



Royal University of Law and Economics

Final Report on

**United State of America Foreign Policy
toward North Korea: The Case of
Nuclear Program**

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**International Program
Bachelor's Degree in International Relations
Cohort 8
Year of Submission: 2020**



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ABSTRACT

Since the partition of the Korean Peninsula following World War II, North Korea started to develop the nuclear program aiming to secure national security and reunite the Korean peninsula. In the early 1980s, North Korea started construction on a nuclear project with the assistance of the Soviet Union, and established its first nuclear plant, at Yongbyon. The pursuit of a nuclear weapon by North Korea has shaken the foundations of US foreign policy in Northeast Asia. Moreover, the rising of the North Korea nuclear program is becoming a major concern to the shared border country, especially the Republic of Korea (ROK). While most countries agree that North Korea should not be able to undertake nuclear production, considering their attempts to roll back North Korea's nuclear program, the Pyongyang administration has focused on producing and researching nuclear capabilities as long as possible. Since anti-proliferation is along with terms of American foreign policy, relations to North Korea is a fundamental responsibility of the U.S president to protect human rights and the spreading of democracy and liberal values. The US, together with China, Japan, Russia, and South Korea, have important positions involving the North Korean negotiations.

The following thesis paper will discuss the U.S. administration's policy from President Bill Clinton until President Donald Trump, to look at the various strategies these presidents had implemented to achieve their denuclearized goal.

Keywords: U.S Foreign Policy, North Korea, Nuclear Program.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

DPRK:	The Democratic People Republic of Korea
US:	The United State
ROK:	Republic of Korea
USSR:	The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
UN:	The United Nation
UNSC:	The United Nation Security Council
KPA:	Korean People's Army
WWI:	World War I
WWII:	World War II
WPK:	Worker's Party of Korea
NPT:	Non-Proliferation Treaty
IAEA:	International Atomic Energy Agency
PSI:	Proliferation Security Initiative

CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION

1.1. Background Information

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), also known as North Korea, tested and produced the first nuclear weapon in 2006.¹ North Korea's pursuit of nuclear power stems has posed the US foreign policy concerns on the Korean peninsula with the most political and security challenge, posing threats both regional stability and the global non-proliferation regime. The intention of North Korea to install nuclear and chemical weapons rooted back to the 1950s when the USSR and China were supporting their back with financial and technology aids.² With its advanced technology in the nuclear weapon; North Korea continues to conduct the nuclear tests countless times which is an alert threat to the shared border country, Republic of Korea (ROK), and Japan. It has become obvious to the world that North Korea has possessed an active nuclear weapons program, and Pyongyang has not been fear to use it. Moreover, it is also obvious that North Korea has long and short-range ballistic missiles that can not only threaten the region but potentially the United States, and through proliferation, areas as far away as the Middle East. The effort to halt the North Korea Nuclear Weapon has occupied the past U.S. administration, include the current president Donald Trump.

When looking back to the previous administration of the last three presidents, Bill Clinton, George W. Bush, and Barak Obama; we can conclude that they all had needed to handle Pyongyang nuclear strategy during the first year of their term. Despite the attempt to resolve the problem with North Korea, past U.S administration address the North Korea crisis's have at times slowed or temporarily halted Pyongyang's progress, but have failed to roll it back or

¹ Ed Payne, "World Leaders React to North Korea's Nuclear Test," February 12, 2013, <https://edition.cnn.com/2013/02/12/world/north-korea-nuclear-reax/>

² "North Korea," Nuclear Threat Initiative - Ten Years of Building a Safer World, accessed April 12, 2020, <https://www.nti.org/learn/countries/north-korea/nuclear/>

to fundamentally change the dynamics of conflict on the Peninsula. North Korea put its efforts to strengthen its military capacity potentially its nuclear weapon program. North Korea has put its efforts to potentially strengthen its nuclear weapons program by strengthening its military capability. North Korea's leader strongly believes in the military and nuclear power that could help achieve its goal of reuniting the Korean Peninsula and state sovereignty. And while President Donald Trump's current administration appears to face many challenges to reaching bilateral talks with the DPRK's leader.

The primary purpose of this research paper is to discuss the four U.S. foreign policy administrations on the North Korean Nuclear Weapon Program. This paper therefore will narrow define the actual solutions the former US president used to deal with the case of the North Korea nuclear program.

1.2. Research Question

North Korean attempted to produce a high range of nuclear weapons is to secure its power as an outsider country. As the possibility of the North Korea nuclear weapon could reach the U.S territory, this crisis has to become the center policy deal for the U.S. administration. As a result, this thesis paper will seek to explain the North Korea crisis, and it will mainly focus on three main questions.

The specific research questions of this paper are:

1. How were the U.S-North Korea diplomatic relations over the nuclear program so far?
2. Which foreign Policy strategic stance of the U.S administration used in dealing with the North Korea nuclear program?
3. How were the four U.S. Presidents implementing their foreign policy in the office during their term?

1.3. Research Objectives

The purpose of this final report are 1) to examine relations between the United States and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) on North Korea's nuclear program after the end of the Cold War to identify a range of problems that have so far struggled to settle, 2) to illustrate how this four administration of the United States introduced their foreign policies on North Korea, 3) to explain American efforts to deal with the development of North Korean nuclear weapons.

1.4. Scope and Limitation

This final report is limited only to the four administration of U. S's foreign policy in dealing with the North Korea nuclear crisis since President Bill Clinton until president Donald Trump. The scope of the study covers the years 1945 up to the present (2020). The analysis of this thesis only describes and explains the data analysis from the expert and the academic website generally detail in a way the United States has stated their main policy. Moreover, this study is an attempt to find the best policy option and implement the U.S. strategy that applied to North Korea, but and therefore seeks to explain why each policy fails to make North Korea's leaders cooperate with the international world.

1.5. Research Methodology

This research is focused on a secondary source, including E-books and internet databases. The data regarding the North Korean information and foreign policy of each of the U.S presidents had been collected from the official websites of both countries, a government archive, journals, scholar publications, policy paper, the publication of the United Nations, and the United Nation Security Council.

1.6. Structure of Research

This final research paper consists of five chapters. The first chapter presents the

introduction, background information of the U.S foreign policy on the DPRK's nuclear weapons issues, research question, research objective, scope and limitation, research methodology, and structure of research.

The second chapter seeks to explain the literature review of the United State policy and the example of the U.S. previous policy toward Pakistan and Iran.

The third chapter will present an overview of Korea's Democratic People's Republic. It explains North Korea's political status and ideology, which is led by the ruling Kim family. It also describes in this chapter the development of the North Korean Nuclear Weapons Program from 1950-2020. Indeed, current North Korea nuclear cannot fully understand without reference from its ambitions in the past. This paper is going to explain how North Korea started its Nuclear Weapons program and how international response to these dangerous issues.

The fourth chapter is the main content of this thesis, which aims to identify a chorology of U.S. foreign policy from the last three administrations and President Donald Trump's current policy. It also describes the variety of negotiations using the "carrot" incentive and the "stick" coercion methods to curb nuclear issues in Pyongyang. Furthermore, this final study seeks to examine and identify the foreign policy significance of the President in a given time to deal with North Korea and to maintain peace on the Korean Peninsula under the Clinton administration, Bush administration, Barack Obama administration, and Donald Trump administration. This paper will explain how the U.S. president responds to the North Korean nuclear program and negotiating strategies and behavior in nuclear talks with North Korea.

The fifth chapter is the final part of the thesis that will discuss the sanction imposed by the two main actors, the UNSC and the US, against North Korea's illicit activities. It will also explain the challenge of imposing sanctions on North Korea when North Korea is very close and secret to the outsider or known as a "hermit kingdom." The end of this chapter will discuss

the two nations' future relations after the U.S. election and the Worker's Party of Korea (WPK)'s 75th founding anniversary to North Korea. Whether the two are going to restore their diplomatic talk or halt the discussion on the matter.

CHAPTER II: LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1. Origin of the U.S. Foreign Policy

For the first 150 years in this country, the US has tried to stay geopolitically isolated from its European neighbors. According to David Skidmore and John Hulsman, after the beginning of the post-Cold War period in the early 1990s, three foreign policy schools of thought have primarily dominated the fundamental approach and course of US foreign policy: realism, neo-conservatism, and liberal internationalism.³ According to George Washington Farewell Address in 1789 contained one major piece of advice to the country regarding relations with other nations: “The great rule of conduct for us concerning foreign nations is to have with them as little political [as distinct from commercial] connection as possible.”⁴ The Administration of the United States has utilized a variety of tactics in its response to international security problems. Which also included ways of unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral negotiation.

To understand the origin of the U.S. foreign, we need to know that during the government's growth, the Founders were split into two political philosophy groups, the Federalists and the Anti-Federalists. Federalists historically supported a federal government with large powers to regulate markets, create a national army, and handle state conflicts. This party, headed by Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and George Washington, served the concerns of landowners and traders, endorsed the Constitution, and tried to dispel doubts of strong national authority.⁵ However, the other side led primarily by Patrick Henry and George Mason, the Antifederalists represented the interests of small farmers, shopkeepers, and

³ KIM Hyun, Comparing North Korea Policies of the Obama and Trump Administrations, *NANZAN REVIEW OF AMERICAN STUDIES* Volume 39 (2017): 45-69.

⁴ “The Development of Foreign Policy,” Office of the Historian, accessed April 15, 2020, <https://history.state.gov/department-history/short-history/development>.

