insists non-interference, in the name of human rights,” *CamboJA News*, <https://cambojanews.com/cambodian-foreign-minister-insists-non-interference-in-the-name-of-human-rights/>. Last access June 5, 2023.

⁵⁴ *Cambodianess*, “Hun Sen says no to Chinese military base in Cambodia,” *Cambodianess*, <https://cambodianess.com/article/hun-sen-says-no-to-chinese-military-base-in-cambodia>. Last access June 5, 2023.

⁵⁵ *Supra* note 41.

⁵⁶ ChanThul & Kanupriya, “Cambodia PM condemns Russian invasion of Ukraine,” *Reuters*, <https://www.reuters.com/world/cambodia-pm-condemns-russian-invasion-ukraine-2022-03-28/>. Last access June 4, 2023.

Ukraine as Cambodia had a deep long history of relations with Russia.⁵⁷ Consequently, Cambodia does not act as the assumption, but the Cambodian government shows a solid commitment to condemn Russia's invasion of its neighbor and support Ukraine. As the actual, Cambodia co-sponsored a UN General Assembly resolution condemning Russia and also voted in support of other General Assembly resolutions condemning Russia's conquest of the territory of Ukraine.⁵⁸ Cambodia had Co-sponsorship the Resolution at the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) along with other states and those resolutions are:

- On 2nd of March 2022, Cambodia had Co-sponsorship the resolution **A/ES-11/L.1** on the “**Aggression against Ukraine**” deploring Russia's attack on Ukraine as well as calling for its withdrawal.⁵⁹ According to the Khmer Times, Cambodia added its voice with 140 other countries on this resolution that aimed to put pressure on Russia and cease its use of force against Ukraine, while also withdrawing all the military forces from Ukraine.⁶⁰
- On 24th of March 2022, Cambodia had Co-sponsorship the resolution **A/ES-11/L.2** on the “**Humanitarian Consequences of the Aggression against Ukraine**”.⁶¹ In this resolution, it stated about the grave concern about the humanitarian situation in Ukraine and the civilization, who suffer and effect by the war and the humanitarian consequence of the hostility by the Russians toward Ukraine.⁶²

⁵⁷ Strangio Sebastian, “How Has the Russia-Ukraine War Impacted Cambodia's Foreign Policy?” The Diplomat, <https://the-diplomat.com/2022/12/how-has-the-russia-ukraine-war-impacted-cambodias-foreign-policy/>. Last access May 28, 2023.

⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁹ UNGA, “Aggression against Ukraine,” United Nations General Assembly, <https://undocs.org/A/ES-11/L.1>. Last access June 5, 2023.

⁶⁰ Khmer Times, “Cambodia votes for UN resolution to condemn Russia's invasion of Ukraine,” Khmer Times, <https://www.khmertimeskh.com/501035194/cambodia-votes-for-un-resolution-to-condemn-russias-invasion-of-ukraine/>. Last access June 5, 2023.

⁶¹ UNGA, “Humanitarian Consequences of the Aggression against Ukraine,” United Nations General Assembly, <https://undocs.org/A/RES/ES-11/2>. Last access June 5, 2023.

⁶² Supra note 49.

- And on the 12th of October 2022, Cambodia had Co-sponsorship the resolution **A/ES-11/L.5** on the “**Territorial Integrity of Ukraine: Defending the Principles of the UN Charter**”.⁶³ Under this resolution, it affirms its commitment to the sovereignty, independence, unity, and integrity of Ukraine and demands Russia to immediately and unconditionally reverse its decision related to the areas, which are the regions of Ukraine that Russia invaded that it violated the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Ukraine and consistent with the principle of the United Nations Charter.⁶⁴

Not only Cambodia had Co-sponsorship on the Resolution at the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), but Cambodia also voted at the UNGA too regarding Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Cambodia had voted to abstain two times and a vote to support at the UNGA:

- The first vote of Cambodia to abstain was on the 6th of April 2022 on the Resolution **A/ES-11/L.4** at the UNGA on the “**Suspension of the rights of membership of the Russian Federation in the Human Rights Council**”.⁶⁵ According to The Phnom Penh Post, Cambodia was one the 58 countries who abstained from suspending Russia from the Human Rights Council and as the explanation from Cambodian ambassador to the United Nations, H.E. Ke Sovann, stated that the Resolution was based on the United Nations Charter and International Law that makes it easier to find the right path to focus on to

⁶³ UNGA, “Territorial Integrity of Ukraine: Defending the Principles of the UN Charter,” United Nations General Assembly, <https://undocs.org/A/ES-11/L.5>. Last access June 5, 2023.

⁶⁴ Supra note 51.

⁶⁵ UNGA, “Suspension of the rights of membership of the Russian Federation in the Human Rights Council,” United Nations General Assembly, <https://undocs.org/A/ES-11/L.4>. Last access June 5, 2023.

end human suffering so Cambodia decided to abstain from voting on the resolution.⁶⁶

- And The second Abstain was on 14th of November 2022 on the Resolution **A/ES-11/L.6** on the “**Furtherance of Remedy and Reparation for Aggression against Ukraine**”.⁶⁷
- Cambodia also voted to Support at the UNGA on 23rd of February 2023 on the Resolution **A/ES-11/L.7** on the “**Principles of the Charter of UN underlying a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in Ukraine**”.⁶⁸ This resolution was about recalling the purposes and principles that are enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations and the importance of reaching peace as soon as possible, a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in Ukraine.⁶⁹

As Cambodia chaired the ASEAN Summit, Cambodia and all ASEAN member states even echoed calls for Russia to ceasefire immediately. Additionally, according to the press releases of the MFAIC, Deputy Prime Minister **Prak Sokhonn** emphasized, “Cambodia will continue to pursue an independent rule-based foreign policy that upholds its core interests, guarantees sovereignty and peace, and boosts economic ties.”⁷⁰ Moreover, Cambodia has affirmed the neutrality that is already enshrined in their foreign policy in order to resolve the matter and the government of Cambodia still expresses the strong will to cooperate to deal with the issue of the war.⁷¹ The primary thing that was expressed by Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen is that Cambodia does not take sides with any state or anyone, however, it

⁶⁶ Ry Sochan, “Cambodia abstains from Russian UN human rights vote,” The Phnom Penh Post, <https://m.phnompenhpost.com/national-politics/cambodia-abstains-russian-un-human-rights-vote>. Last access June 5, 2023.

⁶⁷ UNGA, “Furtherance of Remedy and Reparation for Aggression against Ukraine,” United Nation General Assembly, <https://undocs.org/A/ES-11/L.6>. Last access June 5, 2023.

⁶⁸ UNGA, “Principles of the Charter of UN underlying a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in Ukraine,” United Nations General Assembly, <https://undocs.org/A/ES-11/L.7>. Last access June 5, 2023.

⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁰ Supra note 65.

⁷¹ Cambodianess, “Russia-Ukraine War Tests Cambodian Neutrality,” Cambodianess, <https://cambodianess.com/article/-russia-ukraine-war-tests-cambodian-neutrality>. Last access May 29, 2023.

does not mean Cambodia will not work with anyone.⁷² Apart from this, it indicates that Cambodia does not neglect the Russian aggression on Ukraine, so Cambodia stands with the international community and it also stands neutral with peace as stipulated in the foreign policy that Cambodia has used.⁷³ Cambodia opposes any state that invades or is aggressive on another state's sovereignty or independent state.⁷⁴ Threats of use or the use of nuclear weapons are the most perilous scenario that many states and international organizations fear and it is the biggest concern.⁷⁵ It is, ultimately, a zero-sum game for the whole world.

Noticeably, the rule-based foreign policy plays a significant role to help Cambodia maintain its balance under the context of the war that is happening in Ukraine. This foreign policy reflects how Cambodia does not bias or align with any parties to the war and proves that Cambodia will continue to persuade the policy. It is a foreign policy that does not lean on anyone or any state that violates international law and invades an independent state's sovereignty. Therefore, the rule-based foreign policy that Cambodia obeyed and used towards both Russia and Ukraine is the correct thing to do. No matter how Cambodia had strong relations with Russia or Ukraine, as Cambodia firmly followed the rule-based foreign policy, Cambodia would stand on the accuracy that brought the stability of peace.

⁷² Ibid.

⁷³ Nika, "Cambodia Re-emphasises Clear Stance over War in Ukraine," Ministry of Information, <https://www.information.gov.kh/articles/93756>. Last access June 5, 2023.

⁷⁴ Yalirozy Teng, "Cambodia Stands by Ukraine Support," Cambodianess, <https://cambodianess.com/article/cambodia-stands-by-ukraine-support>. Last access May 31, 2023.

⁷⁵ Williams Heather, "Deterring Nuclear Weapons Use in Ukraine," CSIS, <https://www.csis.org/analysis/deterring-nuclear-weapons-use-ukraine>. Last access June 5, 2023.

CHAPTER 2. SIGNIFICANT TIMELINES OF THE RUSSIA AND UKRAINE CONFLICTS

2.1. The Root Cause of the Conflict

The root cause of the war between Russia and Ukraine is the primary thing that needs to focus on. The origin of the prolonged war with Russia-Ukraine started in early 2014.⁷⁶ Furthermore, during that year, Russia illegally annexed Crimea, which is part of Ukraine's territory.⁷⁷

In the first quarter of 2014, a wave of pro-EU protests known as Euromaidan⁷⁸ spread all over Ukraine in the fall and winter of 2013 till 2014 as a result of Viktor Yanukovich, the country's president at the time, refusing to sign the association agreement between the EU and Ukraine.⁷⁹ The Euromaidan or the Mandan Uprising had been an outbreak of protests and chaos in Ukraine that started on November 21 with large-scale demonstrations at Kyiv.⁸⁰ The protests erupted in response to President Viktor Yanukovich's immediate refusal to consent to the European Union Ukraine Association Agreement⁸¹, instead opting for deeper relations with Russia and the Eurasian Economic Union.⁸² Ukraine's parliament had largely accepted the agreement with the EU's finalization, but Russia had placed pressure on Ukraine to disapprove of it.⁸³ The breadth of the protests expanded, with calls for Yanukovich and the

⁷⁶ Council on Foreign Relations, "War in Ukraine | Global Conflict Tracker," Council on Foreign Relations, <https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/conflict-ukraine>. Last access June 10, 2023.

⁷⁷ Holly Ellyatt, "Russia took Crimea from Ukraine in 2014. Now, Kyiv is fighting back," CNBC, <https://www.cnbc.com/2022/08/18/russia-took-crimea-from-ukraine-in-2014-now-kyiv-is-fighting-back.html>. Last access June 10, 2023.

⁷⁸ Encyclopedia Britannica, "Ukraine - Maidan Nezalezhnosti, Anti-protest Measures, and EU Sanctions," Encyclopedia Britannica, <https://www.britannica.com/place/Ukraine/The-Maidan-protest-movement>. Last access June 15, 2023.

⁷⁹ Ośrodek Studiów Wschodnich, "Ukraine withdraws from signing the Association Agreement in Vilnius: The motives and implications," Ośrodek Studiów Wschodnich, <https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2013-11-27/ukraine-withdraws-signing-association-agreement-vilnius-motives-and>. Last access June 14, 2023.

⁸⁰ The Kyiv Independent, "EuroMaidan Revolution," The Kyiv Independent, <https://kyivindependent.com/euro-maidan-revolution/>. Last access June 15, 2023.

⁸¹ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, "Ukraine-EU Association Agreement," Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, <https://mfa.gov.ua/en/about-ukraine/european-integration/eu-ukraine-association-agreement>. Last access June 16, 2023.

⁸² BBC, "Ukraine protests after Yanukovich EU deal rejection," BBC, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-25162563>. Last access June 15, 2023.

⁸³ European Parliament, "Texts adopted - EU Association Agreement with Ukraine," European Parliament, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-9-2021-0050_EN.html. Last access June 14, 2023.

Azarov administration to quit.⁸⁴ Opponents condemned systemic government corruption, misuse of power, human rights abuses, and privileged dominance.⁸⁵ This failure to sign the agreement had its origins in the post–Cold War world.⁸⁶ In eastern and southern Ukraine, pro-Russian rebellions took place to attack and took over.⁸⁷ At the same time, unannounced Russian forces entered the Ukrainian province of Crimea and occupied its infrastructure, key locations, and government facilities.⁸⁸ Following an extremely contentious referendum, Russia swiftly conquered Crimea.⁸⁹

In April 2014, armed pro-Russian separatists seized government buildings in Ukraine's eastern Donbas region and proclaimed the Donetsk People's Republic (DPR)⁹⁰ and Luhansk People's Republic (LPR)⁹¹ as independent states, starting the Donbas war between armed pro-Russian separatists and Ukrainian government forces.⁹² The separatists received considerable but covert support from Russia, and Ukrainian attempts to fully retake separatist-held areas failed.⁹³ With soldiers and weapons, Russia secretly provided backing for the rebels.⁹⁴ Only “military specialists” were reported to have been sent, but then it was revealed that the rebels

⁸⁴ Korshak Stefan, “Yanukovich accepts Azarov's resignation; other disputes remain (live updates),” Kyiv Post, <https://www.kyivpost.com/post/10852>. Last access June 14, 2023.

⁸⁵ Robertson Graeme, “Analysis Ukrainians are protesting corruption and using a new approach. Here's how it works,” The Washington Post, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2018/01/05/ukrainians-are-protesting-corruption-and-using-a-new-approach-heres-how-it-works/>. Last access June 15, 2023.

⁸⁶ Outlook India, “Roots Of The War: A Peek Into Russia-Ukraine Conflict,” Outlook India, <https://www.outlookindia.com/international/roots-of-the-war-a-peek-into-russo-ukraine-conflict-news-245495>. Last access June 15, 2023.

⁸⁷ Hutchinson Bill, “What are the Ukraine 'separatist' regions at the crux of the Russian invasion,” ABC News, <https://abcnews.go.com/International/ukraine-separatist-regions-crux-russian-invasion/story?id=83084803>. Last access June 15, 2023.

⁸⁸ State Department, “2022 Report on International Religious Freedom: Russia-Occupied Territories of Ukraine,” State Department, <https://www.state.gov/reports/2022-report-on-international-religious-freedom/ukraine/russia-occupied-territories-of-ukraine/>. Last access June 15, 2023.

⁸⁹ McCarthy Cormac, “Ukraine war: Russia claims win in occupied Ukraine 'sham' referendums,” BBC, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-63052207>. Last access June 15, 2023.

⁹⁰ Russia's federal constituent entities, “Donetsk People's Republic,” Russia's federal constituent entities, <http://www.council.gov.ru/en/structure/regions/X2/>. Last access June 15, 2023.

⁹¹ Russia's federal constituent entities, “Federation Council of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation,” Russia's federal constituent entities, <http://council.gov.ru/en/structure/regions/X1/>. Last access June 16, 2023.

⁹² Business Insider, “Pro-Russian Separatists in Ukraine Seize Government Buildings, Demand Russian Intervention,” Business Insider, <https://www.businessinsider.com/pro-russian-separatists-in-ukraine-seize-government-buildings-demand-russian-intervention-2014-4>. Last access June 15, 2023.

⁹³ Jozwiak Rikard and Ardeshir Tayebi, “Ukraine Says It Retook Two Villages As Counteroffensive Gathers Steam,” Radio Free Europe, <https://www.rferl.org/a/ukraine-heavy-fighting-russia-donbas-counteroffensive/32454060.html>. Last access June 15, 2023.

⁹⁴ ISACHENKOV VLADIMIR, “EXPLAINER: Russia-backed rebels a thorn in Ukraine's side,” AP News, <https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-europe-russia-moscow-061c1ea46ad98716b8da01eb8b967da2>. Last access June 15, 2023.

were former Russian combatants.⁹⁵ Ukraine was launching an counteroffensive that was so called “**Anti-Terrorist Operation**”⁹⁶ to have virtually stabilized control of the Russia-Ukraine border and reclaimed the majority of the region held by separatists.⁹⁷

President Vladimir Putin began to work on "returning Crimea to Russia" after Yanukovich resigned, seeing it as an opportunity.⁹⁸ A series of large-scale pro-Russian protests also erupted after Yanukovich left.⁹⁹ In February 27th, Russian forces invaded Crimea, seizing key locations, and put in place the pro-Russian Aksyonov regime.¹⁰⁰ In March 18th 2014, Crimea was legally absorbed into Russia and paramilitaries supported by Russia also took control of a portion of eastern Ukraine's Donbas area.¹⁰¹ Donetsk and Luhansk make up the area in which the Minsk Accords led to some degree of regional autonomy.¹⁰²

Beginning on February 22nd and 23rd, Russian soldiers and special troops started into Crimea via Novorossiysk.¹⁰³ In February 27th, the Russian military without emblems began moving into the Crimea Region.¹⁰⁴ They adopted tactical positions and conquered the

⁹⁵ Sauer Pjotr, “Former Russian soldier reveals he saw Ukrainian prisoners of war tortured,” The Guardian, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/feb/02/former-russian-soldier-reveals-witnessed-torture-ukrainian-prisoners-war>. Last access June 15, 2023.