⁵ Pat Paterson, Origin Of U.S. Foreign Policy (Perry Center Occasional Paper, February 2018), page 4-8 https://www.williamjperrycenter.org/sites/default/files/publication_associated_files/Origins%20of%20US%20Foreign%20Policy.pdf

frontiersmen argued that “a strong national authority run by a small group of elites or aristocrats could abuse citizens’ rights much as King George III had done from England during the War of Independence.”⁶ They therefore strongly supported a confederacy of tiny republics, where states held a balance of authority and the government was not permitted to infringe the privileges of individuals.⁷

The result of this debate has been a sequence of constitutional compromises that have an enormous effect on both domestic and foreign policy. The US structure is constitutionally autonomous as a product of federalism which is defined by the minimal federal authority over both states and individuals. States hold tremendous constitutional and economic sovereignty. The debate for the interests of states has led to America 1861-1865 Civil War and the massacres of about 680,000 Americans for the freedom of Southern plantation owners to hold African Americans as slaves. Furthermore, state sovereignty has a huge effect on US foreign policy.⁸

For the United State foreign policy is a multi-faceted topic of which human rights and democracy promotion is only one of several important interests. Trade and security arrangements with other nations are critically important points of negotiation. Holding a complex and multi-issued international relationship between the U.S. and another country hostage to one single matter when numerous others are at stake is often perceived to be counterproductive to U.S. interests. The foreign policy of America in the 1930s was focused on the realist school of thought. To pursue economic rejuvenation, it promoted free commerce, although its defense policy revealed the realistic limitations of Hans Morgenthau's classical doctrine of realism by eliminating the international presence of its military.⁹

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ “Literature Review of US Foreign Policy,” UKEssays, accessed April 25, 2020, <https://www.ukessays.com/essays/international-relations/literature-review-us-foreign-policy.php?vref=1>.

From a realist point of view, the significant concern for the U.S. national interest during the cold war period is the high dominant in power and security, while preventing any aggressive rival from the competitor and its allies. However, realists did not believe in the view of moral or humanitarian value and the goal of foreign policy. Realists viewed that the U.S. should be selfish for its national interest, embracing the military power to enhancing national security, the preponderance of power, economic prosperity, and the stability of the international system. Even though they support obtain strong military power, but realists did not support the policy of regime change to democratic through military intervention. For instance, as in the Iraq War, that is not just because it does immense human and material disruption, but also because it greatly damages American prestige. And if there is a serious threat to defense, realism prescribes political approaches first, rather than the usage of military powers.¹⁰

Neo-conservatives consider the key national interests to maintain its hegemonic position and promote the ideals of liberty, economic rights, and free-market capitalism practiced by the United States to the outer world. First, the U.S should obtain power in the military to sustain its national security, preventing threats from other countries. Second, the spreading of value to the international community is really important for the U.S, if necessary they can use military power. Third, policies must be placed in motion to remove or overturn governments or institutions that endanger American values and stability. Neo-conservatives recommend a US pre-emptive military strategy against them where required.¹¹

Liberalism was inspired by president Woodrow Wilson, who believes that the U.S. should consider focusing on peaceful negotiation rather than using military power. The spread of democracy is really important, and the international institution is a core mechanism to

¹⁰ KIM Hyun, Comparing North Korea Policies of The Obama and Trump Administrations, NANZAN REVIEW OF AMERICAN STUDIES, 2017, page 3

¹¹ Ibid

enforce cooperation between the countries. Unlike neo-conservatives or realists, it's claimed by liberal internationalists that the U.S. Should follow an interaction strategy, rather than a containment policy or confrontation with the non-democratic nations, by multilateral processes.¹²

After the end of the Cold War, due to the unipolar world system and the Western intervention in “economic assistance” in non-democratic nations, the pursuit of democracy has been an essential component of US (and Western) foreign policy. From Theodore Roosevelt’s “national mission” to Wilson’s commitment in Europe and Latin America, from F.D. Roosevelt’s “Four Freedoms” “age of limits”, from Clinton’s “democratic enlargement” to Obama’s “stepping back” and “stepping up”, and to Donald Trump's "America First", democracy promotion has been always vividly present in US foreign policy.¹³

Foreign policy for the United States has shifted significantly from the day of George Washington. While Americans often pay attention to their beloved founder's leadership, obviously the world was not the same. Today, many people who shape American foreign policy accept the fact that the US is a member of a world community that cannot afford to ignore the importance of getting along with it.¹⁴

2.2. The U.S. Foreign policy: The Pakistani Case

Pakistan is considered to possess approximately 160 nuclear warheads, which was known as a state of the fastest-growing stockpile.¹⁵ Pakistan has stockpiled about 3.4 ± 0.4

¹² Ibid

¹³ Alessandro Badella, “Review - US Foreign Policy and Democracy Promotion,” E-International Relations, Last modified May 31, 2015, <https://www.e-ir.info/2015/05/26/review-us-foreign-policy-and-democracy-promotion/>.

¹⁴ UShistory.org, “Foreign Policy: What Now?,” ushistory.org (Independence Hall Association), accessed April 25, 2020, <https://www.ushistory.org/gov/11a.asp>.

¹⁵ “Pakistan,” Nuclear Threat Initiative - Ten Years of Building a Safer World, accessed May 1, 2020, <https://www.nti.org/learn/countries/pakistan/nuclear/>.

metric tons of highly enriched uranium (HEU) and produces enough HEU for 10 to 15 warheads a year. Pakistan also has an arms-grade plutonium stockpile of about 280 kg.¹⁶

Pakistan nuclear program began in January 1972, after the country lost to the war of 1971 with India that led to the creation of Bangladesh.¹⁷ The main reason that motivated Pakistan to develop nuclear programs because of the nuclear bomb explosion in India, in 1974. There was no other country was shaken by the India nuclear test as much as Pakistan.¹⁸ The Prime Minister of Pakistan, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, viewed that activities of India are a tragic development, as a result, Pakistan considered declaring that it would develop its nuclear program.¹⁹

The U.S administration though the remarks of the Pakistan Prime Minister was just a moral word to boost his national security which in the period of recovery from the Indo-Pak war. However, the intention of Pakistan was real, and the U.S realized that the possible nuclear program in Pakistan would happen soon. Thus the beginning of U.S foreign policy on Pakistan had started include the weapon program of Pakistan since then. The U.S accepted the reality that, a serious intension of Pakistan in developing nuclear threats was affected the U.S interest in the Afghanistan war and the security in the South Asian region.

The United States has experimented with three separate diplomatic approaches to curbing Pakistan's nuclear program since the mid-1970s, but only one of those approaches stays viable today. The first strategy was one of bilateral coercion, which occurred in the 1970s in which the 80s Cold War context. The US has offered to provide Pakistan with military equipment to counter its traditional imbalance with India. The idea was if Pakistan felt assured

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Bhumitra Chakma, *Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons* (New York: Routledge, 2009), 18–19.

¹⁸ Ama Mehmood, "American Policy of Non-Proliferation towards Pakistan: A Post-Cold War Perspective." *PakistanHorizon* 56, no. 1 (2003): 35-58. Accessed May 05, 2020. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/41394011>

¹⁹ Ibid.

that it would abandon its nuclear program conventionally. The approach was failed because Pakistan insisted that the nuclear program was peaceful and was not agreed to replace the nuclear deterrence for weaponry convention. Moreover, Pakistan did not trust the U.S. promise to be a Long-term supplier of conventional weapons in the light of the arms embargo imposed following 1965 The Indo-Pakistan War and the sanctions of the late 1970s.²⁰

The second approach of the United States was to focus on multilateral diplomacy. Indian nuclear test of 1974, promoted the establishment of a foreign export Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) control regime to limit the movement of critical nuclear components and dual-use equipment to non-NPT countries. Other export control instruments, such as the Missile Technology Control Regime (1987) and the Australia Group (1985), were subsequently established to support the global nonproliferation establishment. International treaties such as the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (1996) and the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (proposed in 1993 and still to be negotiated) were – in part – intended to curb non-NPT nuclear programs. However, Pakistan opposed to the international treaties and viewed that the creation of international regimes was to eliminate its nuclear program.²¹

The third U.S. policy was unilateral economic sanctions and regulations on non-proliferation aimed at ending Pakistan's nuclear program include the Symington Amendment (1976), Glenn Amendment (1977), Solarz Amendment (1984), and the Pressler Amendment (1985). These laws usually restricted international assistance to non-NPT states who were actively engaged to seek nuclear power or to secretly sell nuclear energy overseas. At first of the implement progress, these treaties were work on Pakistan, it helped to slow down the development of nuclear arm, however, it ultimately failed after the U.S dropped the sanction

²⁰ Feroz Hassan Khan, Ryan W.French, U.S.-Pakistani Nuclear Relations: A Strategic Survey (2014), 19-22.

²¹ Ibid.

policy in Afghanistan during the Soviet war, and instead supplied Islamabad with economic and military assistance. After the cold war ended, the U.S re-imposed sanctions on Pakistan in the purpose to roll back the nuclear program, but this time failed to prevent Pakistan nuclear test in 1998. In 2001, sanctions were suspended again, due to the need for Washington to safeguard Pakistani counterterrorism and counterinsurgency collaboration in the borderlands between Afghanistan and Pakistan.²²

Today Pakistan continues to confront a growing debt burden and a continuing trade deficit on the economic front. Besides, the high-profile tensions between Pakistan and neighboring India and Afghanistan have occasionally contributed to violence and continue to pose a challenge to regional and international stability.²³

2.3. The U.S. Foreign Policy: The Iranian Case

Since World War II the Middle East has started to capture the main focus of the foreign policy of the United States. Over the last forty years, US strategy in the Middle East has been focused on a variety of conventional geopolitical priorities, including maintaining the stable transfer of global oil sources and economic activity; avoiding the spread of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction; fostering the protection and prosperity of US allies. Among the countries in the Middle East, the U.S. administration also paid extra attention to the Iranian state, a state that supports terrorism and pursuit of weapons of mass destruction.

From history, the U.S. and Iran used to have a good relationship with each other. For instance, on March 05, 1957, The United States and Iran sign the Cooperation Concerning Civil Uses of Atoms agreement as part of President Dwight D. Eisenhower's "Atoms for Peace"

²² Ibid

²³ "The Current Situation in Pakistan," United State Institution of Peace, Last updated August, 11 2020. <https://www.usip.org/publications/2020/08/current-situation-pakistan>.

initiative, under which developing countries receive nuclear education and technology from the United States. This sets the groundwork for the country's nuclear program and the U.S. eventually supplies Iran with an enriched uranium fuel reactor and weapons-grade. They maintain their cooperation until the onset of the 1979 revolution in Iran.²⁴

Following the Iranian revolution in 1979, Khomeini takes power as the supreme leader in December, turning Iran from a pro-West monarchy to a vehemently anti-West Islamic theocracy. Khomeini says Iran will try to “export” its revolution to its neighbors. In 1985, the militant group Hezbollah emerges in Lebanon and pledges allegiance to Khomeini.²⁵ The 1979 revolution transformed Iran into a cornerstone of US diplomacy, and what then-President Jimmy Carter described as "an island of peace in one of the world's most unstable regions" one of the main threats to the global status quo and foreign structure.²⁶ The United States, under the leadership of George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton, began making huge restrictions on Iran. In 1992, Congress enacted the Iran-Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act, which bans goods that may be used for developed weapons development. In 1995 the White House extends restrictions for a full ban on energy and commerce. The law requires the United States to slap sanctions on foreign companies that invest more than \$20 million a year in Iran’s oil or gas sector. The sanctions are, however, not enforced until 2010 despite protests by European countries.²⁷

A similar case to the Democratic People of Korea, The United States administration has upheld a foreign policy for resolving the North Korean and Iranian nuclear challenges. Incentives, pressures, and threats have limited success in these two states. Such systems will be

²⁴ “U.S. Relations With Iran, 1953–2020,” Council on Foreign Relations (Council on Foreign Relations), accessed May 10, 2020, <https://www.cfr.org/timeline/us-relations-iran-1953-2020>.

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Suzanne Maloney, “America and Iran: From Containment to Coexistence,” Brookings, Last modified July 28, 2016, <https://www.brookings.edu/research/america-and-iran-from-containment-to-coexistence/>.

²⁷ Ashish Kumar Sen, “A Brief History of Sanctions on Iran,” Atlantic Council, Last modified May 8, 2018, <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/a-brief-history-of-sanctions-on-iran/>.

immediately brought back after a nuclear attack, but at unacceptable human and economic risks and a heavy likelihood of reconstitution and growth. Therefore, for certain policymakers, the safest choice is to isolate these systems before they collapse or pressures build to compel negotiations on U.S. terms.

North Korea and Iran are very different states which share at least one crucial similarity: decades of estrangement from the efforts of Washington and the US to isolate them from the international community. They also play a destabilizing role in the region where they live, lacking respect for fundamental democratic freedoms and maintaining anti-American policies, friends, and allies. Washington is strongly supporting the isolation, which is remarkable in which the U.S. advocates the engagement, which sharply constrains an already limited U.S. policy arsenal.

Assessing almost a decade of attempts with Iran, it is evident that a more ambitious approach is required in Washington. For both instances, nothing short of a paradigm shift away from denuclearization is required to modify the trend of bad outcomes. The new paradigm, predicated on solid bipartisan consensus, should accept as a prelude to denuclearize the national security implications of a mediated nuclear suspension. Allowing Iran to maintain its current nuclear potential will provide them with a substantial opportunity to comply with international monitoring aimed at increasing the integrity of their nuclear programs and capacities and securing nuclear materials.

Negotiating a nuclear pause will not be easy. Washington has misunderstood the complex and often paradoxical effect of its efforts to isolate Iran on decision making in the states. North Korea and Iran have based policy decisions on lessons gained from the failure to fulfill their standards of nuclear agreements. As a consequence, they began to see their nuclear weapons as critical tools for deterring attempts at regime change; improving diplomatic power

in negotiations, and maintaining adequate political prestige with the United States to allow any consideration of their desires.

Regardless, the two countries North Korea and Iran have the same purpose to pursue the nuclear weapon, which against the desire of the United State, but the nature of the two countries' political behaviors is different in many ways. Iran is a country that is more accessible and flexible than North Korea. It has an unpopular government, an educated middle class, and a young population that is eager to join the international community, making the regime more susceptible to pressure and incentives. Another important distinction is that, as a last resort, a military solution to deter Iran from possessing the weapon remains possible. In North Korea, military preemption has long been stopped by the geopolitical fact that most South Koreans, including Seoul's capital, are beyond the control of thousands of North Korean missiles, and all North Korean neighbors, including South Korea, are resistant to military intervention to deter proliferation. Consideration of the surprise attack on the Iran nuclear program would of cause costly as well as problematic, but allowing Iran to advance its nuclear program would cause more than the prevention. Thus, the military option use on Iran is remaining a possible option, and several Iranian neighbors also support the policy of the U.S.²⁸

Finally, in the case of North Korea, this paper will seek to elaborate on the diplomatic methods that United States administration conduct their foreign policy through a political/diplomatic strategy to cope with North Korean leadership transition, to settle the North Korea nuclear problem, and further to enhance peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia.

²⁸ Philip H. Gordon and Amos Yadlin, "Will Iran Become the Next North Korea?," Foreign Affairs, Last modified September 21, 2017, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/north-korea/2017-08-01/will-iran-become-next-north-korea>

CHAPTER III: OVERVIEW OF DPRK

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK, also known as North Korea) is a country that upholds a communist regime. It is a state with a population of some 25 million people, located on the northern half of the Korean Peninsula between the East Sea (Sea of Japan) and the Yellow Sea.²⁹ Following the end of World War II in 1945, Japan lost control of Korea to the allied force (U.S and USSR). Therefore, Korea was divided into two occupied zones along the 38th parallel, with the United States administering the southern half and the Soviet Union administering the northern half. Since then, the DPRK has started to isolate himself from the world. In North Korea, there is only one ruling party namely, the Workers' Party of Korea which was established in 1948 by Kim Il Sung.³⁰ This date is celebrated each year as the Day of the Foundation of the Republic.

Kim Il-Sung, nevertheless, had the intention to unify Korea again with support from the Soviets and China. On June 25, 1950, North Korea invaded South Korea. The U.S. came to be back up for South Korea. The intense fight was last for three years until 1953 that had resulted in mass devastating as 3 million casualties, including 35,000 American death.³¹ Hence, the Korean Armistice Agreement was created and re-established the line of division at the 38th parallel, with a demilitarized zone extending two kilometers in both directions.

²⁹ "East Asia, "Sout East Asia: North Korea," Central Intelligence Agent, accessed May 15,2020, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/kn.html>.

³⁰ "Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea) Country Brief," Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, accessed May 15, 2020, <https://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/democratic-peoples-republic-of-korea/Pages/democratic-peoples-republic-of-korea-north-korea-country-brief>.

³¹ Matthew Green, "A Brief History of North Korea and How It Became One of America's Biggest Threats (with Lesson Plan)," KQED, Last modified April 25, 2017, <https://www.kqed.org/lowdown/26701/how-north-korea-became-a-rogue-state-a-brief-history-with-lesson-plan>.

After the fights, the DPRK was fully supported by Russia post-war aid. During 1953-1970, Russia was helping North Korea to build up the economic and military again. Kim Jong Il at that time was thinking of building the country by advancing its military power and nuclear weapons. North Korea's investment in mining extract reached its peak, which has helped the country a great deal to population and country.

Despite the growth of mining extraction, the country was dramatically impacted by the economic decline of the Soviet Union and Eastern bloc, its primary source of aid, and trade in the 1980s. In 1991, the fall of the Soviet Union left North Korea politically, economically, and militarily unaided, with China as its only remaining main ally.³²

From 1994-2016, North Korea increasingly isolated from the world. Without aid from the Soviet, Kim Jong-il establish a newly adopted policy called "Songun," or "Military First." The DPRK under this new system uses its nuclear reactor to develop a nuclear weapon program. In 2006, the underground nuclear weapon was successfully tested by the DPRK. Due to this illicit action, the Pyongyang faced a sanction from the U.N Security Council on a broad array of trade and travel sanctions. Despite the U.S and international efforts to remove the nuclear program, North Korea maintains to develop its nuclear program.

The current supreme leader of North Korea is Kim Jong Un, who was appointed as a third president in the Kim Dynasty. Kim Jong Un took over the power from his father Kim Jong Il when he died from a heart attack in 2011. Under the Kim Jong Un regime, North Korea continued to separate itself from the world, and focus on the military build-up and heavy industry, especially mining while sending a mixed signal to the outsider about its nuclear development.

³² Richard W. Chadwick, "A Short History of Contemporary North Korea and International Politics," Political Science Department University of Hawaii at Manoa, accessed May 18 ,2020, <http://www.hawaii.edu/intlrel/pols315s11/NorthKorea.pdf>.

3.1. The Current Political of North Korea

The DPRK's political system since the 1980s is often best described in terms of the concept of the "Suryong (leader) system." Within the present context, this refers to a "system whose purpose is to perpetuate the guidance of the leader through hereditary succession."³³ In the history, the roots of the DPRK's political system had been influenced by the socialist dictatorship of Leninism, it is based on North Korea's own Juche ideology, and therefore the "Suryong" has replaced the "party" as the nucleus of political leadership. Its internalized purpose is to perpetuate its rule through a good more comprehensive and exhaustive regimentation of the population.³⁴

From generation to generation, the supreme leader of the DPRK followed the same vision and ideology, commonly known as Juche (self-reliant) ideology. However, following the collapse of the Soviets in the 1990s, North Korea's economy that used to rely on the Soviet's aid was facing a crisis to feed up their populations. As a result, the supreme leader of the DPRK made a deal with the sponsor countries to abandon its nuclear program, including the United State, South Korea respond to the aid agreement. The current DPRK leader, Kim Jong Un, tends to have a diplomatic conversation with outside countries, but the world believes that the DPRK has not demonstrated its willingness to roll back its nuclear development.

Today, the DPRK is a centralized government that strictly control by the WPK, which has Kim Jong Un as the highest authority. The government restricts all civil and political liberties, including freedom of expression, assembly, association, religion. It also bans all government opposition parties, independent media, civil society, and trade unions.³⁵

³³ "International Circumstances in the Asia-Pacific Series (North Korea's Political System), Japan Digital Library (March 2016), Accessed May 20, 2020. https://www2.jiia.or.jp/en/pdf/digital_library/korean_peninsula/160331_Takashi_Sakai.pdf .