⁹⁶ STATE MIGRATION SERVICE OF UKRAINE, “Information for foreigners who participate in the Anti-Terrorist Operation,” STATE MIGRATION SERVICE OF UKRAINE, <https://dmsu.gov.ua/en-home/services/information-for-foreigners-who-participate-in-the-anti-terrorist-operation.html>. Last access June 15, 2023.

⁹⁷ Erlanger Steven, “As Ukraine Launches Counteroffensive, Definitions of 'Success' Vary,” The New York Times <https://www.nytimes.com/2023/06/10/us/politics/ukraine-counteroffensive-russia.html>. , Last access June 15, 2023.

⁹⁸ Clinton Jane, “Why did Russia annex Crimea? What happened when Putin invaded in 2014 and how NATO reacted,” iNews, <https://inews.co.uk/news/world/russia-annex-crimea-why-putin-invaded-2014-what-happened-nato-annexation-explained-1424682>. Last access June 15, 2023.

⁹⁹ Miller Greg and Viktor Medvedchuk, “FSB errors played crucial role in Russia's failed war plans in Ukraine,” The Washington Post, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/interactive/2022/russia-fsb-intelligence-ukraine-war/>. Last access June 15, 2023.

¹⁰⁰ Minicozzi Lucy, “Russia's annexation of Crimea,” The Kyiv Independent, <https://kyivindependent.com/russias-annexation-of-crimea/>. Last access June 15, 2023.

¹⁰¹ Horncastle James & Simon Fraser, “Paramilitaries in the Russia-Ukraine war could escalate and expand the conflict,” The Conversation, <https://theconversation.com/paramilitaries-in-the-russia-ukraine-war-could-escalate-and-expand-the-conflict-206441>. Last access June 15, 2023.

¹⁰² ABDELKHALEK OSAMA M., “Minsk Accords Have Been in 'Intensive Care', Secretary-General Notes, as General Assembly Discusses Eastern Ukraine Developments,” UN Press, <https://press.un.org/en/2022/ga12403.doc.htm>. Last access June 15, 2023.

¹⁰³ Stefan Canda, “Novorossiysk, Russia Sevastopol, Crimea,” The Black Sea, <https://theblacksea.eu/blogs/novorossiysk-russia-sevastopol-crimea/>. Last access June 15, 2023.

¹⁰⁴ Human Rights Watch, “Ukraine: Apparent War Crimes in Russia-Controlled Areas,” Human Rights Watch, <https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/04/03/ukraine-apparent-war-crimes-russia-controlled-areas>. Last access June 15, 2023.

Crimean legislative body, erecting a Russian flag in the process.¹⁰⁵ The movement of people inside the region was limited and the peninsula of Crimea was separated from the rest of Ukraine by border controls.¹⁰⁶

Russia invaded Ukraine and started in February 24th, after starting its aggression on Ukraine in full from Minsk to toward the north,¹⁰⁷ the Crimean Peninsula that it has acquired to the south, and its own land to the east.¹⁰⁸ Russian President Vladimir Putin, though, defined it as an exceptional military operation with the objective of "**denazifying**" and "**demilitarizing**" Ukraine.¹⁰⁹

On the other hand, the other root causes which are the reasons that made Russia invaded on Ukraine are regarding the Russia wanted to capture the region in Ukraine, Donbas, and advance itself to be powerful the same as it used to be in the Soviet Era¹¹⁰ and its own security from NATO.¹¹¹ First, it is about reunification with Ukraine. Additionally, the reunite that Russia wanted to be followed the Minsk agreements, which is the agreement that was signed in 2014-2015 that tended to secure the ceasefire between the Ukrainian government with Russian-backed separatists in the east of Ukraine.¹¹² However, the agreement failed.¹¹³

¹⁰⁵ Cosgrove Jonathon, "The Russian Invasion of the Crimean Peninsula, 2014–2015: A Post–Cold War Nuclear Crisis Case Study," Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory, <https://www.jhuapl.edu/sites/default/files/2022-12/RussianInvasionCrimeanPeninsula.pdf>. Last access June 15, 2023.

¹⁰⁶ Kramer Mark, "Why Did Russia Give Away Crimea Sixty Years Ago?" Wilson Center, <https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/why-did-russia-give-away-crimea-sixty-years-ago>. Last access June 15, 2023.

¹⁰⁷ EEAS, "February 24 2023: Russia's unprovoked and unjustified full-scale invasion and war in Ukraine one year later," EEAS, https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/trinidad-and-tobago/february-24-2023-russias-unprovoked-and-unjustified-full-scale_in?s=156. Last access June 15, 2023.

¹⁰⁸ Kirby Paul, "Donbas: Why Russia is trying to capture eastern Ukraine," BBC, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-60938544>. Last access June 15, 2023.

¹⁰⁹ Albats Y., Marika S., and Mikhail G., "Six Months of War: What Putin Wanted; What Putin Got," The Moscow Times, <https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2022/09/01/six-months-of-war-what-putin-wanted-what-putin-got-a78699>. Last access June 15, 2023.

¹¹⁰ Wilkinson Tracy, "Why is Russia's Vladimir Putin so obsessed with invading Ukraine?" Los Angeles Times, <https://www.latimes.com/politics/story/2022-02-24/why-is-russias-vladimir-putin-so-obsessed-with-ukraine-invasion>. Last access June 16, 2023.

¹¹¹ Klvaňa Tomáš and Cathy Young, "The Real Reasons Putin Feels Threatened by NATO," The Bulwark, <https://www.thebulwark.com/the-real-reasons-putin-feels-threatened-by-nato/>. Last access June 16, 2023.

¹¹² Haynes Deborah, "Ukraine crisis: What are the Minsk agreements and how Putin has been accused of ending the process," Sky News, <https://news.sky.com/story/ukraine-crisis-what-are-the-minsk-agreements-and-why-they-could-help-avert-a-russian-invasion-12541427>. Last access June 16, 2023.

¹¹³ Powirska Lidia, "Through the Ashes of the Minsk Agreements," Epicenter, <https://epicenter.wcfia.harvard.edu/blog/through-ashes-minsk-agreements>. Last access June 16, 2023.

Second, it is about the protection of its security. In addition, before the war happened, Ukraine desired to join NATO as a member of it,¹¹⁴ however, it was not yet decided by NATO and its alliances.¹¹⁵ Besides, Russian President Putin, also used to warn Ukraine over Ukraine wanting to join NATO many times and clearly stated that there might be a World War III breakout if NATO allowed Ukraine to join as a member.¹¹⁶ In short, it was related to the “red line” of NATO in Ukraine that Russia has drawn,¹¹⁷ which provided military weapons to help Ukraine.

On the other hand, on 21st February 2022, Russia officially declared the DPR and LPR as separate governments and deployed armed forces to those territories.¹¹⁸ President Vladimir Putin then declared a "special military operation" in Ukraine and sharply invaded the Ukraine's territories.¹¹⁹ The invasion was denounced on a global scale, and several nations intensified their already-existing sanctions against Russia.¹²⁰ In a significant escalation of the Russo-Ukrainian War, which had started in 2014, Russia attacked and seized portions of Ukraine's territory.¹²¹ Numerous thousands of people have died as a result of the invasion, which has also caused the worst refugee crisis in Europe since World War II.¹²² By June, around 8 million Ukrainians had been internally displaced, and by May 2023, more than 8.2

¹¹⁴ Greaney Alec, “Ukraine Wanted to Join NATO's Alliance for Years. What Stopped It?” NBC Chicago, <https://www.nbcchicago.com/news/national-international/ukraine-wanted-to-join-natos-alliance-for-years-what-stopped-it/2813488/>. Last access June 16, 2023.

¹¹⁵ Jakes Lara, “NATO Won't Let Ukraine Join Soon. Here's Why,” The New York Times, <https://www.nytimes.com/2022/01/13/us/politics/nato-ukraine.html>. Last access June 16, 2023.

¹¹⁶ Faulconbridge Guy and Lidia Kelly, “Russian official warns of World War Three if Ukraine joins NATO,” Reuters, <https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/admission-ukraine-nato-can-lead-third-world-war-russian-official-2022-10-13/>. Last access June 16, 2023.

¹¹⁷ Soldatkin Vladimir and Andrew Osborn, “Putin warns Russia will act if NATO crosses its red lines in Ukraine,” Reuters, <https://www.reuters.com/markets/stocks/putin-warns-russia-will-act-if-nato-crosses-its-red-lines-ukraine-2021-11-30/>. Last access June 16, 2023.

¹¹⁸ DW, “Russia recognizes independence of Ukraine separatist regions,” DW, <https://www.dw.com/en/russia-recognizes-independence-of-ukraine-separatist-regions/a-60861963>. Last access June 15, 2023.

¹¹⁹ Kirby Paul, “Has Putin's war failed and what does Russia want from Ukraine?” BBC, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-56720589>. Last access June 15, 2023.

¹²⁰ NATO, “NATO's response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine,” NATO, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_192648.htm. Last access June 15, 2023.

¹²¹ Jenkins Michael, “Consequences of the War in Ukraine: Escalation,” RAND Corporation, <https://www.rand.org/blog/2023/02/consequences-of-the-war-in-ukraine-escalation.html>. Last access June 15, 2023.

¹²² Campbell Heidi, Paul B. Raushenbush, and Diana Roy, “The Russia-Ukraine War: How Bad Is the Humanitarian Crisis?” Council on Foreign Relations, <https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/ukraine-humanitarian-crisis-refugees-aid>. Last access June 15, 2023.

million had left the country for abroad.¹²³ In the face of ferocious opposition, Russia abandoned its effort to seize Kyiv in early April 2022.¹²⁴ Due to counter-offensives, Ukrainian forces started retaking northeastern and southern regions in August.¹²⁵ Russia annexed four partially besieged regions in southern and eastern Ukraine in late September, a move that went undetected by the rest of the world.¹²⁶

2.2. The Launch of Russia's Military Intervention in Ukraine

The emergence of Russia invaded Ukraine was in February, 2022.¹²⁷ Russia began to launch a “**special military operation**” (“SMO”)¹²⁸, which was formed as a way to set up the political and military of Russia to control over all or most of the territory of Ukraine.¹²⁹ Additionally, on 24th of February 2022, after Russia’s President, Vladimir Putin made his announcement of his decision to invade Ukraine, the war seriously began.¹³⁰ Below are briefing timelines of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine territory in 2022 month by month.

2.2.1. The Beginning of the War (in February)

There were more than 150,000 of Russian troops amassed near the border of Ukraine. On 24th February 2022, the invasion of Russia on Ukraine began, which started from the north, east, and the south of Ukraine territory that was launched under Russia’s President,

¹²³ Operational Data Portal, “Situation Ukraine Refugee Situation,” Operational Data Portal, <https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/Ukraine>. Last access June 15, 2023.

¹²⁴ BURNS ROBERT, “Russia's failure to take down Kyiv was a defeat for the ages,” AP News, <https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-war-battle-for-kyiv-dc559574ce9f6683668fa221af2d5340>. Last access June 16, 2023.

¹²⁵ McNamee Win, “Ukraine launches counteroffensive to retake Russian-occupied Kherson,” Axios, <https://www.axios.com/2022/08/29/Ukraine-launches-kherson-counteroffensive>. Last access June 16, 2023.

¹²⁶ Kirby Paul, “Russia to formally annex four more areas of Ukraine,” BBC, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-63072113>. Last access June 16, 2023.

¹²⁷ The Associated Press, “Key moments in a year of war after Russia invaded Ukraine,” AP News, <https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-war-one-year-anniversary-timeline-a1304c6fb319bf1c0e93635f6f6a2633>. Last access June 9, 2023.

¹²⁸ Stories state gov, “What is a “Special Military Operation,” Stories state gov, <https://stories.state.gov/what-is-a-special-military-operation/>. Last access June 9, 2023.

¹²⁹ Frolov Vladimir, “New Commander, New Goals for Russia in Ukraine,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, <https://carnegieendowment.org/politika/88301>. Last access June 11, 2023.

¹³⁰ Ilyushina Mary, “Putin says ‘war’ aloud instead of ‘special military operation,’” The Washington Post, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/12/22/putin-war-ukraine-special-operation/>. Last access June 11, 2023.

Vladimir Putin.¹³¹ Russia uses “SMO” on Ukraine as an excuse that aims to “demilitarization” and “denazification” of the country in order to protect Russian ethnicity, prevent Ukraine from joining NATO, and to maintain its sphere of influence in Ukraine.¹³² Furthermore, after the speech of Russian President Putin was over, the attack of missiles broke out and poured on Ukraine along with the Russian forces' attack in the country¹³³, which killed dozens of Ukrainians.¹³⁴ In addition, Russia's first step up to hostility occupied in Donbas, which is the region of Ukraine, noticeably they occupied on the eastern Ukraine (Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts) that forced many civilians, who lived there to evacuated¹³⁵ and during the following week, the President of Russia, Vladimir Putin sent its troops there after they recognized those regions as independent states.¹³⁶ Also, the invasion of Russia on Ukraine is the largest military operation in Europe since the end of World War II.¹³⁷

2.2.2. The First Massive Attacked

On the 1st of March, a massive attack was launched by Russia on Kharkiv and hit the city center that injured and killing people.¹³⁸ Russia temporarily captured Ukraine’s city Kherson when their forces entered the region.¹³⁹ On the 4th of March, the Russian army

¹³¹ The Independent, “A timeline of Putin's invasion – and the fight to save Ukraine,” The Independent, <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/ukraine-war-russia-putin-timeline-b2288219.html>. Last access June 12, 2023.

¹³² Ibid.

¹³³ Semenova Thaisa, “Timeline of Russia's all-out war in Ukraine, month by month,” The Kyiv Independent, <https://kyivindependent.com/timeline-of-russias-all-out-war-in-ukraine-month-by-month/>. Last modified June 13, 2023.

¹³⁴ Myroniuk Anna, “Dozens of Ukrainians killed within hours of Russian invasion,” The Kyiv Independent, <https://kyivindependent.com/dozens-of-ukrainians-killed-within-hours-of-russian-invasion/>. Last access June 13, 2023.

¹³⁵ Ibid.

¹³⁶ Sorokin Oleksiy, “BREAKING: Russia recognizes occupied regions in Ukraine as independent states,” The Kyiv Independent, <https://kyivindependent.com/breaking-russia-recognizes-occupied-regions-in-ukraine-as-independent-states/>. Last access June 13, 2023.

¹³⁷ LibGuides at Cairn University, “Timeline - Russian invasion of Ukraine,” LibGuides at Cairn University, <https://libguides.cairn.edu/ukraine/timeline>. Last access June 13, 2023.

¹³⁸ Bigg Matthew M., “Key Moments in the Russia-Ukraine War: A Timeline,” The New York Times, <https://www.nytimes.com/article/ukraine-russia-war-timeline.html>. Last access June 14, 2023.

¹³⁹ Pérez Richard, “Russian Forces Seize Kherson, the First Ukrainian City to Fall,” The New York Times, <https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/02/world/europe/kherson-ukraine-russia.html>. Last access June 14, 2023.

invaded and stuck near Kyiv, the capital of Ukraine with its convoys and reached Kyiv.¹⁴⁰ In addition to this, Russia-occupied forces carried out the armed seizure of the Nuclear Power Plant at Zaporizhzhia, which is the most concerning issue as it is harmful to the world if there is any attack or strike there.¹⁴¹ Furthermore, on the 16th, there was an attack when Russia struck the theater of the strategic port of Ukraine which is a city in Donetsk Oblast, Mariupol which caused the deadly attack that killed many civilians.¹⁴² Again, on the 26th of the same month, a Russian missile struck the building of the Mykolaiv regional state administration of Ukraine and completely destroyed it.¹⁴³

2.2.3. The Loss of Innocent Lives and the Destruction of Infrastructure

For a month, on the 2nd of April, the region of Kyiv was fully free from Russia after the troops retrieved, but the city was full of horror as there were many civilians dead as well as serious damage to the infrastructure.¹⁴⁴ In addition, two of Ukraine's regions (Chernihiv and Sumy) were also liberated from Russian troops too.¹⁴⁵ Subsequently, there was also a missile strike from Russia to the eastern city of Ukraine, Kramatorsk that attacked the train station, which killed and wounded the people who were there.¹⁴⁶ On the other hand, on the 14th, the flagship of Russia's Black Sea Fleet, Cruiser Moskva was sunk due to Ukrainian troops using their Neptune anti-ship missile to hit it.¹⁴⁷

¹⁴⁰ The Associated Press, "Key moments in a year of war after Russia invaded Ukraine," AP News, <https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-war-one-year-anniversary-timeline-a1304c6fb319bf1c0e93635f6f6a2633>. Last access June 14, 2023.