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ "World Report 2019: Rights Trends in North Korea," Human Rights Watch, January 17, 2019, <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2019/country-chapters/north-korea>.

Furthermore, Kim Jong Un continues to develop the missile and nuclear test the same path as his father and grandfather.

3.1.1. Juche Theory

Juche ideology's origins begin with Kim Il-sung, who ruled the country as a supreme leader from 1912 until he died in 1994.³⁶ In the 1950s, the idea was invented to cut off the power of the Soviet Union and to convince its people of the legitimacy of the government. Around the time, the de-Stalinization campaigns continued in the Soviet Union after the death of Stalin, who helped Kim Il-Sung take power, and there was increasing criticism of Kim Il-Sung in North Korea for the loss of the Korean War.³⁷ Moreover, the revised constitution of 1982 adopted '**Juche**' as the official ruling ideology of North Korea. The leader Kim IL Sung was renamed as 'KIM-II-Sung-Ism' or simply called 'Kimism' in 1974 following the Juche theory.³⁸

The DPRK Government retains Juche steadfastly in all areas of revolution and development. Establishing Juche means the nation accepting the concept of overcoming the revolution and rebuilding one territory. In seeking answers to the issues that occur in the revolution and development, it requires keeping an independent and creative approach. It implies solving those problems mainly by one's efforts and in conformity with the actual conditions of one's own POLITICS country. The realization of independence in politics, self-

³⁶ Jacob A. Terrell, "Political Ideology and Language Policy in North Korea," University of Hawaii ,2007, accessed May 25, 2020, <https://journals.linguisticsociety.org/proceedings/index.php/BLS/article/download/3545/3245>

³⁷ Chan Lee and Woo-ik Yu, "North Korea under Kim Jong Il," Encyclopædia Britannica (Encyclopædia Britannica, inc., Last updated July 30, 2020), <https://www.britannica.com/place/North-Korea/North-Korea-under-Kim-Jong-II>.

³⁸ "North Korea Leader: 'Juche(Self-Reliance)' Ideology," 'Juche(Self-Reliance)' Ideology | Korean Peninsula A to Z | KBS WORLD Radio, accessed May 25, 2020, http://world.kbs.co.kr/special/northkorea/contents/archives/supreme_leader/ideology.htm?lang=e.

sufficiency in the economy, and self-reliance in national defense is a principle the Government maintains consistently.³⁹

According to the North Korean Constitution stipulates in Article 3 state that "The Democratic People's Republic of Korea is guided in its activities by the Juche idea and the Songun idea, a world outlook centered on people, a revolutionary ideology for achieving the independence of the masses of the people." The Workers 'Party is led only by Kim Il-sung's Juche ideology and revolutionary thought.⁴⁰

Today the ruling Kim family in Pyongyang uses Juche Ideology as an ideological weapon to justify its dictatorship and hereditary strategy of domestic power succession, as a way to justify its closed-door structure internationally, and as an ideological instrument to achieve a communist revolution in the South.⁴¹ The Juche ideology shapes the North Korean view and approach to diplomacy and any relations. The implement of the Juche ideology is protecting its country from taking advantage of and also preventing other countries from interfering in internal affairs. The practicing of the Juche principle is a major influence to urge North Korea to establish its nuclear development program.

3.1.2. Kim Dynasty

The three-generation of Kim family has ruled the North Korea country since the end of World War II after receiving independence from Japan on September 9, 1948. The Kim Dynasty refers to the Mount Paektu Bloodline or Mount Baekdu Bloodline in North Korea. The founder of the Democratic People Republic of Korea is Kim IL Sung in 1948. The three men from the Kim family have followed the same practice which focuses on the dimension of

³⁹ "Juche Ideology," Democratic People's Republic of Korea (Korean Friendship Association), accessed June 5, 2020, https://www.korea-dpr.com/juche_ideology.html.

⁴⁰ Naenara, "North Korea: Constitution," ICL Project, accessed June 05, 2020, https://www.servat.unibe.ch/icl/kn00000_.html

⁴¹"Juche Ideology," accessed June 6, 2020, http://www2.law.columbia.edu/course_00S_L9436_001/North%20Korea%20materials/3.html.

nuclear weapon development and sees nuclear weapons as the major guarantee of their state security.

➤ **Kim IL Sung, 1912-1944**

The first leader of the DPRK was Kim Il Sung, who was installed by the Soviet Union following Japan's defeat in 1945. Kim Il Sung reversed in the DPRK as the Great leader Sung is the founder of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) and fashioned the national ideology of "*Juche*," or patriotic self-reliance.⁴² Kim Il Sung held all the main positions of the party, including WPK General-Secretary, President of the Politburo, and Chairman of the Central Military Commission, until his death on July 8, 1994, when he was named "Eternal President" or "Great Leader." Kim Il Sung remained widely cherished, with over 500 statues of him across the country.

➤ **Kim Jong IL, 1942-2011**

Kim Il Sung's oldest son, Kim Jong Il, was named Secretary-General of the WPK in 1997. Since 1994, Kim Jong Il has been the de facto chief of the DPRK, serving as President of the National Defense Commission (now the State Affairs Commission or SAC), and even Secretary-General of the KWP and Supreme Commander of the People's Armed Forces. Kim Jong IL become the supreme leader of the DPRK from July 8, 1994, until Dec 17, 2011. The state declared Kim Jong IL as "Dear leader".

➤ **Kim Jong Un, 2011-Present**

After Kim Jong Il's death in December 2011, his third son, Kim Jong Un, was swiftly announced as "Great Successor" and Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army. In September 2010, he was named a four-star general and a member of the Workers' Party Central

⁴² "The Despotism Dynasty: A Family Tree of North Korea's Kim Clan," TIME | World, Last modified February 24, 2017, <https://time.com/4681304/north-korea-kim-family-album/>.

Committee and Central Military Commission. The following month he appeared on the podium alongside his father at celebrations for the 65th anniversary of the party. He became a leader in December 2011 after his father's death.⁴³ On 9 May 2016, after the first WPK Congress in 36 years, Kim Jong Un was elected as a Chairman of the WPK.

Today, Kim Jong-un is the leader of the DPRK, and he has the same long-term task as his father and grandfather: to ensure the survival of the regime under the control of himself and his eventual familial successor.⁴⁴ In the first year of his power, Kim Jong Un has implemented a PR style that has been portrayed as the modern vision of his grandfather. In February 2013, it was the first nuclear test conducted under the Kim Jong Un regime. This nuclear test was capable of the pace of both underground detonations and long-range missile tests quickened dramatically. By 2017 North Korea had done a total of six nuclear tests, including at least one system believed to be small enough by North Korean officials to install on an intercontinental ballistic missile.⁴⁵


Since the time Kim Jong Un came to the power, the military system of the DPRK has been ruled rebalance again, with the authoritarian leader favoring the regularization and formal institutionalization of the party's levers of power to bring influential factions to heel, particularly within the military. For example, in June 2018, Kim replaced three top military generals: the chief of the military's general staff, Ri Myong-Su; the director of the military's

⁴³ Neil Johnston and Sam Joiner, "Explore Three Generations of North Korea's Ruling Family," *The Kim dynasty-The Time* (Times Newspaper), accessed June 10, 2020, <https://extras.thetimes.co.uk/web/interactives/ae3d525daf92cee0003a7f2d92c34ea3.html>.

⁴⁴ Andrei Lankov, "North Korea Explained: The Kim Dynasty Has Learned the Lessons of History," *Australian Financial Review*, Last updated April 27, 2017, <https://www.afr.com/world/asia/north-korea-explained-the-kim-dynasty-has-learned-the-lessons-of-history-20170427-gvtdjj>.

⁴⁵ Lorraine Murray, "Kim Jong-Un | North Korea Political Official," *Encyclopædia Britannica* (Encyclopædia Britannica, inc., Last modified January 2, 2020), <https://www.britannica.com/biography/Kim-Jong-Eun>.

political bureau, Kim Jong-gak; and the defense chief, Pak Yong-Sik.⁴⁶ Kim Jong Un is more focused on the state military capacity and the development of nuclear weapons. Even though the DPRK has faced a serious sanction from the international community, it has no willingness to halt its nuclear program. More importantly, he also has the diplomacy dilemma with the U.S. leader Donald Trump, related to the war of word and the failure of several diplomatic talks. Despite the consequences that he faces due to his political behaviors, Kim Jong Un is still an unpredictable man under the name of DPRK's leader.



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Figure 1: The Structure of the Kim Dynasty

⁴⁶ Eleanor Albert, "North Korean's Power Structure," (Council on Foreign Relations, last modified June 17, 2020, accessed June 19, 2020), <https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/north-koreas-power-structure>

⁴⁷ "North Korea's Power Structure," Council on Foreign Relations (Council on Foreign Relations), accessed September 1, 2020, <https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/north-koreas-power-structure>

3.2. North Korean Nuclear Program

3.2.1. The DPRK's Nuclear Program (1950-2020)

For almost seventh decades North Korean has been pursued Nuclear Weapon technology that has gradually develop in size, complexity, and capacity. Korea's ballistic missiles pose a direct challenge to North Asia's defense, and North Korea's proliferation of missiles poses a threat to other regions, especially the Middle East and South Asia. The nuclear program can be traced back to about 1950s when Kim Il Sung realized the scale of destruction of the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki with the atomic “doomsday” weapon.

After failing to unify the Korean peninsula by force in the 1950s, North Korea started the ballistic connection with the Soviet Union and China, which were a strong ally. During the 1950s, the Soviet Union provided training North Korean scientists and engineering the basic knowledge to initiate the nuclear program near the town of Yongbyon.⁴⁸ Then in the mid-1960s, North Korea has been able to manufacture short, intermediate, and long-range ballistic missile and surface to sea missile, and has shown the capabilities of a submarine ballistic missile launch.