¹⁴¹ Bacheaga Hugo, "Russia using Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant as army base - Ukraine," BBC, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-62469740.amp>. Last access June 14, 2023.

¹⁴² Supra note 84.

¹⁴³ Roshchina Olena, "Russians have hit Regional State Administration building in Mykolaiv," Ukrayinska pravda, <https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2022/03/29/7335431/>. Last access June 14, 2023.

¹⁴⁴ Al Jazeera, "Ukraine 'retakes whole Kyiv region' as Russia looks east," Al Jazeera, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/4/3/ukraine-retakes-whole-kyiv-region-as-russian-troops-pull-back>. Last access June 14, 2023.

¹⁴⁵ Official website of the President of Ukraine, "President: The liberation of Moshchun was one of the turning points of our struggle and the beginning of the enemy's end," Official website of the President of Ukraine, <https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/zvilnennya-moshuna-stalo-odnim-iz-povorotnih-momentiv-nashoy-81705>. Last access June 14, 2023.

¹⁴⁶ Al Jazeera, "Many killed, wounded in Russian attack' on Ukraine train station," Al Jazeera, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/8/24/fifteen-dead-in-air-raid-on-ukraines-independence-day-zelenskyy>. Last access June 14, 2023.

¹⁴⁷ Miller C. and Paul M., "Ukraine has hobbled Russia's Black Sea Fleet. Could it turn the tide of the war?" Politico, <https://www.politico.com/news/2022/08/29/russias-black-sea-fleet-stuck-struck-and-sinking-00054114>. Last access June 14, 2023.

2.2.4. The Continued Involvement of Other States and the EU

The US President Joe Biden signed on the Democracy Defense Lend-Lease Act of 2022 on the 9th of May, which was the act that allowed the US to provide essential military equipment to support Ukraine against or repulse Russian invasion.¹⁴⁸ Apart from this, after a long week of fighting in Mariupol, Russia successfully announced its victory to gain full control over the city.¹⁴⁹

The United States provided the multiple rocket launchers named **M142 HIMARS** to Ukraine.¹⁵⁰ Moreover, there was a missile strike that was launched by Russia on the 27th of June in the Ukraine city, Kremenchuk, at a crowded shopping mall that resulted in numerous injuries and death.¹⁵¹ On the 30th of June, the Russian troops were pulled back from Snake Island and seized their invasion of Ukraine.¹⁵² Moreover, Germany will send 1,000 anti-tank weapons and 500 Stringer anti-aircraft defense systems to Ukraine.¹⁵³ Also, so far the UK has sent the military weapons to Ukraine as well, such as long-range missiles, tanks, drones, rockets systems, air defense systems, and so on.¹⁵⁴ Furthermore, for the first time in the EU history it also contribute by offering the military aid to Ukraine to transport the weapons that worth 450 million euros (\$502m) and fighter jets as well.¹⁵⁵ Not only it helped provided

¹⁴⁸ Vergun David, "Biden Signs Lend-Lease Act to Supply More Security Assistance to Ukraine," Department of Defense, <https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3025302/biden-signs-lend-lease-act-to-supply-more-security-assistance-to-ukraine/>. Last access June 14, 2023.

¹⁴⁹ PBS, "Russia says it has taken full control of Mariupol in its biggest victory of the war," PBS, <https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/russia-says-it-has-taken-full-control-of-mariupol-in-its-biggest-victory-of-the-war>. Last access June 14, 2023.

¹⁵⁰ Lopez Todd, "U.S.-Provided HIMARS Effective in Ukraine," Department of Defense, <https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3095394/us-provided-himars-effective-in-ukraine/>. Last access June 14, 2023.

¹⁵¹ Ukraine NOW, "The Russians launched a missile strike on a shopping mall in Kremenchuk," Ukraine NOW, <https://war.ukraine.ua/cries/the-russians-launched-a-missile-strike-on-a-crowded-shopping-mall-in-kremenchuk/>. Last access June 14, 2023.

¹⁵² South China Morning Post, "Russian troops leave Ukraine's Snake Island in goodwill gesture" South China Morning Post, <https://www.scmp.com/news/world/russia-central-asia/article/3183693/russian-troops-withdraw-ukraines-snake-island>. Last access June 14, 2023.

¹⁵³ Reuters, "Germany to supply Ukraine with anti-tank weapons, missiles – Scholz," Reuters, <https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/germany-supply-ukraine-with-anti-tank-weapons-missiles-scholz-2022-02-26/>. Last access July 10, 2023.

¹⁵⁴ Brown David and Tural Ahmedzade, "What weapons are being given to Ukraine by the UK?" BBC, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-61482305.amp>. Last access July 10, 2023.

¹⁵⁵ Al Jazeera, "Which countries are sending military aid to Ukraine?" Al Jazeera, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/2/28/which-countries-are-sending-military-aid-to-ukraine>. Last access July 10, 2023.

military aid, but it also adopts €18 billion assistance to Ukraine which is the financial support to help Ukraine too.¹⁵⁶

2.2.5. The Ongoing Attack Between Russia and Ukraine

As July started, an attack by a Russian missile took place in Serhiivka, the Odesa region that killed numerous civilians.¹⁵⁷ Likewise, two days later, Russian forces took over the Lysychansk as a result of the temporary occupation of nearly the entire Luhansk region.¹⁵⁸ Nevertheless, the Snake Island, or Zmiinyi Island was liberated from Russia by Ukrainian defenders.¹⁵⁹ On the other hand, during the invasion of Russia, there was a fire of missiles by the Russian military at two residential buildings located in Chasiv Yar in the Donetsk region.¹⁶⁰ Even so, the Black Sea Grain Initiative was signed by the United Nations and Turkey on the 22nd,¹⁶¹ in order to allow the release of some parts of Ukrainian seaports for grain export, which is the most crucial product as Ukraine is one of the biggest exporters of grain that many countries relied on.¹⁶² Last but not least, on the 29th of July, there was a missile strike that hit a prison located at the Olenivka which is the eastern town of Ukraine, where Russia captured Ukrainian soldiers and killed at least 53 people.¹⁶³ Both Russia and Ukraine blamed each other regarding the attack that happened.¹⁶⁴

¹⁵⁶ Relief Web, "Council of the EU - Council adopts €18 billion assistance to Ukraine," Relief Web, <https://reliefweb.int/report/ukraine/council-eu-council-adopts-eu18-billion-assistance-ukraine>. Last access July 10, 2023.

¹⁵⁷ Amnesty International, "Ukraine: Civilians killed by 'reckless' Russian attacks on Serhiivka apartment block and beach resort," Amnesty International, <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2022/07/ukraine-civilians-killed-by-reckless-russian-attacks-on-serhiivka-apartment-block-and-beach-resort/>. Last access June 14, 2023.

¹⁵⁸ BBC, "Ukraine confirms Russia captured eastern city Lysychansk," BBC, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-62030051.amp>. Last access June 14, 2023.

¹⁵⁹ Feng Emily, "Russian forces leave Snake Island in a win for Ukraine," NPR, <https://www.npr.org/2022/06/30/1108855805/russia-withdraws-snake-island-ukraine>. Last access June 14, 2023.

¹⁶⁰ Lock Samantha and Lorenzo T., "Chasiv Yar death toll rises to 34 in one of Russia's deadliest attacks so far," The Guardian, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/jul/12/chasiv-yar-death-toll-rises-to-33-in-one-of-russias-deadliest-attacks-so-far>. Last access June 14, 2023.

¹⁶¹ Consilium European Union, "Ukrainian grain exports explained," Concilium European Union, <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/infographics/ukrainian-grain-exports-explained/>. Last access June 14, 2023.

¹⁶² UNCTAD, "The Black Sea Grain Initiative: What it is, and why it's important for the world," UNCTAD, <https://unctad.org/news/black-sea-grain-initiative-what-it-and-why-its-important-world>. Last access June 14, 2023.

¹⁶³ Blann Susie, "Russia, Ukraine blame each other for deadly attack on POW prison in Donetsk region," PBS, <https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/russia-ukraine-blame-each-other-for-deadly-attack-on-pow-prison-in-donetsk-region>. Last access June 14, 2023.

¹⁶⁴ Ibid.

There was an explosive strike on an air base in Crimea and the fighting between Russian forces with Ukraine was still ongoing in the east of Ukraine, Donetsk Oblast.¹⁶⁵ Even though, the serious issue that happened during the invasion was that Russia was turning the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant that they had occupied into a ticking bomb, which made the risk of nuclear safety.¹⁶⁶

2.2.6. The Last Four Months of the War in Ukraine (September to December)

During September, most of the Kharkiv region was free from Russian occupation.¹⁶⁷ On the 21st of September Russia's President Putin was ordered to activate 300,000 of reservists which caused many Russians to flee to their neighboring countries to avoid recruitment.¹⁶⁸ Hence, Russia even staged the illegal “referendums” on Ukraine’s territory, which are Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhzhia regions, to become a part of Russia.¹⁶⁹ Thus on the 30th, Russian President Putin signed the documents of the annexation of Ukraine's four regions at a Kremlin ceremony.¹⁷⁰

There was an explosive at the linking bridge to Crimea on the 8th of October, that is the bridge that Russia annexed illegally in 2014 from Ukraine¹⁷¹, and Russia blames Ukraine for this attack and responded back by using a missile strike on the power plant of Ukraine and

¹⁶⁵ Tucker Patrick, “Explosions at Russian Air Bases May Change Several Nations' Calculations,” Defense One, <https://www.defenseone.com/technology/2022/12/explosions-russian-air-bases-may-change-several-nations-calculations/380521/>. Last access June 14, 2023.

¹⁶⁶ Query Alexander, “Occupied Ukrainian plant becomes the epicenter of Russia's nuclear blackmail,” The Kyiv Independent, <https://kyivindependent.com/occupied-ukrainian-plant-becomes-epicenter-of-russias-nuclear-blackmail/>. Last access June 14, 2023.

¹⁶⁷ Lâiné Brice, “Liberation has finally come to Ukraine's Kharkiv. But scars of Russia's brutal occupation remain,” CNN, <https://www.cnn.com/2022/09/19/europe/kupiansk-ukraine-liberated-russia-intl-cmd>. Last access June 14, 2023.

¹⁶⁸ Ritter Karl, “Putin orders partial call-up of reservists, first since World War II,” PBS, <https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/putin-orders-partial-call-up-of-reservists-first-since-world-war-ii>. Last access June 14, 2023.

¹⁶⁹ Euronews, “Ukraine war: Russia illegally annexes four regions in east Ukraine,” Euronews, <https://www.euronews.com/2022/09/30/ukraine-war-russia-illegally-annexes-four-regions-in-east-ukraine>. Last access June 14, 2023.

¹⁷⁰ France 24, “Putin signs accord annexing four occupied Ukrainian regions in lavish ceremony,” France 24, <https://www.france24.com/en/europe/20220930-putin-signs-accord-annexing-four-occupied-ukrainian-regions-in-lavish-ceremony>. Last access June 15, 2023.

¹⁷¹ Schreck Adam and Vasilisa Stepanenko, “Blast on bridge to Crimea hurts Russian supply lines, pride,” AP News, <https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-explosions-fires-kharkiv-a5d6dd74e0fc8301cdd87601f5e2db1f>. Last access June 15, 2023.

other important infrastructure.¹⁷² Additionally, Russian forces used missiles to attack Ukraine constantly, especially as they mainly attack on essential infrastructures, such as energy objects.¹⁷³

On the 9th of November, Russia announced its pullback from Ukraine's city, which is Kherson as Ukraine made the counter-offensive that caused Russia to lose the only regional center that they had captured from Ukraine for eight months.¹⁷⁴ On the 5th of December, Russia said Ukraine used the drones to target Russia's bases of long-range bombers that are located in Russia's territory.¹⁷⁵ In addition to this, there was another strike on the same place, which made Ukraine ready to reveal the gap of Russia's defense.¹⁷⁶ Nonetheless, Russia attacked Ukraine again in Kherson by launching the missiles on Christmas Eve, despite the ceasefire, Russia even launched missiles to Ukraine and was continually threatened by Russian troops.¹⁷⁷ The attack from Russia did not stop, on New Year's Eve,¹⁷⁸ which was the day that Ukrainian might celebrate the new year happily, but Ukraine was under war and threatened by Russia.

¹⁷² PBS, "Putin drives across bridge to Crimea that was damaged during war," PBS, <https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/putin-drives-across-bridge-to-crimea-that-was-damaged-during-war>. Last access June 15, 2023.

¹⁷³ Özerdem Alpaslan and Andrian Prokip, "Russian Air Attacks on Ukraine's Power System," Wilson Center, <https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/russian-air-attacks-ukraines-power-system>. Last modified June 15, 2023.

¹⁷⁴ Sly L., Michael E. Miller, Mary Ilyushina, et al., "Russia orders exit from Kherson city, giving up key regional capital," The Washington Post, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/11/09/russia-withdraws-kherson-ukraine/>. Last access June 15, 2023.

¹⁷⁵ Kramer Andrew E., Michael Schwirtz, and Marc Santora, "Ukraine Targets Bases Deep in Russia, Showing Expanded Reach," The New York Times, <https://www.nytimes.com/2022/12/05/world/europe/ukraine-russia-military-bases.html>. Last access June 15, 2023.

¹⁷⁶ Polityuk Pavel and Sergiy Chalyi, "Ukraine appears to expose Russian air defense gaps with long-range strikes," Reuters, <https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukraine-warns-emergency-blackouts-after-more-missile-hits-2022-12-05/>. Last modified June 15, 2023.

¹⁷⁷ Staff NPR, "Latest on Ukraine: The Russian Christmas cease-fire that wasn't," NPR, <https://www.npr.org/2023/01/09/1146899579/russia-ukraine-war-news-jan-9>. Last modified June 15, 2023.

¹⁷⁸ Troianovski Anton, "Russia Bombards Ukraine as Putin Calls Invasion a 'Sacred Duty,'" The New York Times, <https://www.nytimes.com/2022/12/31/world/europe/ukraine-strikes-russia-new-years-eve.html>. Last access June 15, 2023.

2.3. The New Updated Situation of the Russia-Ukraine War

The prolonged war in Ukraine is still ongoing in 2023 and still cannot be resolved. However, there is involvement from China, the United States, and the European Union during the war between Russia and Ukraine.

Since the war broke out, China and Russia still have a friendly relationship, despite Russia making an invasion of Ukraine.¹⁷⁹ It is a big surprise and could be a historic moment that China implies itself to mediate the war because China often avoids getting involved in a conflict with other countries.¹⁸⁰ In addition, Ukrainian President Zelenskyy had the first phone call with Chinese President Xi Jinping since the invasion of Russia on Ukraine.¹⁸¹ Thus, China had released “**China’s Position on the Political Settlement of the Ukraine Crisis**” in February 2023 which contained 12 points that showed China's effort as a neutral peace broker.¹⁸² Thus, in the position paper it stated that dialogue and negotiation are the only options, which could settle the war and find peace.¹⁸³ The preliminary thing in this paper is about keeping nuclear plants safe as it is the most dangerous thing that brings harm to the world.¹⁸⁴ Also, as China had released its position paper, both Russia and Ukraine showed their interest but stressed out the broad obstacles to the dialogue. On the other hand, China's President claimed that China will continue to facilitate talks for peace. According to the South China Morning Post, China confirmed to send Li Hui, China’s Special Representative on

¹⁷⁹ CNBC, “Russia and China are becoming ever closer and the West should worry,” CNBC, <https://www.cnbc.com/2023/03/21/russia-and-china-are-becoming-ever-closer-and-the-west-should-worry.html>. Last access June 19, 2023.

¹⁸⁰ McDONALD JOE, “Why China is trying to mediate in Russia's war with Ukraine,” AP News, <https://apnews.com/article/china-russia-ukraine-2970bea530e821a4ed2155a8bcc23980>. Last access June 19, 2023.

¹⁸¹ CNN, “China's Xi speaks with Zelensky for first time since Russia's invasion of Ukraine,” CNN, <https://www.cnn.com/2023/04/26/europe/xi-jinping-zelensky-phone-call-intl/index.html>. Last access June 19, 2023.