By the late 1980s to the early 1990s, the scope of North Korea's nuclear program expanded, as Pyongyang began the development of a suite of new medium and long-range missiles primarily using Scud-type engines. North Korea first tested the medium-range Nodong missile in 1990, and the development of the multi-stage Taepodong-1 and Taepodong-2 missiles may have begun around that time as well. Although North Korean was a member of the Non-proliferation treaty in 1985, in an effect the North Korea leader Kim iL Sung did not dismantle its nuclear development.

⁴⁸“North Korea,” Nuclear Threat Initiative - Ten Years of Building a Safer World, Last updated July 2020, <https://www.nti.org/learn/countries/north-korea/>.

The first North Korea crisis came to the attention of the International Community in 1992 when the **International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)** discovered that its nuclear activities were more extensive than declared.⁴⁹ Due to the inspection from IAEA, The DPRK decided to leave the IAEA in 1994, this issue has caused international concern. As a result, the UN and other allies' countries imposed a heavy sanction again North Korea. The DPRK faces many internal and external security challenges from the international community especially the U.S due to its ballistic activities. North Korea declared to be an isolated nation that neither open for diplomatic talk nor foreign relations. Despite the political and technical obstacles facing North Korea's missile engineers, the country has already deployed over 800 ballistic missiles, and Pyongyang will continue to develop and deploy new missiles.⁵⁰

In violation of the united nations Security Council resolutions, North Korea keeps pursuing its nuclear enrichment and attempt to build a long-range missile improvement effort. Although the scale of North Korea's uranium enrichment program remains unclear, the U.S Intelligence corporation estimate that it has sufficient plutonium to produce at least six nuclear weapons, and probable as much as sixty.⁵¹

Until recently in the 21st century, the expansion of North Korea's capacity on nuclear weapon has never stopped even the state are dramatically facing several sanctions and military confrontations from the U.S and international community. North Korea carried out its first nuclear test on 8 October 2006 and its second one on 25 May 2009. Since Kim Jong-un came to power in November 2011, there have been three more tests. The most recent and biggest test

⁴⁹ "North Korea," Overview of North Korea, Last updated July 2020, <https://www.nti.org/learn/countries/north-korea/>

⁵⁰ "A Timeline of North Korea's Nuclear Tests," CBS News (CBS Interactive, Last updated September 3, 2017), <https://www.cbsnews.com/news/north-koreas-nuclear-tests-timeline/>. <https://www.cbsnews.com/news/north-koreas-nuclear-tests-timeline/>

⁵¹ "North Korea Crisis | Global Conflict Tracker," Council on Foreign Relations (Council on Foreign Relations, August 20, 2020), <https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/north-korea-crisis>.

took place on 9 September 2016 – with an explosive force of ten kilotons (the atomic bombs used on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945 were between ten and 20 Kt).⁵² In September 2017, the DPRK conducted its sixth nuclear weapons test which was the most powerful test so far. Like previous tests in 2016, it once more claimed to possess developed hydrogen, or thermonuclear, which might represent the further advancement in the nuclear program and the ability to build a powerful nuclear weapon.⁵³ The condition has been much more serious in recent years. North Korea performed two samples of the Hwasong-14 rocket during the summer and autumn of 2017, launched ballistic missiles straight into the Pacific over Japan, and exploded what it claimed was a thermonuclear bomb. They launched their latest Hwasong-15 in November that year, a weapon that experts say may have hit the whole U.S.⁵⁴

Since 2006 until 2020, the DPRK has successfully conducted a nuclear test for 6 times:

Figure 2: North Korea Nuclear Test

No	Time	Type of Weapons	North Korea's Claim
1 st	09 October 2006	Underground Nuclear explosion	North Korea claimed that the test represented a further crucial turning point in both the country's foreign and security policy strategy and its main attempts at legitimizing its nuclear program. ⁵⁵

⁵² Michael Paul, Elisabeth Suh, "North Korean's Nuclear Arm Missiles,"(SWP comments,2017),https://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/comments/2017C32_pau_suh.pdf

⁵³ "North Korea Crisis | Global Conflict Tracker," Council on Foreign Relations (Council on Foreign Relations, August 20, 2020), <https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/north-korea-crisis>

⁵⁴ "North Korea's Nuclear Program," Foreign Policy for America, accessed July 25, 2020, <https://www.fp4america.org/north-korea-nuclear>.

⁵⁵ Hanns Günther Hilpert and Oliver Meier, "Facets of North Korea Conflicts,"(SWP Research Paper, December 2018), https://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/research_papers/2018RP12_hlp_mro_ed.s.pdf

2 nd	25 May 2009	Underground Nuclear	North Korea said that it had carried out a powerful underground nuclear test - its second test, which was much larger than one the regime conducted in 2006. ⁵⁶
3 rd	12 February 2013	Successfully detonated a miniaturized nuclear device	Official state media in North Korea claimed the test was done safely and seeks to deal with "outrageous" U.S. aggression that "violently" threatens the democratic, independent right of the North to launch satellites. ⁵⁷
4 th	06 Jan 2016	Hydrogen Bomb Test	State television in North Korea reported that the government had tested a "miniaturized" hydrogen bomb, bringing the "military strength" of the nation to the next point, supplying it with an arsenal to protect itself against the United States and its other enemies.
5 th	09 Sep 2016	The nuclear warhead test explosion	North claimed the fifth nuclear test was a hydrogen bomb, which led to

⁵⁶“A Timeline of North Korea's Nuclear Tests,” CBS News (CBS Interactive, Last updated September 3, 2017), <https://www.cbsnews.com/news/north-koreas-nuclear-tests-timeline/>.

⁵⁷ “North Korea,” Nuclear Threat Initiative - Ten Years of Building a Safer World, accessed June 10, 2020, <https://www.nti.org/learn/countries/north-korea/nuclear/>

			wide condemnation and tougher international sanctions. ⁵⁸
6 th	3 Sep 2017	Hydro Bomb Test	North Korea said it had successfully developed hydrogen(thermonuclear) the weapon that could be placed on a ballistic intercontinental missile. ⁵⁹

3.2.2. North Korean Nuclear Strategy in 2020

According to Kim Jong Un’s speech at the planetary meeting of the 7th Central Committee of the Worker’s Party of Korea, held Dec. 28–31, Pyongyang is continued to develop the “necessary and prerequisite strategic weapons”.⁶⁰ Kim Jong had announced that the DPRK will not give up its state security over the economic crisis. The announcement said the missile being tested would "be delivered to units of [the Korean Peoples' Army]," which observers have believed that the missile will soon be operational. In a statement a day earlier, KCNA reported the launches were part of an “artillery fire competition between large combined units of the Korean People’s Army.” In recent years, Kim Jong Un and his officials have vowed to pursue a "new way," developing North Korea's nuclear arsenal, giving up talks with the US, and focusing increasingly on economic and diplomatic assistance from China and Russia.⁶¹

According to another speech of Kim Jong Un:

⁵⁸ “North Korea Conduct Its Fifth test of Nuclear Weapon,”(The NPR, press release, Last updated September 8,2016), <https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2016/09/08/475854951/seismic-activity-in-north-korea-indicates-possible-fifth-nuclear-test>.

⁵⁹ “U.S-North Korea Relations,” Congressional Research Service, Lasted update: April 29, 2020, <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/IF10246.pdf>

⁶⁰ “Arms Control Today,” North Korea Tests First Missiles of 2020 | Arms Control Association, accessed September 1, 2020, <https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2020-04/news/north-korea-tests-first-missiles-2020>.

⁶¹ Anthony Kuhn, “Kim Jong Un Says North Korea No Longer Bound By Testing Moratorium,” NPR (NPR, January 1, 2020), <https://www.npr.org/2020/01/01/792805183/kim-jong-un-says-north-korea-no-longer-bound-by-testing-moratorium>

*“If we fail to put spurs to the struggle for bolstering our strength for self-development while waiting for the lift of sanctions, the enemies' reactionary offensive will get fiercer and they will dare to check our advance. The more we bolster up our strength and create valuable wealth on the strength of self-reliance and self-sufficiency, the greater agony the enemies will suffer, and the earlier the day of victory of socialism will come. The DPRK will steadily develop indispensable and prerequisite strategic weapons for national security until the US rolls back its hostile policy and a lasting and durable peace mechanism is in place.”*⁶²

However, the exact plan of the North Korean leader, Kim Jong Un regarding “New Strategic Weapon” might be soon fully detail after October 10, the 75th founding anniversary of the Worker’s Party of Korea (WPK).

3.2.3. International Response

North Korea’s ambition to pursue nuclear weapons is dated back to the time when North Korea started to receive advanced technology from the Soviets. To respond to the North Korea nuclear provocation, in 1990, the United States negotiated the Agreed Framework to freeze North Korea’s nuclear weapon program while pursuing the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. In 1992, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) had discovered that North Korea discovered that its nuclear activities were more extensive than declared. The IAEA proposed to inspect the nuclear site of North Korea, however, North Korea rejected and announced to leave the NPT, a treaty that was signed between the United State and North Korea to prevent the development of the nuclear weapon. The United States, Japan, and South Korea establish the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) to implement the 1994 Agreed Framework and oversee the financing and construction of the two light-water reactors. KEDO breaks ground in August 1997.⁶³

⁶² “Report of the Fifth Plenary Meeting of the 7th Central Committee of the WPK (Kim Jong Un's 2020 New Year Address),” NCNK, January 2, 2020, https://www.ncnk.org/resources/publications/kju_2020_new_years_plenum_report.pdf/file_view.

⁶³ “North Korean Nuclear Negotiations: A Brief History,” Council on Foreign Relations, Council on Foreign Relations, accessed July 18, 2020, <https://www.cfr.org/timeline/north-korean-nuclear-negotiations>.

Despite the limited success of the NPT and Agreed Frame Work to cope up with the North Korea regime, South and North Korea, China, Japan, Russia, and the United States launch a diplomatic initiative known as the Six-Party Talks to bring the DPRK to the negotiation table. There is a sixth round of the Six-Party Talk, therefore, the result from the talk did not end the ambition of the rogue state. The Six-Party Talk failed due to multiple North Korea nuclear and missile tests, leading to imposed several sanctions against North Korea such as the serious economic and trade sanctions from the U.S. and series of sanction resolutions imposed by the United Nation Security Council. In 2018, President Moon Jae-in of the Republic of Korea and Donald Trump president of the United State help a series of summits with Kim Jong-Un under the goal to halt the nuclear development in Pyongyang.

Until now, the crisis in North Korea is ongoing because from the treaty, to sanctions, and diplomatic negotiation, North Korea still cannot make its promise and put itself unbounded to the international regime. For more discussion regarding the intending of the U.S. to deal with the North Korea issue will explain in the following section. Additionally, will explain fully about the involvement of the NPT, the Agreed Framework, and the Six-Party Talk.

CHAPTER IV: U.S FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD NORTH KOREA

NUCLEAR WEAPON PROGRAM

4.1. U.S Foreign Policy during Bill Clinton Administration

When Bill Clinton became the president of the United State in 1993, the tension between the U.S and the Soviet Union that had lasted for the half-century after World War II was over. The nation has become the only superpower in the world, it had led an international coalition to roll back Iraq's annexation of Kuwait. The United State seemed to have not only the resources to resolve international problems, but also the will to do so.⁶⁴

However, President Bill Clinton was a person who was interested in domestic policy rather than foreign policy. President Bill Clinton thought that "the end of the Cold War would release both financial resources and human resources within the policy community that could now be mobilized for the daunting task of restructuring the American economy".⁶⁵

While Clinton was concerned with domestic politics, the United States needed to face that there is still an international dispute that requires the commitment of the U.S president. The cold war was ended, however, North Korea is remaining as an isolated state and attempt to possess nuclear power. North Korean's behavior had to become a threat to the International Community and American foreign policy. Because of the former president's previous failure to stop the illicit action in North Korea, President Clinton inherited this problem. President Bill Clinton's approach to the DPRK matter was distinct in that it was the first time that the U.S

⁶⁴Kim, Ilsu, "A Comparative Analysis of President Clinton and Bush's Handling of the North Korean Nuclear Weapons Program: Power and Strategy,"Pacific Focus, October 2008, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/230532758_A_Comparative_Analysis_of_President_Clinton_and_Bush's_Handling_of_the_North_Korean_Nuclear_Weapons_Program_Power_and_Strategy.69-106

⁶⁵ Seyon Brown, *The Faces of Power: United States Foreign Policy from Truman to Clinton*, 2nd ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 584

formally engaged in direct talk with North Korea policymakers. Clinton's position in this region was complicated as he had to preserve South Korea's military strategy as well as to prevent the DPRK from joining the Nuclear State community.

The Clinton administration's foreign policy toward North Korea focused on three important issues including the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, the Agreed Framework, and the terrorism list. The risen of nuclear weapons was a major problem that required a solution from the Clinton administration at the time. Regarding a priority on domestic affairs, the administration spent time addressing the advancement of North Korea's nuclear weapons.⁶⁶ There is three initial policy of Bill Clinton on North Korea: 1) Clinton's bilateral approach, 2) Economic reward and the use of diplomatic mean, 3) international regime.

4.1.1. Clinton's Bilateral Strategy

In 1994, when the door is opened for bilateral talk, the administration of Clinton demanded the DPRK to freeze its development of nuclear activities and ease all the production of the mass weapon of destruction from the Kim Il Sung regime. In June 1994, the former president of the United State, Jimmy Charter successfully convicted the North Korean to return to dialogue. North Korea finally confirmed to freeze its nuclear activities and resume a high-level talk with the United States.⁶⁷ However, the Clinton bilateral approach indicated a direct diplomatic negotiation with the Pyongyang with the exclusion of countries such as South Korea, China, Japan, and Russia. Before the high-level talk happened, President Kim Il Sung died, and then it succeeded by his son Kim Jong Il. Regardless of the changes in the North Korean leadership regime, the bilateral negotiation between the two countries was resumed, and on 13

⁶⁶ Andrew Derewiany, "U.S Foreign Policy Toward North Korea : 1945 to Present," U.S Foreign Policy Toward North Korea : 1945 to Present (2011), http://etd.fcla.edu/CF/CFH0003766/Derewiany_Andrew_O_201105_BA.pdf

⁶⁷ Lisa Collins, "25 Years of Negotiations and Provocations: North Korea and the United States," CSIS Beyond Parallel, accessed July 20, 2020, <https://beyondparallel.csis.org/25-years-of-negotiations-provocations/>.

August 1994, the primary agreement was signed. Ultimately, following two more months of the bilateral talk, the Agreed Framework was signed on 21 October 1994. In the process, North Korea committed to freezing its nuclear reactors and allowed the inspector of IAEA to monitor the implementation process. In exchange, the U.S. promised to provide sanctions relief, aid, oil, and two light-water reactors for civilian use.⁶⁸

Clinton's bilateralism consisted of high-level talks addressing the problems and disagreements between the two nations, ranging from matters relating to the nuclear project, economy, diplomacy, and military use.

The Agreed Framework ended an 18-month crisis during which North Korea declared its intention to withdraw from the NPT, in which North Korea agreed not to produce nuclear arms. The Clinton administration made remarkable progress in fulfilling this aspect of the framework towards the end of its second term.⁶⁹The below section is the details between the two parties agreed to fulfill of the Agreed Framework.

The Agreed Framework

The Agreed Framework was signed in 1994 between the United State of America and the Democratic People Republic of Korea. The meeting was held in Geneva from September 23 to October 21, 1994, to negotiate an overall resolution on the nuclear issues of the Korean peninsula. The Agreed Framework's purpose was to replace North Korea's nuclear power program with U.S-supplied light-water reactors, which are more resistant to nuclear proliferation.⁷⁰

⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁹ "The U.S.-North Korean Agreed Framework at a Glance | Fact Sheets & Briefs," Arms Control Association, Last modified July 2018, <https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/agreedframework>.

⁷⁰ "Agreed Framework Between the United States of America and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (1994)," Asia For Educator | Columbia University, accessed July 25, 2020, http://afe.easia.columbia.edu/ps/korea/us_dprk.pdf.

According to the Agreed Framework, both parties agreed to:

- I. Both sides must work closely to upgrade the graphite-moderated reactors and associated systems of the DPRK with light water reactor (LWR) power plants.
- II. The two sides will move toward full normalization of political and economic relations.
- III. Both sides will work together for peace and security on the nuclear-free Korean peninsula.
- IV. Both sides will work together to strengthen the international nuclear non-proliferation regime.⁷¹

4.1.2. Economic Rewards and the Use of Economic and Diplomatic Means

The Clinton Administration's original strategy was focused on the assistance program through which the government operated on economic rewards for North Korean concessions and bargained bilaterally through diplomatic means. The Agreed Agreement contained provisions for economic assistance for the DPRK and advantageous trade relationships. The regime, in effect, would be limiting its nuclear arms output. Theoretically, bilateral relations between the two countries would gradually improve, and a landmark in Clinton's legacy was characterized by the bilateral negotiations resulting from the Agreed Framework.⁷²

The Clinton administration's key reward consisted of a commitment by the US and its allies to ship fuel oil to North Korea and to build proliferation-resistant light-water reactors in the country to offset the North's power generation losses by relinquishing its allegedly peaceful

⁷¹ "Agreed Framework Between the United States of America and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea," U.S. Department of State (U.S. Department of State), accessed July 25, 2020,

<https://2001-2009.state.gov/t/ac/rls/or/2004/31009.htm>.

⁷² Gunsik Kim, "Clinton and Bush Administrations' Nuclear Non-Proliferation Policies On North Korea: Challenges and Implications Of Systemic and Domestic Constraints," *Clinton and Bush Administrations' Nuclear Non-Proliferation Policies On North Korea: Challenges and Implications Of Systemic and Domestic Constraints* (dissertation, 2005), <https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=5199&context=etd>.

nuclear power program. President Bill Clinton lifted a half-century restriction on trade, travel, and banking sanctions against North Korea as a rewarding for North Korea's willingness to comply with the agreement not to test any missile which might reach Hawaii or Alaska.⁷³ Indeed, North Korea used its nuclear weapon program as a bargaining chip to gain economic assistance from the international community especially to lift the tension from the United State. However, there was a debate between scholars that the U.S. should use the stick as opposed to North Korea's threat rather than the use of carrot negotiation.

Despite the debating theory between scholars, the Clinton administration had chosen the diplomatic negotiation as the primary option. Besides, if carrots weren't working, the Clinton Administration had planned to use the sticks strategy. According to Robert Gallucci, despite warnings about the possible risks involved in adopting a proactive stick strategy, the United States had intended to step forward with attempts to have the UN adopt economic sanctions.⁷⁴ Clinton had hoped that by refusing to give North Korea a negotiated settlement, the Chinese would see this give as a fair attempt to settle this conflict, and not veto a potential subsequent Security Council sanction resolution.⁷⁵ After evaluating US officials' stance on using an economic 'reward and sanction' approach, the North Korean case indicates a balance between the two strategies, and the tone they combine makes all the difference. The promise of non-proliferation advantages, and otherwise the threat of punishment, must still be present in US policy.⁷⁶

⁷³ Terrence Hunt, "Clinton Ends Most N. Korea Sanctions" (Global Policy Forum, Last modified September 18, 1999), <https://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/202/42450.html>.

⁷⁴ William E. Berry. 1995, US Air Force Academy Institute for National Security Studies. "North Korea's Nuclear Program: The Clinton Administration's Response," INSS Occasional Paper 3. <http://atlas.usafa.af.mil/inss/OCP/ocp3.pdf>.

⁷⁵ Ibid.

⁷⁶ Michael. J. Mazarr, 1997, "North Korea and the Bomb: A Case Study in Nonproliferation. New York," NY: Macmillan Press.