¹⁸² Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, “China's Position on the Political Settlement of the Ukraine Crisis,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/zxxx_662805/202302/t20230224_11030713.html. Last access June 19 2023.

¹⁸³ Ruwitch John and Emily Feng, “China calls for a cease-fire and peace talks between Russia and Ukraine,” NPR, <https://www.npr.org/2023/02/24/1159208413/china-calls-for-a-cease-fire-and-peace-talks-between-russia-and-ukraine>. Last access June 19, 2023.

¹⁸⁴ Supra note 175.

Eurasian Affairs and a former Chinese ambassador to Russia as the special representative for the future meeting with Ukrainian officials and other countries.¹⁸⁵

Besides, the United States is also getting involved in the war in Ukraine too.¹⁸⁶ During the war in Ukraine that was invaded by Russia, the US not only stood with Ukraine as opposed to Russia, but they also provided much aid to Ukraine as well.¹⁸⁷ In addition, according to the State Department Official, the U.S. announced that as they support Ukraine, they provided \$460 million, including arms and equipment with \$10 million for emergency assistance to maintain Ukraine's energy infrastructure.¹⁸⁸ Moreover, the US is determined to support Ukraine and according to the U.S. Secretary of State, Antony Blinken stated that the US has to sustain its involvement, while the US with NATO allies committed to ensuring that Ukraine is free from Russia's invasion.¹⁸⁹ Likewise, the US had provided many military aid to Ukraine, such as rockets, guns, and ammunition.¹⁹⁰ On the contrary, there was a huge surprise to the world when the US President, Joe Biden paid an unannounced visit to Ukraine city, Kyiv to meet with the Ukrainian President¹⁹¹ and spent about six hours there.¹⁹²

¹⁸⁵ South China Morning Post, "China to send special envoy to Ukraine after Xi holds phone call with Zelensky," South China Morning Post, <https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3218460/chinese-president-xi-jinping-holds-phone-call-ukraines-volodymyr-zelensky>. Last access June 19, 2023.

¹⁸⁶ VOA, "Are Americans Growing Weary of Supporting Ukraine in War with Russia?" VOA <https://www.voanews.com/a/are-americans-growing-weary-of-supporting-ukraine-in-war-with-russia-/6927596.html>. Last access June 19, 2023.

¹⁸⁷ The White House, "FACT SHEET: One Year of Supporting Ukraine," The White House, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/02/21/fact-sheet-one-year-of-supporting-ukraine/>. Last access June 19, 2023.

¹⁸⁸ Reals T., Charlie D., and Weijia J., "Biden visits Ukraine in show of support a year into Russia's invasion, amid concern China could give Putin lethal aid," CBS News, <https://www.cbsnews.com/news/biden-in-ukraine-russia-war-news-today-china-putin-lethal-aid-concern/>. Last access June 19, 2023.

¹⁸⁹ Novak Analisa, "U.S. must 'sustain' its involvement in Ukraine war, Secretary of State Antony Blinken says," CBS News, <https://www.cbsnews.com/news/ukraine-war-news-secretary-of-state-antony-blinken-us-sustain-involvement/>. Last access June 19, 2023.

¹⁹⁰ Baldor C., Lorne Cook and Matthew L., "U.S. to provide Ukraine with \$2.6 billion in military aid," PBS, <https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/u-s-to-provide-ukraine-with-2-6-billion-in-military-aid>. Last access June 19, 2023.

¹⁹¹ Liptak Kevin, "Biden makes surprise visit to Ukraine for first time since full-scale war began," CNN, <https://www.cnn.com/2023/02/20/politics/biden-ukraine-zelensky-visit-one-year-war-anniversary-intl-hnk/index.html>. Last access June 19, 2023.

¹⁹² Supra note 93.

Nevertheless, the European Union (EU) also helped Ukraine against Russia too.¹⁹³ In addition, besides the sanction (Economic sanction, Financial sanction, etc.) that the EU have put on Russia in 2022,¹⁹⁴ There are many aids that the EU has provided to support Ukraine.¹⁹⁵ Also, according to the EU High Representative Joseph Borrell stated that it is the first time in its history to provide the lethal equipment to a third country,¹⁹⁶ which is Ukraine, and initially agreed to mobilize €500 million through the European Peace Facility to finance support of lethal and non-lethal material to the Ukrainian army.¹⁹⁷ Furthermore, both provision of equipment and supplies to the Ukrainian Armed Forces are financed by EU member states, such as personal protective equipment, military equipment designed, and so on.¹⁹⁸ Besides, in February 2023, after being under the pressure from the US and its allies over sending the military aid to Ukraine, Germany approved sending the **Leopard 2** tanks to Ukraine.¹⁹⁹ The tanks were offered to Ukraine when Ukraine has an urgent need for heavier armor in order to against the Russian invasion.²⁰⁰

On the other hand, in July 2023, the U.S. President Joe Biden stated that the US will provide the cluster bombs to Ukraine in order to fight against Russia.²⁰¹ In addition, cluster bombs are banned in more than 100 countries around the globe as they are extremely

¹⁹³ European Commission, “EU solidarity with Ukraine,” European Commission, https://eu-solidarity-ukraine.ec.europa.eu/-index_en. Last access June 19, 2023.

¹⁹⁴ Consilium.europa.eu, “EU sanctions against Russia explained,” Consilium.europa.eu, 2023, <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/sanctions/restrictive-measures-against-russia-over-ukraine/sanctions-against-russia-explained/>. Last access June 19.

¹⁹⁵ Kleine Thomas, “Europe is giving more aid to Ukraine than you think,” EU observer, 2023, <https://euobserver.com/-opinion/156658>. Last access June 19,

¹⁹⁶ EU NEIGHBOURS east, “EU support for Ukraine: from sanctions to military and humanitarian aid,” EU NEIGHBOURS east, <https://euneighbourseast.eu/news/explainers/eu-support-for-ukraine-from-sanctions-to-military-and-humanitarian-aid-how-is-the-eu-helping/>. Last access June 19, 2023.

¹⁹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁹⁸ EU NEIGHBOURS east, “EU agrees extra €500 million of military support for Ukraine,” EU NEIGHBOURS east, <https://euneighbourseast.eu/news/latest-news/eu-agrees-extra-e500-million-of-military-support-for-ukraine/>. Last access June 19, 2023.

¹⁹⁹ Camut Nicolas, “Germany to send 88 Leopard I tanks to Ukraine,” POLITICO, <https://www.politico.eu/article/germany-send-leopard-tanks-ukraine-russia-war-rheinmetall/>. Last access July 10, 2023.

²⁰⁰ Beaumont Peter, “Leopard 2 tanks: what are they and why does Ukraine want them?” The Guardian, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/jan/25/leopard-2-german-tanks-what-are-they-why-does-ukraine-want>. Last access July 10, 2023.

²⁰¹ MILLER Z., BALDOR C., and TARA C., “The US will provide cluster bombs to Ukraine and defends the delivery of the controversial weapon,” AP News, <https://apnews.com/article/cluster-bombs-ukraine-biden-russia-unexploded-ordnance-c16c482d86b34102ffec6ee682a524>. Last access July 10, 2023.

dangerous to the people and have a huge impact on the country.²⁰² Hence, it created the controversy among the US with its allies and also the NATO member,²⁰³ especially to the world since the bombs are a risk to the civilians. Thus, the human rights groups are also concerned about the US decision because of its danger to the humanitarian.²⁰⁴ Along with this, Spain and the UK warn against sending cluster bombs to Ukraine.²⁰⁵

2.4. The Impacts of the Quarrel to the Globe

2.4.1. The Economic Component

The Russian invasion of Ukraine has begun causing the most detrimental impacts on the world economy as a whole since February of 2022.²⁰⁶ According to an assessment released in November 2022 by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the conflict in Ukraine caused a “massive and momentous energy shockwave” to the markets as a whole.²⁰⁷ One of the key reasons why economic growth had slowed in 2022 to just 3.1% and why the OECD predicted it would fall to 2.2 percent in 2023 was due to the “shock” of the outbreak of war.²⁰⁸

2.4.1.1. The Economic Component Toward the World

The global economy is anticipated to decline more in the next year as the large and unprecedented oil shock caused by Russia's aggression against Ukraine continues to fuel

²⁰² Gardner Frank, “What are cluster bombs and why is US sending them to Ukraine?” BBC, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-66133527.amp>. Last access July 10, 2023.

²⁰³ Armstrong Kathryn and Antoinette Radford, “Cluster bombs: Unease grows over US sending cluster bombs to Ukraine,” BBC, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-66144153>. Last access July 10, 2023.

²⁰⁴ Bowman Emma, “U.S. sends cluster munitions to Ukraine despite humanitarian warnings,” NPR, <https://www.npr.org/2023/07/07/1186534233/cluster-bombs-munitions-ukraine>. Last access July 10, 2023.

²⁰⁵ Pollet Mathieu, “Spain and UK warn against sending cluster bombs to Ukraine,” POLITICO, <https://www.politico.eu/article/spain-and-uk-warn-against-sending-cluster-bombs-to-ukraine-russia-war/>. Last access July 10, 2023.

²⁰⁶ Arce Oscar, Gerrit Koester, and Christiane Nickel, “One year since Russia's invasion of Ukraine – the effects on euro area inflation,” European Central Bank, <https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/blog/date/2023/html/ecb.blog20230224~3b75362af3.en.html>. Last access June 20, 2023.

²⁰⁷ State Department, “The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) - United States Department of State,” State Department, <https://www.state.gov/the-organization-for-economic-co-operation-and-development-oecd/>. Last access June 20, 2023.

²⁰⁸ OECD, “Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine continues to create serious headwinds for global economy,” OECD, <https://www.oecd.org/newsroom/russia-s-war-of-aggression-against-ukraine-continues-to-create-serious-headwinds-for-global-economy.htm>. Last access June 20, 2023.

inflationary pressures, undermining confidence and household spending power, and raising risks globally.²⁰⁹

President Vladimir Putin's decision to conduct the beginning of a full-blown re-invasion of Ukraine just over a year ago caused a worldwide disaster that marked an unexpected end to nearly 30 years of globalization with major economic consequences for countries throughout the world.²¹⁰ The ongoing conflict between Russia and Ukraine has dramatically led to fluctuating and high commodities and energy costs, exacerbating a shortage of food and fueling inflation in many parts of the world.²¹¹ Essentially, energy and grain prices have fallen from high in the middle of the year 2022, potential risks of a turnaround remain, and the world may still confront energy security issues.²¹²

Diversification from Russia and support for Ukraine, together with the unrest in Ukraine and Russia, all of which have had a substantial economic impact on the world economy.²¹³ Despite being a tiny nation, Ukraine was one of the top three exporters of grains before the conflict; this natural resource undoubtedly fed Russia's drive for dominance.²¹⁴ The prohibitive cost of Ukraine's crucial food goods, along with Russia's aggressive rejection of its inexpensive gas, has resulted in dramatically higher global prices for grain and gas, two essential components of the global economy.²¹⁵ Inflation has taken place concurrently with

²⁰⁹ Gourinchas Pierre, "Global Economy to Slow Further Amid Signs of Resilience and China Re-opening," International Monetary Fund, <https://www.imf.org/en/Blogs/Articles/2023/01/30/global-economy-to-slow-further-amid-signs-of-resilience-and-china-re-opening>. Last access June 20, 2023.

²¹⁰ Supra note 112.

²¹¹ the United Nations, "One year of the war in Ukraine leaves lasting scars on the global economy," the United Nations, <https://www.un.org/en/desa/one-year-war-ukraine-leaves-lasting-scars-global-economy>. Last access June 19, 2023.

²¹² World Bank, "Commodity Markets Outlook: Currency Depreciations Risk Intensifying Food, Energy Crisis in Developing Economies," World Bank, <https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2022/10/26/commodity-markets-outlook>. Last access June 20, 2023.

²¹³ COFACE, "Economic consequences of the Russia-Ukraine conflict: Stagflation ahead," COFACE, <https://www.coface.com/News-Publications/News/Economic-consequences-of-the-Russia-Ukraine-conflict-Stagflation-ahead>. Last access June 20, 2023.

²¹⁴ Eisele Ines, "Five facts on grain and the war in Ukraine," DW, <https://www.dw.com/en/five-facts-on-grain-and-the-war-in-ukraine/a-62601467>. Last access June 20, 2023.

²¹⁵ The White House, "G7 Leaders' Statement on Ukraine," The White House, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/05/19/g7-leaders-statement-on-ukraine/>. Last access June 20, 2023.

record inflation, and each has exacerbated the other.²¹⁶ As a result, the economic consequences of the Ukrainian conflict can be felt globally in the form of higher food and energy costs, as well as more difficult import or export operations.²¹⁷

2.4.1.2. The Economic Component Toward European Union

Russia's illegitimate invasion of Ukraine began one year ago.²¹⁸ The war caused an enormous shock to the European economy, particularly to the oil and food markets, which resulted in a supply shortage and record-high prices.²¹⁹ The European Union's currency area has been more sensitive to the negative economic effects of the Russian takeover of Ukraine than other economic areas.²²⁰ The fundamental reason for this is the euro area's heavy reliance on energy imports, which in 2020 accounted for in excess of half of all energy consumption in the region.²²¹ Russia was also a significant energy provider to the Euro region prior to the conflict,²²² due to the commencement of Russia's invasion, imports of food, as well as fertilizer into the eurozone, were heavily influenced by Russia and Ukraine.²²³ In general, the extremely open economy of the euro area results in it being more vulnerable to interruptions within worldwide value chains and marketplaces.²²⁴

²¹⁶ Höflmayr Martin, "Inflation explained: What lies behind and what is ahead?" European Parliament, [https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2022/729352/EPRS_BRI\(2022\)729352_EN.pdf](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2022/729352/EPRS_BRI(2022)729352_EN.pdf). Last access June 20, 2023.

²¹⁷ COFACE, "Economic consequences of the Russia-Ukraine conflict: Stagflation ahead / News / News & Publications," COFACE, <https://www.coface.com/News-Publications/News/Economic-consequences-of-the-Russia-Ukraine-conflict-Stagflation-ahead>. Last access June 20, 2023.

²¹⁸ Supra note 102.

²¹⁹ Jenkins Michael, "Consequences of the War in Ukraine: The Economic Fallout," RAND Corporation, <https://www.rand.org/blog/2023/03/consequences-of-the-war-in-ukraine-the-economic-fallout.html>. Last access June 20, 2023.

²²⁰ Consilium.europa.eu, "Impact of Russia's invasion of Ukraine on the markets: EU response," Consilium.europa.eu, <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/eu-response-ukraine-invasion/impact-of-russia-s-invasion-of-ukraine-on-the-markets-eu-response/>. Last access June 20, 2023.

²²¹ Adolfsen Jakob F., Friderike K., Eliza M. Lis, & Tobias Schuler, "The impact of the war in Ukraine on euro area energy markets," European Central Bank, https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/economic-bulletin/focus/2022/html/ecb.ebbox202204_01~68ef3c3dc6.en.html.

²²² Supra note 120. Last access June 20, 2023.

²²³ Caprile Anna, "Russia's war on Ukraine: Impact on food security and EU response," European Parliament, [https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/ATAG/2022/729367/EPRS_ATA\(2022\)729367_EN.pdf](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/ATAG/2022/729367/EPRS_ATA(2022)729367_EN.pdf). Last access June 20, 2023.

²²⁴ European Central Bank, "Working Paper Series - A macroeconomic vulnerability model for the euro area," European Central Bank, <https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/scpwps/ecb.wp2306~8907aafca2.en.pdf>. Last access June 20, 2023.

2.4.1.3. The Economic Component Toward European Union Member States (France, Germany, and Hungary)

The economic consequences of Russia's invasion of Ukraine will be felt across all of Europe. Although it is still difficult to anticipate the overall economic effects, each member state will see a distinct impact with a focus on direct trade relations, possible costs of energy dependency on Russia, and sensitivities towards rising prices for energy.²²⁵ It demonstrates how economically vulnerable the EU's member nations are to Russia's invasion of Ukraine.²²⁶ As we have known each member of the EU is concerned all influenced by the decline of economic growth, especially affecting on some members such as France, German, and Hungary so on.²²⁷

Certainly, France's economy has declined more than anticipated as a result of severe supply shortages brought on by rising oil prices and Russia's invasion of Ukraine.²²⁸ Since Russia's invasion of Ukraine at the end of February, the cost of fuel, a need for agricultural operations, has risen, with the average cost of barrels of oil reaching \$100.²²⁹ Finance Minister Bruno Le Maire predicted that France's inflation will hit 6% over the coming months and 4% by the end of next year, despite the nation's high energy and food costs.²³⁰

Moving to Germany's economic growth during the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the German economy has lost 2.5% of its GDP as a result of the war in Ukraine and rising energy

²²⁵ Redeker Nils, "Economic Consequences Ukraine," Jacques Delors Centre, <https://www.delorscentre.eu/en/publications/economic-consequences-ukraine>. Last access June 20, 2023.

²²⁶ World Bank, "European Union Overview: Development news, research, data," World Bank, <https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/eu/overview>. Last access June 20, 2023.

²²⁷ European Commission, "A macro-economic overview," European Commission, https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/cache/digpub/european_economy/bloc-1a.html?lang=en. Last access June 20, 2023.

²²⁸ Economy and Finance, "France - Economic forecast for France," Economy and Finance, https://economy-finance.ec.europa.eu/economic-surveillance-eu-economies/france/economic-forecast-france_en. Last access June 20, 2023.

²²⁹ EURACTIV.com, "How the Ukraine war has impacted the French agrifood sector," EURACTIV.com, <https://www.euractiv.com/section/agriculture-food/news/how-the-ukraine-war-has-impacted-the-french-agrifood-sector/>. Last access June 20, 2023.

²³⁰ Horobin William, "France Finance Minister Bruno Le Maire Clings to Growth Forecast Despite Snags," Bloomberg.com, <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-06-20/french-government-clings-to-growth-prediction-despite-headwinds>. Last access June 20, 2023.

costs.²³¹ The German economy has suffered more from the crisis as a result of its greater reliance on Russian energy, a large share of energy-intensive industries, and significant reliance on exports and international supply networks.²³² Between the time that Russia launched its invasion in February 2022 and the end of 2023, the group projects that the war and its effects will cost Germany about 4% of its GDP.²³³ They also note that a recession is typically defined as a decline in GDP over two consecutive quarters and that the German economy agreed upon in the fourth quarter of 2022.²³⁴

Taking a glance at the view of Hungary's economic consequences, the Ukraine conflict might have an impact on several aspects of the Hungarian economy, including increased inflation, a deteriorating public budget, impaired international commerce, and a declining currency exchange rate. However, the most hazardous effect may be a shift in how foreign investors see the nation's economic progress.²³⁵ As evidenced by the Budapest Stock Exchange's sharp decline in price, the national currency's lowest-ever price, and the abrupt shutdown of the local bank.²³⁶ The limit was put in place as a result of a price ceiling of 480 Hungarian forints (1.38 USD) which the Hungarian government laid on the price of gasoline at retail back on November 15 in an effort to mitigate the consequences of increasing inflation.²³⁷

²³¹ DW, "Ukraine war costs Germany's economy €100 billion," DW, <https://www.dw.com/en/ukraine-war-costs-germanys-economy-100-billion/a-64768176>. Last access June 20, 2023.

²³² Lan, Ting, Galen Sher, and Jing Zhou, "The Economic Impacts on Germany of a Potential Russian Gas Shutoff," International Monetary Fund, <https://www.imf.org/-/media/Files/Publications/WP/2022/English/wpia2022144-print-pdf.ashx>. Last access June 20, 2023.

²³³ Lauer Klaus, Sarah Marsh, & Barbara Lewis, "Ukraine war expected to cost Germany 160 billion euros by year-end," Reuters, <https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukraine-war-expected-cost-germany-160-bln-euros-by-year-end-2023-02-19/>. Last access June 20, 2023.

²³⁴ AP News, "Germany economy shrinks in first quarter, signaling one definition of recession," AP News, <https://apnews.com/article/germany-economy-growth-recession-gdp-b04621eff9861c152936f6bc02804ed4>. Last access June 20, 2023.

²³⁵ China-CEE Institute, "Hungary economy briefing: Ukrainian war and its effects on the Hungarian," China-CEE Institute, <https://china-cee.eu/2022/03/26/hungary-economy-briefing-ukrainian-war-and-its-effects-on-the-hungarian-economy/>. Last access June 20, 2023.

²³⁶ Reuters, "Hungary signs liquidity deal with ECB, market approves," Reuters, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-hungary-centralbank-idUKTRE49F20920081016>. Last access June 20, 2023.

²³⁷ Komuves Anita, Gergely Szakacs, and Alex Richardson, "Hungary extends food and fuel price caps until Oct amid surging inflation," Reuters, <https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/hungary-extends-food-fuel-price-caps-until-oct-amid-surging-inflation-2022-06-16/>. Last access June 20, 2023.

2.4.1.4. The Economic Component Toward Other Regions (Asia, Africa, and Middle-East)

The Russian invasion's aftermath conflict in Ukraine continues to be in its earliest phases.²³⁸ It is yet too early to assess the war's entire impact on the crises in the Middle East and North Africa, but it is obvious that there will be many different effects.²³⁹

Due to their reliance on imported food and energy, several Middle Eastern and North African nations have proven especially vulnerable to economic crises brought on by the Ukraine crisis.²⁴⁰ Numerous nations import significant quantities of wheat from Russia and Ukraine.²⁴¹ The rising price of oil and gas might have a domino effect that drives up the cost of transportation and, in turn, all commodity prices.²⁴² This would lead to rising inflation and perhaps break supply chains for both vital and non-essential items, further upsetting already fragile economies.²⁴³ Additionally, the growing price of oil will drive oil-poor nations to devalue their national currencies, further reducing earnings and deteriorating living standards.²⁴⁴ It is not likely that economic suffering and governments' failure to appropriately address it would cause the area to see another outbreak of civil unrest and maybe even violence.²⁴⁵

²³⁸ Council on Foreign Relations, "War in Ukraine Global Conflict Tracker," Council on Foreign Relations, <https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/conflict-Ukraine>. Last access June 20, 2023.

²³⁹ Crisis Group, "The Impact of Russia's Invasion of Ukraine in the Middle East and North Africa," Crisis Group, <https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/impact-russias-invasion-ukraine-middle-east-and-north-africa>. Last access June 20, 2023.

²⁴⁰ Ibid.

²⁴¹ Statista, "Wheat import reliance on Russia & Ukraine by country 2022," Statista, <https://www.statista.com/statistics-/1302415/wheat-import-dependence-on-russia-and-ukraine-by-country/>. Last access June 20, 2023.

²⁴² Schaer Cathrin, "Will high oil prices derail Middle East reforms?" DW, <https://www.dw.com/en/ukraine-war-oil-prices-middle-east-reforms-end/a-61675230>. Last access June 20, 2023.

²⁴³ Ibid.

²⁴⁴ Reuters, "Iraq devalues dinar as oil prices squeeze revenue," Reuters, <https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-iraq-currency-idUSKBN28T00L>. Last access June 20, 2023.

²⁴⁵ Rivlin Paul, "The Ukraine War and the Middle East: The Rich Get Richer and the Poor Get Poorer," Moshe Dayan Center, <https://dayan.org/content/ukraine-war-and-middle-east-rich-get-richer-and-poor-get-poorer>. Last access June 20, 2023.

Even geographically distant places like Southeast Asia have been impacted by the continuing war for a year already.²⁴⁶ The ASEAN countries, there are regionally remarkable areas impacted by the economy by the Ukraine war within other countries in the entire Southeast Asia region.²⁴⁷ Due to supply chain problems brought on by economic sanctions on Russia, which is the third-largest supplier of Oil in the world and it accounts for 35% of the entire world's oil consumption in which oil prices will inevitably increase.²⁴⁸ The eight economies of South Asia are all major oil importers, which makes them sensitive to oil crises by increasing the cost of production and escalating the prices of consumer products.²⁴⁹ Given that the production of food is an energy-intensive industry, higher oil prices are directly correlated with rising food costs.²⁵⁰ Rising oil prices will have a greater impact on growing Asian markets than any other part of the world since the majority of Asian economies depend on consumption, with food and energy accounting for over half of consumer expenses.²⁵¹ The war between Russia and Ukraine has had a direct effect on the main Southeast Asian economies by driving up commodity prices, particularly those of oil, nickel, wheat, and maize.²⁵² Given that Singapore, Vietnam, and Thailand are net importers of these goods from the troubled region, this development is very alarming for them.²⁵³ Due to the rise in

²⁴⁶ Andaya Barbara W., "Introduction to Southeast Asia," Asia Society, <https://asiasociety.org/education/introduction-southeast-asia>. Last access June 20, 2023.

²⁴⁷ ORF, "The ongoing Russia-Ukraine conflict: Impact on Southeast Asia," ORF, <https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/the-ongoing-russia-ukraine-conflict-impact-on-southeast-asia/>. Last access June 20, 2023.

²⁴⁸ Hindustan Times, "Effects of Russia-Ukraine conflict on Asian Economies," Hindustan Times, <https://www.hindustan-times.com/ht-insight/economy/effects-of-russia-ukraine-conflict-on-asian-economies-101653290378940.html>. Last access June 20, 2023.

²⁴⁹ Asian Development Bank, "South Asia Economic Report," Asian Development Bank, <https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/publication/27966/economic-report.pdf>. Last access June 20, 2023.

²⁵⁰ Asian Development Bank, "Volatility Linkages between Energy and Food Prices: Case of Selected Asian Countries," Asian Development Bank, <https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/publication/411176/adbi-wp829.pdf>. Last access June 20, 2023.

²⁵¹ CNBC, "Asia faces 'tough decisions' on inflation as oil prices rise, ADB says," CNBC, <https://www.cnbc.com/2023/04/04/asia-faces-tough-decisions-on-inflation-as-oil-prices-rise-adb-says.html>. Last access June 20, 2023.

²⁵² Supra note 232.

²⁵³ USTR, "Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) | United States Trade Representative," USTR, <https://ustr.gov/countries-regions/southeast-asia-pacific/association-southeast-asian-nations-asean>. Last access June 20, 2023.

commodity prices, Thailand has seen both producer and consumer price inflation.²⁵⁴ Vietnam has had an oil scarcity, and reports of stockpiling of gasoline are also emerging, which is driving up prices even further.²⁵⁵ The effects of increased oil costs may be seen in several industries, including transportation, housing, power, and gas, in Vietnam, Malaysia, and Indonesia.²⁵⁶

2.4.2. The Changing of New World Order

The war in Ukraine made a change to the world order as it used to.²⁵⁷ In fact, for many decades since the end of World War II, Finland and Sweden have been known as the most neutral countries in the world.²⁵⁸ However, there was a tremendous and historic shift for two nations with a long history of wartime neutrality and staying out of military alliances asked to join NATO.²⁵⁹ Besides, Finland has exercised with NATO countries for so long, but never formally joined the defensive alliance.²⁶⁰ In addition, in July 2022, Finland and Sweden joined the NATO alliance at the Madrid Summit.²⁶¹ The reason that both countries asked to join NATO might be because of the aggressive invasion of Russia on Ukraine that established the instability of security in northern Europe and was wary of Russia.²⁶² Hence, according to Mark Leonard, the think tank's director and a co-author of the report said that “The paradox of

²⁵⁴ Krungsri, “The potential impacts of the Ukraine war on the Thai economy,” Krungsri, <https://www.krungsri.com/en/research/research-intelligence/russia-ukraine-impacts>. Last access June 20, 2023.

²⁵⁵ Giang Nguyen K. and Saket Sundria, “Vietnam Hit by Fuel Shortages as Hundreds of Retailers Run Dry,” Bloomberg.com, <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-02-23/vietnam-hit-by-fuel-shortages-as-hundreds-of-retailers-run-dry>. Last access June 20, 2023.

²⁵⁶ East Asia Forum, “Russia war on Ukraine threatens Southeast Asia’s economic recovery,” East Asia Forum, <https://www.easiaforum.org/2022/04/21/russia-war-on-ukraine-threatens-southeast-asias-economic-recovery/>. Last access June 20, 2023.

²⁵⁷ Wright Frank L. and Emily Chang, “How the War in Ukraine Has Changed The World Order,” Bloomberg, <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/videos/2023-02-17/how-the-war-in-ukraine-has-changed-the-world-order>. Last access June 20, 2023.

²⁵⁸ World Population Review, “Neutral Countries 2023,” World Population Review, <https://worldpopulationreview.com/country-rankings/neutral-countries>. Last access June 20, 2023.

²⁵⁹ LAWLESS JILL, “Global impact: 5 ways war in Ukraine has changed the world,” AP News, <https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-war-5-things-c183ddfe6c140393464d3e0c3828c328>. Last access June 20, 2023.

²⁶⁰ Garamone Jim, “Finland's Accession to NATO Strengthens Alliance Security > U.S.,” Department of Defense, <https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3351900/finlands-accession-to-nato-strengthens-alliance-security/>. Last access June 20, 2023.

²⁶¹ NATO Parliamentary Assembly, “Finland and Sweden Accession,” NATO Parliamentary Assembly, <https://www.nato-pa.int/content/finland-sweden-accession>. Last access June 20, 2023.

²⁶² Kleberg Charlotte and James Black, “Finland Joins NATO, Sweden's Accession Remains Uncertain,” RAND Corporation, <https://www.rand.org/blog/2023/04/finland-joins-nato-swedens-accession-remains-uncertain.html>. Last access June 20, 2023.

the Ukraine war is that the West is both more united and less influential in the world, than ever before.”²⁶³ On the other hand, not only does the West unite, but it also helps Russia and China become closer too.²⁶⁴

For many years NATO has been expanding itself and has 30 alliances around the globe.²⁶⁵ Nonetheless, as the NATO expansion becomes more and more bigger, there might be negative signs to the security of the globe. As we have known, in NATO principle, if one other state attacks its members or alliances, it means that the nation is attacking NATO as a whole.²⁶⁶ Furthermore, NATO is likely a political bloc that serves the ideology of the West and Europe and its expansion was a major reason for war in several regions during the Cold War era.²⁶⁷ Besides, one of the purposes that NATO enlarges itself is because it wants to integrate Russia into the bloc or break it down so that it can no longer fight back and it would dominate the world.²⁶⁸ Also, Russia claimed that NATO promised not to expand itself after the Cold War and stated that it betrayed them,²⁶⁹ while NATO claimed that there was no agreement regarding that matter.²⁷⁰

²⁶³ Henley Jon, “War in Ukraine defining new world order, says thinktank,” The Guardian, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/feb/21/war-in-ukraine-defining-new-world-order-says-thinktank>. Last access June 20, 2023.

²⁶⁴ Al Jazeera, “China: Ties with Russia will 'grow from strength to strength,’” Al Jazeera, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/3/7/china-ties-with-russia-will-grow-from-strength-to-strength>. Last access June 20, 2023.

²⁶⁵ NATO, “Topic: NATO member countries,” NATO, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_52044.htm. Last access June 20, 2023.

²⁶⁶ NATO, “10 things you need to know about NATO,” NATO, <https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/126169.htm>. Last access June 20, 2023.

²⁶⁷ Global Times, “NATO expansionist agenda a threat to global security, a US tool to control EU and enhance hegemonic manipulation capacity,” Global Times, <https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202206/1269357.shtml>. Last access June 20, 2023.

²⁶⁸ Ibid.

²⁶⁹ Wintour Patrick, “Russia's belief in NATO 'betrayal' and why it matters today,” The Guardian <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/jan/12/russias-belief-in-nato-betrayal-and-why-it-matters-today>. Last access June 20, 2023.

²⁷⁰ NATO, “Topic: NATO-Russia relations: the facts,” NATO, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_111767.htm. Last access June 20, 2023.

2.4.3. The Social Component

2.4.3.1. Human Rights and Humanitarian Matter

The invasion of Russia on Ukraine made a huge impact on human rights and humanitarian.²⁷¹ According to the Head of the United Nations Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine, Matilda Bogner stated that since February 2022, there were 91 cases of enforced disappearances and arbitrary detention committed by Ukrainian security forces²⁷², and 53 percent had been tortured or ill-treated by members of Ukrainian armed forces.²⁷³ Furthermore, human rights and humanitarianism are being violated which affects both civilians and combatants.²⁷⁴ In addition, throughout the year, the hostilities of the war caused human suffering, with many civilians killed or injured, forced displacement, lack of humanitarian assistance, etc.²⁷⁵ The war in Ukraine created a risk for civilians, mainly women and girls that face trafficking, sexual exploitation, and gender-based violence²⁷⁶ and by the end of January 2023, 5.4 million Ukrainians were internally displaced.²⁷⁷ The Russian military and the Russian government have committed **War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity** in Ukraine and must be allegedly responsible for what they have done.²⁷⁸

²⁷¹ Amnesty International, "Russia's invasion of Ukraine," Amnesty International, <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2022/03/latest-news-on-russias-war-on-ukraine/>. Last access June 20, 2023.

²⁷² United Nations in Ukraine, "UN Human Rights Ukraine released reports on treatment of prisoners of war and overall human rights situation in Ukraine," United Nations in Ukraine, <https://ukraine.un.org/en/224744-un-human-rights-ukraine-released-reports-treatment-prisoners-war-and-overall-human-rights>. Last access June 20, 2023.