-4.1.3. The International Regime: NPT and IAEA

The Clinton administration has been a consistent supporter of the international non-proliferation regime consisting of conventions, international organizations, multilateral and bilateral agreements, and unilateral acts, each intended to avoid further proliferation.⁷⁷ The major components of the international regime include (1) Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which have 180 member states, commits representatives of non-nuclear weapons not to obtain or build them, and requires foreign inspections of all nuclear activities, and (2) The IAEA, founded in 1957 in Vienna, regulates the peaceful use of nuclear materials; and (3) other actors such as the international export control regimes.

The NPT and IAEA have played very significant roles in nuclear detection Weapons and, more importantly, North Korea's nuclear program. Nevertheless, while the international system to which they belong is one of the most important sources of measure for implementing the Clinton administration's policies, it may also be a source of constraints. The Clinton administration, for instance, used the IAEA and the NPT to monitor undeclared nuclear sites in North Korea, though no other country had demanded such inspections.⁷⁸

4.2. U. S Foreign Policy during George W. Bush Administration

President George Bush came into office in January 2001, the Bush team has deliberately distanced itself from the Clinton administration's policy of engaging the former "state of concern."⁷⁹ On 6 June 2001, Bush released a statement presenting the current strategic goals of the United States regarding North Korea's nuclear and missile development and its military

⁷⁷ "U.S. COMMITMENT TO THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS," NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY, October 15, 1997, <https://fas.org/nuke/control/npt/docs/commnpt.htm>.

⁷⁸ Gregory Elich, "Targeting North Korea," Centre for Research on Globalisation (CRG), December 31, 2002, <https://archives.globalresearch.ca/articles/ELI212A.html>.

⁷⁹ John Feffer, "Bush Policy Undermines Progress on Korean Peninsula," Institute for Policy Studies, last modified May 8, 2014, https://ips-dc.org/bush_policy_undermines_progress_on_korean_peninsula/.

powers. Bush stated that if North Korea took positive actions in response to his policy, the United States "will expand our efforts to help the North Korean people, ease sanctions and take other political steps".⁸⁰ The Bush administration recognized the Agreed Framework's shortcomings and saw a need to shift the strategy of an international policy against North Korea. Bush formed a significant part of his foreign policy during the State of the Union speech in 2001, in which he identified North Korea as part of the "axis of evil".⁸¹

The Bush administration promptly proposed a complete review of US policies against North Korea after assuming office. However, key members of the administration and several Congressmen resisted the implementation of the Agreed Agreement in its existing form. The Agreed Framework required Pyongyang to fully disclose its nuclear program, but North Korea did not cooperate fully and the IAEA was unable to verify the comprehensiveness of North Korea's report. The Administration declared in June 2001 that it would undertake the "Comprehensive" negotiations which would require a further lifting of the United States sanctions, providing humanitarian aid and "other political steps" where the North committed to verifiable actions to minimize its traditional military posture against South Korea, "improved implementation" of the Committed Framework and acknowledged "verifiable restrictions" on its nuclear program and a restriction on its missile exports.⁸²

In January 2002, according to George W. Bush: Remarks at Dorasan Train Station in Dorasan, South Korea, President Bush claimed the U.S. has no intention of attacking North Korea and fully endorsed the South Korean President's "sunshine policy," which facilitated

⁸⁰ Nicksch, Larry A. 2003. "North Korea's Nuclear Weapons Program." <http://fas.org/spp/starwars/crs/IB91141.pdf>.

⁸¹ "Bush 0-for-3 with the 'Axis of Evil,'" Bush's Foreign Policy: A Disaster, accessed August 10, 2020, <https://web.stanford.edu/~moore/AxisEvil.htm>.

⁸² The American Presidency Project, University of California, Santa Barbara, "Statement on the Completion of the North Korea Policy Review," June 6, 2001.

interaction.⁸³ The United States and North Korea scheduled talks for the summer of 2002, but they were postponed after a naval skirmish between North and South Korea on 29 June 2002 in which 19 South Korean troops were killed. While, the parties agreed to implement the Agreed Framework; in August 2002, with US envoy Jack Pritchard present, the concrete basis for the first light-water reactor to be supplied under the KEDO agreement was poured out. The US also encouraged North Korea to collaborate on verification with the IAEA, but North Korea stated it would not do so for another three years and threatened to drop out of the Agreed Framework entirely if quicker progress on reactor construction was not achieved. A new crisis, unfortunately, began in October 2002. After a visit to Pyongyang, then-Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and Pacific Affairs James A. Kelly allegedly revealed details of a clandestine highly enriched uranium (HEU) development plan in North Korea. Plutonium or HEU can be used on a nuclear weapon as fissile material. According to the Bush administration, North Korea admitted the allegation and said the Agreed Framework had been revoked. The United States, Japan, and South Korea released a trilateral statement saying that the undeclared uranium enrichment program represented a clear violation of the Negotiated Arrangement, the NPT, the IAEA safeguards deal with North Korea, and the Joint North-South Declaration on Korean Peninsula denuclearization of the Korean peninsula.⁸⁴

North Korea released a statement on 25 October 2002 saying that it could acquire nuclear weapons. North Korea has even refused numerous IAEA requests to discuss the issue of uranium enrichment. North Korea has refused numerous IAEA efforts to discuss the issue

⁸³ The American Presidency Project, University of California, Santa Barbara, "George W. Bush: Remarks at the Dorasan Train Station in Dorasan, South Korea," February 20, 2002, and The White House, "President Bush & President Kim Dae-Jung Meet in Seoul," press release, February 20, 2002.

⁸⁴ Richard Boucher, Department of State Spokesman, Press Statement, "North Korean Nuclear Program," October 16, 2002; Joint US-Japan-ROK Trilateral Statement, October 27, 2002; "KEDO Executive Board Meeting Concludes," November 14, 2002, KEDO website.

regarding uranium enrichment. On 29 November 2002, the IAEA Board of Governors adopted a resolution calling on North Korea to discuss reports of a plan for uranium enrichment and comply with its safeguards deal. The resolution stated that "any other covert nuclear activity would be a clear violation of the DPRK's international commitments, including the DPRK's NPT safeguards agreement with the Agency."⁸⁵ North Korea decided to leave the NPT in January 2003 because the US had refused to meet its commitment to help develop the modern water reactor plant.⁸⁶ With this confrontation, the relationship between the two countries became at the worst line, and North Korea had expelled all the inspectors from the Yongbyon nuclear site and removed all the cameras, and breaking seals.

To try to resolve the crisis, the Bush administration focused on the multilateral diplomatic negotiation rather than the bilateral talk. On a trip to Asia, President George W. Bush has said that the United States is prepared to have an official, multilateral assurance that the United States does not strike North Korea but that a structured non-aggression treaty is "off the table."⁸⁷ Three initial policies had been introduced during the administration of President Bush such as 1) Bush's multilateral strategy: Six-Party Talks, 2) Rewards, Sanctions, and Diplomacy, 3) International Regime.

4.2.1 Bush's Multilateral Strategy: Six-Party Talks

Following the Agreed Framework collapsed in October 2002 due to suspected violations by both parties (the U.S. and the DPRK). According to claimed of Assistant Secretary of State

⁸⁵ "Report by the Director General on the implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement Between the Agency and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea," International Atomic Energy Agency, last modified 29 November 2002, <https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/gov2002-60.pdf>.

⁸⁶ "KCNA 'Detailed Report' Explains NPT Withdrawal," KCNA, January 22, 2003, accessed at <http://www.fas.org>; Director of Central Intelligence's Worldwide Threat Briefing, "The Worldwide Threat in 2003: Evolving Dangers in a Complex World," February 11, 2003

⁸⁷ "Chronology of U.S.-North Korean Nuclear and Missile Diplomacy | Fact Sheets & Briefs," Chronology of U.S.-North Korean Nuclear and Missile Diplomacy | Arms Control Association, July 2020, <https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/dprkchron>.

James Kelly in a bilateral meeting, North Korea had admitted it possessed a uranium-enrichment program, which Pyongyang denied, and which would break the agreement.⁸⁸ North Korea initially opposed multilateral negotiations, actively insisting that the nuclear issue was solely a bilateral matter between the United States and the DPRK. However, the DPRK agreed to three-party talks with China and the United States in Beijing on 23 April 2003, due to the growing pressure from major powers, particularly the United States and China.

In early August 2003, North Korea eventually cooperated to sit with the United States and China at the negotiating table after the United States threatened to take the issue to the United Nations Security Council for economic sanctions if North Korea persisted in refusing to participate in multilateral talks with the United States and others.⁸⁹ President Bush insisted that the North Korean nuclear problem was the concern of all powers in the region and that the issue had to be resolved on a multilateral basis that includes South Korea, China, Japan, and Russia as well.⁹⁰

His argument was simple because China, South Korea, Japan, and Russia all seem to have an interest in resolving the Korean Peninsula crisis and would do their best to reach a better settlement. Due to the relationship deadlock between U.S.-North Korea, President Bush let China play the role of a broker to bring North Korea to the multilateral dialogue.⁹¹ Between times of stalemate and crisis, the six-party talks made crucial breakthroughs in 2005, when North Korea promised to surrender 'all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear technologies' and

⁸⁸“The Six-Party Talks at a Glance | Fact Sheets & Briefs,” The Six-Party at a Glance | Arms Control Association, last updated June 2018, <https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/6partytalks>.

⁸⁹ Ibid.

⁹⁰ James A. Lindsay, 2003, “Deference and Defiance: The Shifting Rhythms of Executive Legislative Relations in Foreign Policy,” *Presidential Studies Quarterly*, 33 (3), 530-547.

⁹¹ Iisu Kim, “A Comparative Analysis on President Clinton and Bush’s Handling with North Korean Nuclear Weapons Program: Power and Strategy,” Research Gate, last modified October 2008, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/230532758_A_Comparative_Analysis_of_President_Clinton_and_Bush's_Handling_of_the_North_Korean_Nuclear_Weapons_Program_Power_and_Strategy.

return to the NPT, and in 2007, when the parties decided to a set of measures to enforce the 2005 agreement.