²⁷³ Corrigan C. and Bethany M., "Ukraine Continues to Endure Egregious Human Rights Violations at the Hands of Russian Forces," Geneva International Centre for Justice, <https://www.gicj.org/positions-opinions/gicj-positions-and-opinions/3392-ukraine-continues-to-endure-egregious-human-rights-violations-at-the-hands-of-russian-forces>. Last access June 20, 2023.

²⁷⁴ Council of Europe, "Memorandum on the human rights consequences of the war in Ukraine," Council of Europe <https://rm.coe.int/memorandum-on-the-human-rights-consequences-of-the-war-in-ukraine/1680a72bd4>. Last access June 20, 2023.

²⁷⁵ OCHA, "HUMANITARIAN SITUATION IN UKRAINE," OCHA, <https://www.unocha.org/ukraine/humanitarian-situation-ukraine>. Last access June 20, 2023.

²⁷⁶ UN Women, "Creating safe spaces for women in Ukraine," UN Women, <https://eca.unwomen.org/en/stories/feature-story/2023/02/creating-safe-spaces-for-women-in-ukraine>. Last access June 20, 2023.

²⁷⁷ Global Crisis Response Platform, "Ukraine and Neighboring Countries Crisis Response Plan," Global Crisis Response Platform, <https://crisisresponse.iom.int/response/ukraine-and-neighbouring-countries-crisis-response-plan-2023>. Last access June 20, 2023.

²⁷⁸ Panayotatos Daphne, "Crisis in Ukraine: Humanitarian and Human Rights Imperatives," Refugees International, <https://www.refugeesinternational.org/reports-briefs/crisis-in-ukraine-humanitarian-and-human-rights-imperatives/>. Last access June 20, 2023.

2.4.3.2. Refugee

The war in Ukraine caused a serious refugee crisis in the world and many people have left their homes and fled to other countries to escape the war, mainly to their neighboring countries to seek refuge.²⁷⁹ Additionally, the war in Ukraine triggered Europe's largest refugee crisis since World War II.²⁸⁰ According to the United Nations Figure, more than 8 million people have fled from Ukraine.²⁸¹ Those people fled across Europe including Poland, Hungary, Moldova, and other countries.²⁸² Furthermore, among those countries, Poland faced an enormous refugee from Ukraine almost 60 percent as it shares the border with Ukraine²⁸³ and according to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 5,935,300 of people, who are refugees across Europe.²⁸⁴ Hence, many families have been torn apart and there is no guarantee that they will reunite.

²⁷⁹ BBC, "How many Ukrainian refugees are there and where have they gone?" BBC, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-60555472>. Last access June 20, 2023.

²⁸⁰ Campbell H., Paul B. Raushenbush, and Diana R., "The Russia-Ukraine War: How Bad Is the Humanitarian Crisis?" Council on Foreign Relations, <https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/ukraine-humanitarian-crisis-refugees-aid>. Last access June 20, 2023.

²⁸¹ Operational Data Portal, "Situation Ukraine Refugee Situation," Operational Data Portal, <https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/Ukraine>. Last access June 19, 2023.

²⁸² USA for UNHCR, "Ukraine Refugee Crisis: Aid, Statistics and News," USA for UNHCR, <https://www.unrefugees.org/emergencies/ukraine/>. Last access June 20, 2023.

²⁸³ UNICEF, "Majority of Ukrainian refugee mothers in Poland experiencing high or severe levels of distress," UNICEF, <https://www.unicef.org/eca/press-releases/majority-ukrainian-refugee-mothers-poland-experiencing-high-or-severe-levels>. Last access June 20, 2023.

²⁸⁴ Supra note 207.

CHAPTER 3. CAMBODIA'S RULE-BASED FOREIGN POLICY

TOWARD RUSSIA- UKRAINE CONFLICT: The Nation Benefits and Impacts in the Global Arena

The rule-based foreign policy that Cambodia has used during the emergence of the war in Ukraine has made Cambodia gain more advantages dramatically, mainly regarding strengthening diplomacy with various states that have different ideologies from Cambodia. Obviously, before the war Cambodia did not have closer relations with the EU and some Western states due to its strong relations and collaboration with China.²⁸⁵ In the sphere of the global community toward the context of the Russia-Ukraine war, Cambodia is impartially delivering its foreign policy, such as the neutrality, the 7-points, multilateralism, non-alliance, and non-interference that made Cambodia decrease its good reputation on the global stage. On the other hand, the policy that Cambodia applied under the context of the Ukraine war has also impacted Cambodia regarding the instability of relations and limitations. Furthermore, the following points are focusing on the benefits and also the impact of foreign policy on Cambodia, mainly during the war in Ukraine.

3.1. The Nation Benefits

3.1.1. Cambodia's Reputation in the Context of the European Union

Cambodia gradually built its reputation in the European Union, particularly during the Ukraine war. It is known that despite having strong economic relations with the EU, Cambodia faced some challenges in terms of political matters. The EU has put sanctions on Cambodia related to free trade access and Everything-But-Arms (EBA),²⁸⁶ cuts of funds, trade

²⁸⁵ VOA, "China's Influence Colors US-Cambodia Relationship, Experts Say," VOA, <https://www.voanews.com/a/china-s-influence-colors-us-cambodia-relationship-experts-say/6568080.html>. Last access July 10, 2023.

²⁸⁶ EEAS, "Cambodia loses duty-free access to the EU market over human rights concerns," EEAS, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_20_1469. Last access July 7, 2023.

deals,²⁸⁷ etc. That was caused by the EU's concern over the political issue in Cambodia. Nevertheless, the decision of Cambodia on the Ukraine war to remain neutral, there were many states from the EU that appreciate and even bring closer cooperation with Cambodia.

In actual fact, on the 14th of December late 2022, the Prime Minister of Cambodia proactively fulfilled Cambodia's mission to take part in the ASEAN-EU Commemorative Summit 2022 held in Brussels, Belgium that was on the occasion of the 45th anniversary of ASEAN-EU Dialogue Relations²⁸⁸ as well as concerning the Ukraine and Russia war. As Cambodia robustly co-chaired of ASEAN-EU Summit, Cambodia had a well-fulfilled that potentially played a crucial role in addressing the main challenging issues in the meeting that also supported like other states and strived to help solve the war matters in Ukraine along with the EU, in which Cambodia was strategically aligned with the EU to make a shared decision-making process in tackling the Ukraine crisis together. This joint intersection is a fact that indicates that Cambodia and the EU have the same decision and will, which makes the possibility for becoming a close dialogue partner, and is also because the instance of key foreign policy is a core driving factor that can lead and back up all statements mainly related Ukraine in the ASEAN-EU summit successfully from the beginning until the end. On the other hand, if Cambodia's foreign policy is weak, perhaps Cambodia could face the loss of each state's reliability due to a lack of neutral co-chairmanship, and especially tension, complexity, and controversy will unexpectedly occur in the meeting moment. Hence, the above-mentioned practiced policy is the sense of motive to bring Cambodia closer and closer to its EU counterpart.

²⁸⁷ Hutt David, "In blow to Hun Sen, EU cuts Cambodia trade deal," Asia Times, <https://asiatimes.com/2020/02/in-blow-to-hun-sen-eu-cuts-cambodia-trade-deal/>. Last access July 7, 2023.

²⁸⁸ Council of EU, "EU-ASEAN Commemorative Summit 2022," Council of EU, <https://newsroom.consilium.europa.eu/events/20221214-eu-asean-commemorative-summit-2022>. Last access July 11, 2023.

In a joint statement led by Cambodia's initiative during the ASEAN-EU Commemorative Summit 2022, it hereby emphasized the issue of the Ukraine war:

*[This year, we have also witnessed the war in Ukraine further adversely impact the global economy. There was a discussion on the issue. We reiterated our positions as expressed in other fora, including the UN Security Council and the UN General Assembly.....we continue to reaffirm, as for all nations, the need to respect the sovereignty, political independence, and territorial integrity of Ukraine.]*²⁸⁹

Additionally, Cambodia also has closer cooperation with other EU member states as well. Cambodia Prime Minister Hun Sen met with the President of France, Emmanuel Macron during his working visit and was invited to join the press conference on solidarity with Ukraine people in France.²⁹⁰ During the conference, the President of France gave a warm welcome and even addressed each other by only their first name.²⁹¹ What is more, Switzerland also vows to have bilateral relations and expand cooperation with Cambodia too during the Economic Forum Annual Meeting 2023 of bilateral meetings between Switzerland and Cambodia.²⁹² Furthermore, on 22nd June 2023, there was a bilateral meeting of H.E. Astrid Emilie Helle, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Kingdom of Norway with H.E. Chem Widhya, Secretary of State of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation related to the economic relations as well as cooperation in the

²⁸⁹ Asean.org , “FINAL 1 ASEAN-EU Commemorative Summit 2022 Joint Leaders' Statement WE, the Member States of the Association of Southeast Asian,” Asean.org, <https://asean.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/12/Final-ASEAN-EU-Commemorative-Summit-2022-Joint-Leaders-Statement.pdf>. Last access July 16, 2023.

²⁹⁰ Khmer Times, “PM Hun Sen meets President Macron during trip to France,” Khmer Times, <https://www.khmertimeskh.com/501201868/pm-hun-sen-meets-president-macron-during-trip-to-france/>. Last access July 15, 2023.

²⁹¹ Ry Sochan , “Brotherly love: Hun Sen reveals close bond with France's Macron,” Phnom Penh Post, <https://www.phnompenhpost.com/national-politics/brotherly-love-hun-sen-reveals-close-bond-frances-macron>. Last access July 15, 2023.

²⁹² Khmer Times, “Cambodia, Switzerland pledge to strengthen existing bilateral relations and expand cooperation in priority fields,” Khmer Times, <https://www.khmertimeskh.com/501225581/cambodia-switzerland-pledge-to-strengthen-existing-bilateral-relations-and-expand-cooperation-in-priority-fields/>. Last access July 15, 2023.

multilateral framework with a view to further promote friendly ties between the two countries.²⁹³

On top of that, Germany also pledged to further enhance bilateral relations and cooperation with Cambodia during the meeting between Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen and visiting German President Frank-Walter Steinmeier.²⁹⁴ It is the historic and first visit of the German President who visited Cambodia. As So it reflects that Cambodia's foreign policy is on the right path and even leads Cambodia to tie up a strong connection with the EU, including various EU member states.

3.1.2. Cambodia's Reputation in the United Nations

Being a United Nations member state, the royal government of Cambodia has played an active role in specifying its clear position on Ukraine towards the international stage, which has showcased its support and co-sponsored many UNSC resolutions.²⁹⁵ In the UN statement, Cambodia expressed deep concern for the suffering being inflicted on humanity in Ukraine and stressed the significance of peaceful dialogue and negotiation. Cambodia reiterated the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) call for a peaceful resolution to the current dispute and emphasized the requirement to shield civilians and civilian infrastructure as well as to ensure the delivery of humanitarian aid.²⁹⁶ This is about more than just Ukraine or Europe; it is about safeguarding a rules-based international order. It is a decision whether choose tanks and missiles or dialogue and diplomacy.

²⁹³ MFAIC, "Meeting with H.E. Astrid Emilie Helle, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Kingdom of Norway," Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, <https://mfaic.gov.kh/Posts/2023-06-23-News-Meeting-with-H-E--Astrid-Emilie-Helle--Ambassador-Extraordinary-and-Plenipotentiary-of-the-Kingdom-o-09-03-31>. Last access July 15, 2023.

²⁹⁴ Khmer Times, "Cambodia, Germany pledge to further promote bilateral ties, cooperation," Khmer Times, <https://www.khmertimeskh.com/501240543/cambodia-germany-pledge-to-further-promote-bilateral-ties-cooperation/>. Last access July 15, 2023.

²⁹⁵ FRESH NEWS, "TOP NEWS: Cambodia Co-sponsors Resolution of the Emergency Special Session of UNGA on Situation in Ukraine," FRESH NEWS, <https://m.en.freshnewsasia.com/index.php/en/localnews/27882-2022-03-03-07-32-20.html>. Last access July 10, 2023.

²⁹⁶ UN Press, "General Assembly Overwhelmingly Adopts Resolution Demanding Russian Federation Immediately End Illegal Use of Force in Ukraine, Withdraw All Troops," UN Press, <https://press.un.org/en/2022/ga12407.doc.htm> Last access July 16, 2023.

Cambodia's voting decision is considered a notion to reveal the neutrality of its ruled-based foreign policy towards the Russia not interfere, but to intervene both to take a negotiation with each other and pursue an effective resolution in order to stop extending the war longer than ever, under some reasons that Russia is voted against its invasion over Ukraine considered the violation of international law in the UN charter. In this regard, Cambodia did not only vote against the Russian counterpart taking the side to support Ukraine but Cambodia is just exercised following the neutrality and international non-interference which are the core principles, in conjunction with making against the war because Cambodia pursue a foreign policy based on the law and UN charter, do not pursue a foreign policy based on the force in the scope of the international arena.

Moreover, as for Cambodia voting at the UNGA to support Ukraine and against Russia's aggression in Ukraine, there were many praises and compliments from the United Nations member states to Cambodia. For the actual example, the President of the US, Joe Biden, expressed his appreciation for Cambodia's co-sponsoring resolutions at the United Nations to support Ukraine against Russia's brutal aggression.²⁹⁷ Germany's newly appointed ambassador Stefan Anton Messerer also praised Cambodia's position on the ongoing war during his meeting with the Cambodian President.²⁹⁸ Last but not least, French President Emmanuel Macron expressed his deep gratitude to the Cambodian Prime Minister for taking a clear stance on Ukraine and also joined statements with Cambodia to support and hedge the Ukraine as a victim amid the war.²⁹⁹ What is more, in December 2022, during the second round of bilateral consultations between Cambodia and Slovakia of H.E. Dr. Chem Widhya,

²⁹⁷ The White House, "Readout of President Joe Biden's Meeting with Prime Minister Hun Sen of Cambodia," The White House, last modified July 15, 2023, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/11/12/readout-of-president-joe-bidens-meeting-with-prime-minister-hun-sen-of-cambodia/>.

²⁹⁸ Khmer Times, "Germany praises Cambodia's stance on war in Ukraine and Myanmar," Khmer Times, <https://www.khmertimeskh.com/501165881/germany-praises-cambodias-stance-on-war-in-ukraine-and-myanmar/>. Last access July 15, 2023.

²⁹⁹ FRESH NEWS, "France's Macron Warmly Welcomes PM Hun Sen," FRESH NEWS, <https://m.en.freshnewsasia.com/index.php/en/33584-2022-12-14-01-50-05.html>. Last access July 15, 2023.

secretary of state of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation with Mrs. Ingrid Brockova, State Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs of the Slovak that she expressed her sincere gratitude for Cambodia's stance at the United Nation over the Ukraine war crisis.³⁰⁰ Also, there was a bilateral meeting between the Cambodian Prime Minister and Prime Minister of Canada Justin Pierre Trudeau in which he thanked Cambodia for its stance.³⁰¹ Additionally, in 2023, according to the press release from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation stated that for Cambodia's support and co-sponsorship of the UN General Assembly's (UNGA) Resolutions and Cambodia's position on the armed conflict, which he also extended thanks for Cambodia's humanitarian assistance in helping train Ukrainian deminers last January.³⁰² Also, the new UK ambassador to Cambodia, H.E. Domenic Williams, also expressed precious words of appreciation for Cambodia's bold decision that breaks with its neighbors and is critical of a traditional ally, Russia, and wholeheartedly thanked Prime Minister Hun Sen and Foreign Minister Prak Sokhonn for co-sponsoring and supporting this crucial UN General Assembly Resolution to condemn Russia's violations of the UN Charter.³⁰³

3.1.3. Cambodia's Reputation in the ASEAN Region

Cambodia has chosen the ASEAN theme for 2022 **“ASEAN A.C.T.: Addressing Challenges Together”**.³⁰⁴ The idea is to highlight the importance of ASEAN's spirit as a

³⁰⁰ MFAIC, “Outcomes of the Second Round of Bilateral Consultations between Cambodia and Slovakia,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, <https://www.mfaic.gov.kh/posts/2022-12-03-Press-Release-Outcomes-of-the-Second-Round-of-Bilateral-Consultations-between-Cambodia-and-Slovakia--10-47-40>. Last access July 15, 2023.

³⁰¹ MFAIC, “Prime Ministers of Cambodia, Canada Hold Bilateral Meeting,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, <https://www.mfaic.gov.kh/posts/2022-11-13-Press-Release-Prime-Ministers-of-Cambodia--Canada-Hold-Bilateral-Meeting--13-30-18>. Last access July 15, 2023.

³⁰² MAIC, “Telephone Conversation Between Samdech Akka Moha Sena Padei Techo HUN SEN, Prime Minister of the Kingdom of Cambodia, and His Excellency Volodymyr Zelenskyy, President of Ukraine,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, <https://www.mfaic.gov.kh/posts/2023-05-29-Press-Release-Telephone-Conversation-Between-Samdech-Akka-Moha-Sena-Padei-Techo-HUN-SEN--Prime-Minister-of-the-Kin-20-56-18>. Last access July 16, 2023.

³⁰³ Phnom Penh Post, “Cambodia joins UN in resolution on Russia,” Phnom Penh Post, <https://www.phnompenhpost.com/national-politics/cambodia-joins-un-resolution-russia>. Last access July 11, 2023.

³⁰⁴ MFAIC, “Cambodia's Chairmanship,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, <https://www.mfaic.gov.kh/Page/2021-04-01-Cambodia-s-Chairmanship>. Last access July 27, 2023.

united family of Ten, with a strong sense of togetherness in achieving common goals amidst the many challenges the world and region are facing.³⁰⁵

The 40th and 41st ASEAN Summits and Related Summits were held on 8th-13th November 2022 under the Chairmanship of Cambodia.³⁰⁶ The Summits were chaired by the **Prime Minister of Cambodia**. As the ASEAN Chair, Cambodia coordinated to have three ASEAN Foreign Ministers' Statements issued to express concern over the situation in Ukraine, call for an immediate ceasefire in Ukraine and a return to political dialogues, and support the call of the UN Secretary-General for an independent investigation into all acts of violence against civilians in Ukraine. What Cambodia has done during the 40th and 41st ASEAN Summit is a testimony to the country's leading role, as the ASEAN Chair, in regional and global affairs.

Furthermore, because of the strong foreign policy and the position of Cambodia during the Ukraine war attracted many leaders from powerful states to join the summit as Cambodia was a chair. In other words, Cambodia successfully gathered with all ASEAN members, including dialogue partners to join the whole meeting events from the beginning until the end.³⁰⁷ Cambodia initiatively arranged the ASEAN statements to declare in the meeting which is interrelated to the Current crisis of Russia's invasion of Ukraine:

[The ASEAN Foreign Ministers are deeply concerned over the evolving situation and armed hostilities in Ukraine. We call on all relevant parties to exercise maximum restraint.....seek a peaceful resolution in accordance with international law, the

³⁰⁵ Ibid.

³⁰⁶ ASEAN Cambodia 2022, "40TH AND 41ST ASEAN SUMMITS AND RELATED SUMMITS - ASEAN Cambodia 2022," ASEAN Cambodia 2022, <https://asean2022.mfaic.gov.kh/meeting/2022-11-0840TH-AND-41ST-ASEAN-SUMMITS-AND-RELATED-SUMMITS>. Last access July 27, 2023.

³⁰⁷ Cambodian Institute for Cooperation and Peace, "CAMBODIA'S CHAIRMANSHIP OF ASEAN," Cambodian Institute for Cooperation and Peace, https://cicp.org.kh/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/ASEAN-Chairmanship_full-book.pdf. Last access July 11, 2023.

*principles of the United Nations Charter, and the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia.*³⁰⁸

On the other hand, in another opposite scenario, if Cambodia does not have a strong foreign policy and an unclear position on the war matters in Ukraine, there would be some negative things happening. Behind the success of Cambodia's chairmanship of the 40th and 41st ASEAN Summits, Cambodia actually passed through a number of challenging issues before and after the meeting that was conducted. Indeed, the ASEAN summit was the historically largest meeting event, it is abundant of great powers, the international community, and other main NGOs across the world, in which some key factors such as the European Union, United States, China, Russia, India, and especially, Ukraine was honored to be invited via agenda of dialogue partners. However, in contrast, the obvious situation seemed unspecific and always flexible due to some of the superpowers deciding to not join based on a bunch of reasons: First ground, it could be caused by Cambodia's political situation was political instability like occurring the interior controversy, an insecure society that caused by the chaos of demonstrator, especially, coup overthrow leader so on. The second ground, which definitely may come from Cambodia's rule-based foreign policy is about an exercise of lower quality, remaining the most extreme weakness of neutrality, and having no adhering its foreign policy, in contrast, turning to biasedness and non-neutrality that is mirrored its political system was not a plausible spot where suited with those great powers come. In addition, the summit would be under a paralyzed situation and would fail, which might face numerous criticism and shame from other nations around the globe to Cambodia. Furthermore, the leaders from powerful states who were supposed to join the summit would

³⁰⁸ ASEAN.org, "ASEAN Foreign Ministers' Statement on The Situation in Ukraine," ASEAN.org, <https://asean.org/asean-foreign-ministers-statement-on-the-situation-in-ukraine/>. Last access July 11, 2023.

not come. Therefore, it would reflect that Cambodia does not have a good and strong foreign policy which causes the nation not to have good leadership to host or conduct the summit.

Therefore, everything that happened and brought the positive outcome was because Cambodia has a sharp and powerful foreign policy that pushed the nation to be famed at the national level, but also among the ASEAN member state and international level. Cambodia now has a better well known and more recognized, if we compare it to the past that is a positive sign that Cambodia could gain in order to advance and develop the country.

3.1.4. Closer Relations with Ukraine

The relationship between Cambodia and Ukraine became closer, particularly during the Russian invasion. Cambodia has further cooperation in various sectors with Ukraine, such as economics, trade, and education, which boosts Cambodia's development in terms of economy. Furthermore, before the outbreak of the war, Cambodia and Ukraine did not really get close and rarely interacted with each other. However, now the relations of Cambodia with Ukraine are more cordially improved. Additionally, Cambodia has political ties with Ukraine, which makes Cambodia build friendly ties with Ukraine. As Cambodia and Ukraine have become close friends, it shows that Ukraine vows to maintain strong ties with Cambodia to be a long-term sticky friendship unconditionally. For an exact instance, after the ASEAN summit in 2022, Cambodia and Ukraine have built up a more resilient relationship that originated from the root of bilateral meetings via video conference between Prime Minister Hun Hen and President, Vladimir Zelenskyy. That bilateral meeting was widely evidenced that both relationships can move forward together with numerous priorities and comprehensive cooperation, no matter how the current world order has been shifted by Russia's invasion of Ukraine.

3.1.5. Cambodia Demonstrated Its Commitment to International Law and Human Rights

As Cambodia strongly opposes the invasion of Russia into Ukraine's territory, it demonstrated Cambodia's dedication to respecting and elevating the exercise of international law, mainly regarding human rights. Since the war started, Cambodia has been against Russia's aggression and its violation of human rights by voting for the UN resolution, which helped highly lift up its reputation on the global stage. What is more, Cambodia strictly refused and unsupported what Russia had attacked Ukraine, which caused many impacts on the human rights system and human survival. Also, when Cambodia generously offered its training and technical to Ukrainian deminers, voted in UNGA, and unify with different countries, it doubly stimulated a commitment to stand on lawful accuracy and adhere to the principles of international law, especially UN charter and international human rights law. Therefore, without a doubt, Cambodia sustains and obeys human rights and international law with the ambition to bring peace and stability of security to the world even though Cambodia is just a small nation.

3.1.6. Economics Advantages

By supporting Ukraine, Cambodia could strengthen its economic ties with the European Union and the United States, which have imposed sanctions on Russia in response to its actions in Ukraine. This could create new opportunities for trade and investment between Cambodia and these markets in the future. Additionally, Cambodia could benefit from increased foreign aid and assistance from Western countries that support Ukraine. This could help Cambodia address its own development challenges and improve its infrastructure, education, and healthcare systems. Furthermore, Cambodia will be more advanced, while making collaboration with those countries in different factors, such as trade, export Cambodian products to the global market, to achieve economic growth. Additionally,

Cambodia could fasten and facilitate the extension of the economy and access to international markets more easily.

3.1.7. Other Political Advantages

Supporting Ukraine against Russian aggression could also help Cambodia strengthen its relationships with other countries and increase its influence in regional and global affairs by aligning itself with Western countries that support Ukraine, Cambodia could potentially reduce its dependence on China, which has been increasing its economic and political influence in the region. This could help Cambodia maintain its sovereignty and independence in the face of growing Chinese assertiveness. Furthermore, Cambodia could also nudge itself to have closer communication with various states that had distant relations with Cambodia in the past in order to improve a better political and social development. Moreover, Cambodia could also depend on itself which means the nation does not need to always rely on other countries.

3.2. The Impacts of the Cambodia Foreign Policy

3.2.1. The Decline of the Diplomatic Relations Between Cambodia and Russia

As Russia made a full invasion of Ukraine, the relations between Cambodia and Russia seem to be a little unstable. As we already know, Cambodia has condemned Russia for its aggression on Ukraine and does not support the invasion. Besides, Russia has helped Cambodia during the difficult situation and helped Cambodia a lot. Undoubtedly, Russia is displeased with Cambodia when Cambodia supported the UN General Assembly (UNGA) and opposed Russian aggression along with other states.³⁰⁹ Additionally, another thing regarding Cambodia training Ukrainian deminers under the humanitarian act, Russia is surely unhappy about it because Russia was also a part to teach Cambodia demining after the cold

³⁰⁹ Phnom Penh Post, "Russia remains an indispensable partner of Cambodia and ASEAN," Phnom Penh Post, <https://www.phnompenhpost.com/opinion/russia-remains-indispensable-partner-cambodia-and-asean>. Last access July 8, 2023.

war which caused millions of mines in Cambodia. The relations between Russia and Cambodia are still good, but there might be a little instability between Russia and Cambodia. It should be noted that as a friend of Cambodia, Russia should understand why Cambodia is unbiased and oppose its invasion since Cambodia once was invaded, which made Cambodia vow to stand against any invasion.³¹⁰ It means Cambodia does not support any state that violates the sovereignty and independence of another state.³¹¹

This has resulted in reduced economic and assistance aid from Russia. In addition, if the war in Ukraine gets more and more serious which makes Cambodia oppose Russia's aggression, Russia could decrease the amount of bilateral trade to export goods from Cambodia, which could cause a lower economic rate in Cambodia. Furthermore, Russian investment in Cambodia would drop and could impact the economic booth. Moreover, in the future, Russia might stop or even cut the assistance aid to Cambodia which would harm the enhancement of Cambodia. Russia has often provided assistance to Cambodia and also foster other sectors in Cambodia, so when Cambodia does not support or take sides with Russia, especially during the war in Ukraine, Russia might reconsider what they have done so far in Cambodia, particularly the bilateral relations in terms of diplomatic and economic fields that Russia might make Cambodia doubly pressure.

3.2.2. Limited Capacity to Solve the Matter

The war in Ukraine has become a complicated matter that cannot be solved by peaceful resolution or other means until now.³¹² Cambodia does have a limitation to solve the war or end it peacefully. Moreover, according to the foreign policy of Cambodia that is 7-point (which is mentioned in Chapter 2) demonstrates that Cambodia has its limitation of

³¹⁰ Ibid.

³¹¹ Ry Sochan, "PM: Kingdom against forceful invasion," Phnom Penh Post, <https://m.phnompenhpost.com/national-politics/pm-kingdom-against-forceful-invasion>. Last access July 11, 2023.

³¹² Partlett Will, "Why the war in Ukraine is so hard to stop," Pursuit, <https://pursuit.unimelb.edu.au/articles/why-the-war-in-ukraine-is-so-hard-to-stop>. Last access July 8, 2023.

doing something, mainly solving the other state matters, such as the Ukraine war. In addition, Cambodia cannot violate its practiced policy that has been followed and adapted for a long time just to be neutral in order to figure out the confrontations in Ukraine. Frankly, Cambodia respects the principle of non-interference with no support and implementation such as the violation of sovereignty or the territorial invasion and so on.³¹³ Also, Cambodia cannot struggle to force both Russia and Ukraine to end the war because Cambodia does not have hard power or soft power enough to handle the issue of war. Even though Cambodia has, it is still difficult for Cambodia since it is the conflict and the war between two nations. In the case that Cambodia could interfere and mediate between both countries to stop the war if Cambodia made a small mistake, the war would get worse and could lead to World War III which might be involved with the nuclear weapon. So again, Cambodia has the capability and constraint to solve such a big affair.

3.2.3. Conflicts with Other Nations that Support Russia

In the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war, some nations such as Hungary, Belarus, Vietnam, Laos are strongly standing on Russia's side to support and enhance each other's political relations.³¹⁴ Furthermore, Cambodia is opposed to Russian aggression so there might be some conflict between Cambodia with those countries that stand with Russia. In addition, Vietnam and Lao are the neighboring countries of Cambodia. As both nations stand with Russia, while Cambodia does not, it establishes a different ideology and stance between Cambodia and those nations, which could reach to a larger conflict. Therefore, Cambodia might face some problems, such as two different blocs in which one is Russia and another is Ukraine even Cambodia clearly will not stand with either side. However, in the eyes of those countries who

³¹³ Suos Yara, "Respect principle of non-interference," Khmer Times, <https://www.khmertimeskh.com/110539/respect-principle-non-interference/>. Last access July 9, 2023.

³¹⁴ Al Jazeera, "Russia's war in Ukraine challenges old comrades in Southeast Asia," Al Jazeera, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/11/15/russias-war-in-ukraine-challenges-old-comrades-in-southeast-asia>. Last access July 26, 2023.

stand with Russia, they might think that Cambodia is on Ukraine's side and abandon Russia, a long-time friend of Cambodia. Nevertheless, Cambodia has already realized being unable to oppose or align with those supported-Russia countries because it can bring advantageous and disadvantageous impacts to international relations and diplomatic economics, but Cambodia decides to choose a foreign policy direction in order to use its neutrality to keep moving forward with the world situation rather than taking one side between Russia or Ukraine.

CHAPTER 4. FUTURE ANALYSIS OF CAMBODIA'S INDEPENDENT RULE-BASED FOREIGN POLICY

4.1. Analysis of Cambodia's Current Foreign Policy

After being mentioned about a variety of pros and cons in the previous chapter, it is undoubtedly shown that its foreign policy of Cambodia has brought significant benefits for Cambodia internationally despite some challenges. It helps Cambodia to expand its reputation and status on the global stage, such as in ASEAN regional, in the United Nations, and so on, while maintaining the stability of both internal and external peace. Furthermore, as the foreign policy of Cambodia is mainly about neutrality, Cambodia could balance diplomatic relations with many states around the world, especially creating a lot of foreign alliances that could help Cambodia's development. The preliminary thing is that it assures the national security of Cambodia as a small developing country, chiefly during the competition of great power, such as the US-China rivalry. In addition to this, the most important thing is that it prevents Cambodia from becoming an object or the pawn that is used by major power states in order to conquer the world or create a unipolar system, in which only one single state dominates the world. Additionally, it promotes and advertises national prestige and strategically improves the soft power of Cambodia through foreign policy. It is also the mechanism of Cambodia that drives to enhance and embraces Cambodia which has limited capacity and resources to build strong ties with other democratic states in order to guarantee that Cambodia is a dependable country and a trusted partner. Moreover, the policy that Cambodia has followed and obeyed allows Cambodia to avoid direct and indirect threats, essentially to balance gains and losses to enlarge the national interests. The current policy as well reflects Cambodia's flexibility and carefully considers working with other states, especially the superpower states who interact

with Cambodia with any propaganda. Therefore, there are countless gains that Cambodia has earned by sticking with the foreign policy that the government designed.

4.2. Analysis of Cambodia's Foreign Policy Under the Current View of the Russia and Ukraine War

Indeed, during the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war, Cambodia has been continuously affected by a massive risk-contingency by the influence of the Russia-Ukraine war, particularly in its decision-making whether to support international resolutions against Russia or to ignore all those international resolutions and support Russia instead to maintain the long and close relationship between the two countries. There is pressure in every corner either for the West, including the EU and The United States, while other pressure from its closer friend, Russia. Cambodia, on the other hand, has encountered pressure from both sides. Cambodia's firm stance does not only reach to take sides or support either Russia or Ukraine, but in contrast, to firmly support the international peace, and elevate the neutrality as globally in accordance with the adherence to its independent rule-based foreign policy toward the Russia and Ukraine war, which is a Cambodia's political tool that plays a critical role in balancing political stability and enhancing the non-alignment in terms of the global political system.

In fact, the capacity of Cambodia's foreign policy is incapable of ceasing the outbreak of the Ukraine war but capable of supporting them to reach out finding a joint peaceful resolution and international peacekeeping rather than continuing to extend the war longer and longer. Despite Russia continuing its ambition to devastate and take over the Ukraine's territories, but Cambodia also continues to doubly neutralize its policy and clear stance to take part in intervening and addressing the war matters as well as drive both key actors to adapt and respect the international law of the UN charter to pursue the possibility of shifting from enemy to cordial friendship as much as Cambodia can. From the perspective of Cambodia's

government, foreign policy is the first priority strategic policy considered a two-pronged weapon used as a strategic political pathway that deepens in maintaining the rise of diplomatic relations and diplomatic economy without losses and firmly stresses neutrality, and joint peace. In this regard, the abovementioned policy is if just a look is soft, but if a practice is hard (means strong), which obviously reflects over the Ukraine war that Cambodia's practiced policy is an utmost good policy that can correspond all over toward the Ukraine war being able to unveil its soft power policy with sufficient influence enshrining on the international stage that can make all foreign countries turn to support Cambodia's foreign policy sharply. Moreover, those supports are the core joint values and the main driving force in helping Cambodia's policy to be more effective and powerful to bar Russia's invasion of Ukraine can be reached to discontinue. Additionally, during foreign countries supports its policy, Cambodia also can avail itself to grab these opportunities to declare its influence on foreign policy more effectively and comprehensively, further fostering more friendship abroad, promoting economic diplomacy toward the global supply chain, reinforcing multilateralism globally, and enhancing the quality, efficiency, and capacity of Cambodian diplomats in line with Cambodia's foreign policy direction that will be linking with bringing national interest and prosperity.

All in all, Cambodia's independent rule-based foreign policy is absolutely the first utmost priority policy exercised under the wise leadership of the royal government of Cambodia as during the chairmanship of the ASEAN summit and co-chairmanship of the ASEAN-EU summit which is almost the prestige of Cambodia to the globe that lay its foreign policy toward the international arena with full of fundamental neutrality in responding the resolution of Russia-Ukraine war. Consequently, it can be truly witnessed across the world that Cambodia's foreign policy is not what other states should look over, but should turn over

to recognizing and supporting it for joint peace and neutrality together, especially Russia and Ukraine.

CONCLUSION

The Russia-Ukraine war is the current global issue that many states, including Cambodia, are overwhelmingly striving to resolve. Before Russia made its full invasion of Ukraine, there was a warning from Russia, and much analysis and research, has also stated the possibility of war in Ukraine.

The Russian aggression to invade Ukraine was such a shocking and unbelievable action for the whole world. Moreover, when the war emerged, there was also intervention from superpower states and international organizations that got involved with finding peaceful resolutions to the war, such as the EU, the US, NATO, Germany, the UK, and so on, in order to provide military support and warfare to Ukraine to fight against Russia. In addition, there are many impacts on the world as well as Cambodia in various sectors including the economic sector. Furthermore, there are other detrimental impacts on civilians, infrastructures, etc. Besides, there are also serious violations of human rights and humanitarian standards as a result of the prolonged war.

On top of that, Cambodia's independent rule-based foreign policy plays an integral part and contributes to making Cambodia gain many advantages, mainly reputation and complement during the war in Ukraine. Cambodia's decision to be neutral, vote to oppose Russia's aggression, and effort to make solidarity and contribution to resolve the global issues on the international stage, such as in ASEAN Summit is a positive sign of great achievement. Another thing that is related to the humanitarian act of Cambodia towards Ukraine and maintaining sticky relations with both Russia and Ukraine is a wise choice of the Cambodian government. Although, Cambodia adheres to its foreign policy standing on the principle of being neutral, yet, in realistic aspects, Cambodia also exercises without taking sides between both sides, just only supporting international law enforcement and UN resolutions. So, this

can witness and mirror how sharper Cambodia's foreign policy is in the contemporary context of troubleshooting the Russia-Ukraine war.

However, while there was a positive outcome, there are also some challenges that Cambodia faces too, regarding the instability of its economy and politics. On the other hand, the government of Cambodia made a great effort based on an independent rule-based foreign policy to be able to keep balancing the nation's common benefits, sustainable development, and stability of peace, particularly the social prosperity during the Russia-Ukraine war.

RECOMMENDATION

A. Recommendation Related to Cambodia's Foreign Policy in the General Context

Despite all the efforts, it is important for every nation to further expand and updated their foreign policy so that they could be able to make the right decision in a world in which the situation keeps changing. In this connection, having the same foreign policy would be a barrier to the state's development. This research paper also listed down some of the potential recommendations to further enhance and expand the effectiveness of Cambodia's foreign policy.

1. Building Competent Diplomats

Human resource is the most crucial part for one nation to advance the country. Development. In order to boost its diplomacy, Cambodia needs to strengthen human resources development particularly the youth in order to produce the quality and capability of the people. Additionally, Cambodia should strive to build an expert pool of diplomats since they play a significant role to promote the nation in the international arena. More young and dynamic people shall have the opportunity to participate actively in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other representative missions including the embassies and permanent missions of Cambodia abroad. Their voices are the weapons to help the nation defend and protect itself from other external interferences.

2. The Active Involvement from Other Relevant Authorities in Cambodia

The foreign policy of Cambodia in general exercising is actually less complimentary, but obviously, it still remains a relevant point that the government should take serious concentration. In this regard, Cambodia's government should considerably focus on further nudging to build more interconnection between each relevant ministry, such as the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Commerce, the Ministry of Tourism, the Minister of Labor, and so

on, in order to link up working systems all over, which relates to additionally develop and enhance in terms of joint national affairs under its foreign policy. In fact, plenty of relevant ministries in Cambodia should further construct stronger working connectivity of each ministry as essential to better pursue the potential approaches by creating a new procedure in a vision of the era 2023.

For instance, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation should cooperate with the Ministry of Commerce, in order both to reach the new developing level under the rule-based foreign policy to structure and set up an implementation plan that can flourish both institutions towards the foreign states in terms of international cooperation over commercial or foreign affairs factors for Cambodia's development. This strategic process can drive Cambodia's key sectors as foreign affairs and commerce to grow upward with other states of national benefits and sticky friendships in the global political context to receive sustainable development and progress Cambodia's economic growth. Linking with the Russia-Ukraine war, as has been mentioned in the chapter above, Cambodia is principally adhering to its neutrality and non-alignment, therefore, Cambodia's government is high priority able to strengthen and operate the implementation plan or international cooperation of its national institutions with other countries linking with its firm and clear stance on Ukraine war to affirm international region due to foreign policy is massively strong, if the policy is reflected weak, Cambodia is charged or lost reliability from each state and will be no cooperation, no trade, no influence even small part.

Lastly, Cambodia's government is required to not look over this amelioration of each national institution for entire national development under its valuable foreign policy to spread the influences through the policy across the world based on the adoption and national

solidarity to make it happen in all sectors and institutions becoming more progressive and sustainable development.

3. Expanding Soft Power

Cambodia seems to have less soft power when compared with neighboring countries. The government of Cambodia should focus on including more soft power in current foreign policy. For example, boosting tourism, trade, people to people exchange, there are three reasons that Cambodia should include soft power. First, when Cambodia has a strong soft power, Cambodia can influence other states easily, which promotes itself to make other states have further cooperation with Cambodia. Second, it not only advertises the nation but also showcases the core values of Cambodia to the globe. Finally, soft power could benefit Cambodia, particularly during making the decision, such as at the UNGA which means that Cambodia's voice can be heard on the international stage. So, soft power is a major part that not only promotes the country but is also a key factor to influence other countries.

4. Striving to Build Enhance and Expand Relationships Across the World

The interaction and diplomatic relations as well as building alliances are crucial for Cambodia, which is a developing country. Cambodia shall strive to create friendly ties with foreign states, including the regional and international, such as countries in Africa, the Middle East, and the Americas so that Cambodia is not relying on only a few nations in the regions, China, the U.S, or the EU. On the other hand, Cambodia could spread its corporations in those mentioned regions to build more friends for many reasons ranging from politics, and economics to people and people exchanges. Cambodia could ensure peaceful relations and stability of national security once Cambodia balances international relations with various states around the world. Moreover, the more Cambodia has a great number of interactions

with many states, the better Cambodia could attract and work with those countries to make them invest in Cambodia in various fields, such as economics, education, and so on.

5. Sport Diplomacy

Sports also play a big contribution to help Cambodia's development. The government of Cambodia should focus and strengthen more on sports diplomacy. An actual fact, Cambodia hosted the 32nd Southeast Asian Games starting from May 5th to 17th, and the 12th Para Games starting from June 3rd to 9th, which are known as “**SEA GAMES and ASEAN PARA GAMES**” in 2023 for the first time in its history after 64 years.³¹⁵ In addition to this, during the event, there were many Southeast Asian countries participated and sent their officials and athletes to the event, while lots of people from different nations visited Cambodia to be able to join and witness the rare opportunity of the event. Moreover, the Cambodian government waived the participation fees of all the nations that were involved and offered free tickets to audiences who wish to watch the event.³¹⁶ Also, Cambodia earned lots of compliments or appreciation, and increased revenue in the tourism sector which is a major contribution to Cambodia’s economy.³¹⁷ It is another positive achievement for Cambodia as the country has hosted such a biggest event at the international level and is a world-class event. Additionally, Cambodia used the motto “**Sport: Live in Peace**”, inspired by everyday Cambodians who are currently enjoying peace and stability in the kingdom.³¹⁸ Obviously, Cambodia's reputation has spread to the globe. Therefore, as the results that Cambodia has gained from the event, the Cambodian government should consider sharpening and enhancing

³¹⁵ Gunston Jo, “Southeast Asian Games at Cambodia 2023: Three things to know,” Olympics.com, <https://olympics.com/en/news/things-to-know-southeast-asian-games-cambodia-2023>. Last access July 19, 2023.

³¹⁶ OCA, “SEA Games host Cambodia provides free accommodation for 5,000 athletes,” Olympic Council of Asia, <https://ocasia.org/news/3958-sea-games-host-cambodia-provides-free-accommodation-for-5000-athletes.html>. Last access July 19, 2023.

³¹⁷ IPS Cambodia, “From Underdog to Champion: Cambodia's Successful Hosting of 2023 SEA Games,” IPS Cambodia, last modified July 19, 2023, <https://ips-cambodia.com/cambodia-successful-hosting-of-2023-sea-games/>.

³¹⁸ Cambodia 2023, “About Cambodia 2023,” Cambodia 2023, <https://www.cambodia2023.com/info>. Last access July 19, 2023.

diplomacy by using sports to be able to maintain and balance the nation's benefits and development.

6. Strictly Implement the 7 Foreign Policy

As Chapter 2 mentioned above, Cambodia's rule-based foreign policy contains the main 7 points that have been designated restrictedly during exercising. Cambodia's government must strictly take the most serious and precise role to ensure, observe and oversee all corners of its foreign policy over the principle of Foreign Policy before the implementation process of policy. The reason is that those key 7 avoided points might be the most detrimental impact of hundreds of challenging crises on Cambodia's foreign policy that can make Cambodia face risky losses of national interests. Particularly, it will be able to propel the decline of effectiveness such as the neutrality system can lead towards the negative notion of national political stability, economic diplomacy in the view of comprehensive economic partnership, international relations, and the incapability of enhancing the quality of diplomats. Furthermore, the current world situation is the happening Russia-Ukraine war. So, Cambodia's government should pay more attention by carefully exercising its policy towards new context, making robust sure that Cambodia's foreign policy is neutral, unbreakable, not under control, and non-interchangeable from the pressure of any country, especially Russia and Ukraine's counterpart no matter how Cambodia's situation is facing.

B. Recommendations Related to Cambodia's Foreign Policy in the Context of the Russia and Ukraine War

1. Maintain Bilateral Relations with Russia

Cambodia-Russia relations remain stronger even though some differences exist over the Ukraine crisis. Even after the collapse of the Berlin Wall in 1989, the two countries have

continued to enjoy good relations and cooperation on all fronts.³¹⁹ Trying to avoid any kind of decisions that might make the relations even worsen such as withdrawing Russia from the United Nations Security Council, military fightback, and so on is very crucial for Cambodia. Cambodia should remain its friendly interaction with Russia, even though Russia invaded Ukraine. Also, to maintain bilateral relations and closer cooperation is one thing that Cambodia should do in order to reflect the capability and commitment of a small state to remain a good friend with Russia. Clearly, Cambodia must create friends more than enemies that could threaten the security of the nation.

2. Avoid Being Trapped by Ukraine Diplomacy

As the war in Ukraine emerged and still continues, Ukraine seems to have more friendly interaction with Cambodia. In addition, Ukraine tries to connect and ask for Cambodia's solidarity to support the nation and against Russian aggression, especially during the video call with Cambodia's Prime Minister a few times.³²⁰ However, when Ukraine persuades Cambodia to stand with its country, Cambodia should carefully stick with helping the Ukrainian and strictly respect the rule of law. Cambodia must not fall into an unbiased and stand on one side, mainly with Ukraine as it is not a wise choice. Furthermore, Cambodia should be aware of Ukraine diplomacy because Ukraine might pull Cambodia little by little to bias on its side that makes Cambodia lose the neutrality that the nation has adhered since the outbreak of the war. So, Cambodia should avoid the diplomacy that was set by Ukraine to trap Cambodia to be on their side as best as it could because, once Cambodia is trapped by Ukraine diplomacy, the unbiased foreign policy that Cambodia used will not be effective and undoubtedly, there will be criticism and diplomatic problems with Russia too. Cambodia

³¹⁹ Phnom Penh Post, "Russia remains an indispensable partner of Cambodia and ASEAN," Phnom Penh Post, <https://www.phnompenhpost.com/opinion/russia-remains-indispensable-partner-cambodia-and-asean>. Last access July 25, 2023.

³²⁰ The Cambodia Daily, "Cambodian PM Hun Sen holds phone meeting with Ukrainian leader Zelenskyy," The Cambodia Daily, <https://english.cambodiadaily.com/politics/cambodian-pm-hun-sen-holds-phone-meeting-with-ukrainian-leader-zelenskyy-182928/>. Last access July 26, 2023.

should maintain close relations with Ukraine under the context of developing the country, but not too close that makes Cambodia lose the dignity of neutrality and national benefits with other states. As long as the war does not end, Cambodia must cling to the rule of law and foreign policy that the country has adapted and implemented and be aware of the main propaganda from Ukraine towards the nation.

3. Balance the Nation's Interests in Any Kind of Situation

Cambodia's national interest is essential, especially under the Russia-Ukraine war. Additionally, Cambodia should strictly balance its nation's interests while also making it flexible in any kind of situation that easily adapts to new circumstances that occur, such as the Ukraine war. Moreover, in the case that the decision could affect or is not supported by Cambodian citizens, the Cambodian government should consider it again to emphasize the preservation and protection of the whole value of Cambodian benefits. Furthermore, the government must indicate that the national interest of the country is already balanced and will bring positive signs to advance the country. Also, the balance and protection of national interest is a key element to the path of stability of peace.

4. Encourage Both Nations to Continue Peaceful Negotiation

Negotiation is a significant method of an international peaceful resolution in line with the UN resolution to find collective peace. This also applies to the war in Ukraine, in which only negotiation could end the war and earn peace. In this regard, Cambodia must keep neutrally encouraging both parties Russia and Ukraine, which is to suddenly stop sparking a long-term war with each other. It should be noted that the war cannot end by war, so only peaceful means of negotiation can effectively deal with the war. Additionally, the Cambodian government should firmly suggest both Russia and Ukraine have a sustainable and peaceful negotiation with each other face-to-face without using any force, in order to build a

relationship to become a better long-term friendship. Also, it might not be an easy task to persuade both parties to negotiate, but Cambodia could strive to use strategic neutrality to unify with various states, such as the US, China, the EU, and so on to encourage Russia and Ukraine to get a joint negotiation peacefully without continuously extending war as both nations are currently fighting.

5. Encourage the International Community to Provide More Humanitarian Assistance

War cannot end war, so it is important to continue encouraging the international community to provide more humanitarian assistance and not providing weapons. Cambodia should contribute to encouraging behalf of the adhered rule-based foreign policy country to extensively reflect that the war cannot end by the war. In addition, when various nations around the globe are providing military weapons to support Ukraine, it will be intensified, leading the ongoing war to be more largely complicated and protracted and severely causing human suffering. However, the entire international community should better shift from providing military support to supplying humanitarian assistance to help rescue Ukrainian people instead. The reason is as there are many civilians or people who are being suffered and harmed by the war, and they extremely need international humanitarian aid to help sustain their difficult situations. If many states still continue to support military weapons to Ukraine, the war will not end and resolve peacefully which will likely bring serious damage to Ukraine that is hard to recover.

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