The Bush administration was succeeded in establishing a multilateral forum when North Korea announced its intention to engage in six-party talks on its nuclear program with the United States, China, South Korea, Japan, and Russia in August 2003. The first Six-Party Talk was held in Beijing. The goal of the Six-Party Talks is to seek a solution for the Korean Peninsula crisis and also bring North Korea peace and prosperity. The main issue that the talks address is the DPRK nuclear weapons program.⁹² However, it was failed because the participants in the talk were not able to reach a joint statement or make any significant breakthrough. The second round of Six-Party Talk was held in Beijing, and a little progress is made between both sides. The countries that participated in the talk were agreed to hold another round of the talk before the end of June 2004, also to have a meeting of the working group to be held before the upcoming talk.⁹³ A third round of the Six-Party Talk took place in Beijing on 23-24 June 2004. In this round, the way to find a resolution on North Korea was still a difficult task for the six parties, particularly the Bush administration.⁹⁴ The fourth round of the Six-Party was holding on July 25, 2005, in Beijing. In this round, the talk had made a significant resolution in which North Korea agreed to return to NPT and abandoned its nuclear program in exchange for aid from the United State. Although, the day after the joint statement was made North Korea seems to violate the joint statement, and debated over the timing of discussions on the provision of such a reactor remained.⁹⁵ The fifth round of the Six-Party Talk began on

⁹² “Six-Party Talks,” Inventory of International Nonproliferation Organization and Regimes Center for Nonproliferation Studies, last updated August 4, 2011, <https://media.nti.org/pdfs/6ptalks.pdf>.

⁹³ “Chronology of U.S.-North Korean Nuclear and Missile Diplomacy | Fact Sheets & Briefs,” Chronology of U.S.-North Korean Nuclear and Missile Diplomacy | Arms Control Association, last updated July 2020, <https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/dprkchron>.

⁹⁴ Ibid.

⁹⁵ Ibid.

November 05, 2005, and lasted three days. Six Parties shared their opinions on how to enforce the Joint Declaration, but no new achievements were achieved and concrete negotiations were neither attempted nor envisioned. According to U.S. lead negotiator, Christopher Hill said, “We were not expecting to make any breakthroughs,” the meeting ended without scheduling a date for the next round of discussions.⁹⁶ Finally, the sixth round of the Six-Party began on schedule, therefore the six parties were not able to reach a concrete conclusion since North Korea delegations did not release funds from the sanctioned Banco Delta Asia.⁹⁷

From the desire of president Bush to settle the North Korean nuclear weapon crisis through a multilateral basis seems impossible to happen. While the talk was making a move at first, the six parties were not being able to agree on the main objective that it ought to meet. That was mainly because of the three reasons. First, North Korea is an unpredictable regime that is hard for other states to gain trust and cooperation from its leaders. The talk was receptive to separate dialogue with Japan and the U.S., however, Pyongyang did not intend to separate talks with Seoul. Furthermore, in what it agreed to fulfill and its subsequent action at the talk, the DPRK was showing the uncertain willingness to obtain and keep its promise with the other five parties.⁹⁸ Second, among the six participating countries had their objective within the talk, and they found it difficult to comprise its goal with each other. No consensus may be achieved with each government establishing its own immediate goals over those of the other nations.⁹⁹ For instance, while Japan and the U.S. called for more heavy sanctions on North Korea, but China, Russia, and South Korea afraid of the massive refugee problem if North Korea

⁹⁶ Ibid.

⁹⁷ Ibid.

⁹⁸ Caitlin Lu, “Six Party Talks on North Korea’s Nuclear Program,” Stanford University, last updated March 12, 2016, <http://large.stanford.edu/courses/2016/ph241/lu2/>.

⁹⁹ Ibid.

collapsed.¹⁰⁰ Finally, the U.S. administration opposed having bilateral talk with North Korea since President Bush introduced a multilateral channel could also be an efficient measure for the United States' policy towards North Korea.¹⁰¹

4.2.2. Rewards, Sanctions, and Diplomacy

While the multilateral strategy did not go so well, President Bush announced to introduce a new engagement policy that the Bush team want “more quo for its quid”. The Bush administration indicated that North Korea would show its behavior to the U.S. by removing its placement conventional troops, dismantle its nuclear weapons, and verification. North Korea’s compliance with the Bush administration’s aggressive strategies may yield rewards, perhaps substantial ones such as the normalization of relations and a large aid package. According to columnist Richard Manning, “The Bush bumper sticker would be: “Bigger carrot, bigger stick.”¹⁰²

Even the Bush administration issued inducements (carrots) that lowered the cost of non-compliance, however, those rewards were not taking into consideration by the rogue state, because they could never stop its envision of the nuclear program.¹⁰³ Move to the next level, the Bush administration had decided to continue to make missile defense its strategy priority, that it was a proposal by Andrew W. Marshall, the 79-year-old head of the Pentagon’s internal think tank.¹⁰⁴ The American stance on North Korea was opposed by Russia and China. Hence, South Korea also against the new strategy of the U.S. due to its concern about the future

¹⁰⁰ Ibid.

¹⁰¹ Ibid.

¹⁰² John Feffer and Karin Lee, “Bush Faces Challenges on the Korean Peninsula,” Institute for Policy Studies, May 8, 2014, https://ips-dc.org/bush_faces_challenges_on_the_korean_peninsula/.

¹⁰³ Rupert Schulenburg, “A Failure of Coercion: The George W. Bush Administration and North Korea,” E-International Relations, Last modified June 7, 2020, <https://www.e-ir.info/2020/06/07/a-failure-of-coercion-the-george-w-bush-administration-and-north-korea/>.

¹⁰⁴ John Feffer and Karin Lee, “Bush Faces Challenges on the Korean Peninsula - FPIF,” Foreign Policy In Focus, Last modified May 18, 2013, https://fpif.org/bush_faces_challenges_on_the_korean_peninsula/.

engagement of North Korean. As seen the economy in North Korea was not stable at the time being, president of the Republic of Korea, Kim Dae Jung has not insisted on the “strict mutualism” and reciprocity that Bush is seeking, as some South Koreans fear that the Bush administration’s approach will hinder their efforts toward reconciliation.¹⁰⁵

Since the U.S. still needed to take responsibility to halted the North Korean nuclear program. The Bush administration asked to have diplomacy talk with its allies to imposed economic sanctions on Pyongyang. However, it seems completely difficult to made North Korea agreed to ease its actions. As North Korea’s economy is not most likely to depend on the U.S. since it had the partner with other countries include China, Japan, and most industrialized European countries. Because of its main trade partner with other countries besides the U.S., in effect, the U.S. economic sanction seems to slowly work on North Korea, and this does not change its political behaviors.

4.2.3. International Regime: Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)

On May 31, 2003, President Bush called for the creation of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). The PSI is a voluntary, multilateral initiative to strengthen the framework of non-proliferation architectures. The mission of the PSI is to try to disrupt and restricting imports of biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons, their means of delivery, and the illegal sale of dual-use products that may be used to manufacture these devices.¹⁰⁶ This further aims to strengthen coordination between States and facilitate the exchange of knowledge and information on potential proliferation risk shipments.

¹⁰⁵ Gunsik Kim, “Clinton and Bush Administrations’ Nuclear Non-Proliferation Policies On North Korea: Challenges and Implications Of Systemic and Domestic Constraints,” *Clinton and Bush Administrations’ Nuclear Non-Proliferation Policies On North Korea: Challenges and Implications Of Systemic and Domestic Constraints* (dissertation, 2005), <https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=5199&context=etd>.

¹⁰⁶ “The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) At a Glance | Fact Sheets & Briefs,” The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) At a Glance | Arms Control Association, Last updated March 2020, <https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/PSI>.

The Bush administration aimed to create the PSI because of several factors. In the 2002 National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation, the administration realized that the prevention of research and material technology can be disrupting the development of proliferation in North Korea. The strategy indicated that “we must enhance the capabilities of our military, intelligence, technical, and law enforcement communities to prevent the movement of WMD materials, technology, and expertise to hostile states and terrorist organizations.”¹⁰⁷ The Bush administration has viewed PSI as reacting to a gap visible from the So San accident, PSI was started partially in response to legal gaps revealed in an incomplete interdiction of the So San, a North Korean-flagged ship that was carrying Scud missile parts to Yemen in December 2002.¹⁰⁸ The boarding was illegal, however, U.S. and Spanish have the legal right to seize the cargo, and then the ship was released. Yemen claimed possession of the weapons and allegedly assured the US not to retransfer the products or buy additional weapons from North Korea. Although it is not obvious whether if this event had happened after PSI was established, the result would have been different, it was certainly a motivation to put a process for the negotiation of multilateral prohibitions to fruition efficiently.¹⁰⁹

The US and over 90 other countries committed to the PSI terms, but initially, South Korea declined to join the PSI because of "unique geopolitical circumstances". South Korea believed it might worsen its ties with North Korea if it joined the PSI. North Korea was upset by the PSI, because it was the primary goal of the negotiation, although the PSI did not state that North Korea is its specific intended target. South Korea decided to join PSI in May 2009,

¹⁰⁷ Ibid.

¹⁰⁸ For a detailed account, see Susan J. Koch, “Proliferation Security Initiative: Origin and Evolution,” Occasional Paper No. 9, Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction, National Defense University, June 2012. <http://wmdcenter.dodlive.mil/files/2012/06/Koch-OP9.pdf>.

¹⁰⁹ Jofi Joseph, “The Proliferation Security Initiative: Can Interdiction Stop Proliferation?” Arms Control Today, June 2004, at http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2004_06/Joseph.asp; Andrew C. Winner, “The Proliferation Security Initiative: The New Face of Interdiction,” The Washington Quarterly, Spring 2005, http://www.twq.com/05spring/docs/05spring_winner.pdf

due to the change of power in South Korea, the election was won by the opposition party. North Korea called South Korea's joining of the PSI "tantamount to a declaration of war". Furthermore, North Korea's state-run news agency released the following statement: "The PSI is a mechanism for a war of aggression built by the U.S. against the DPRK under the pretext of intercepting and blockading ships and planes, etc. suspicious of transporting weapons of mass destruction including nuclear weapons and missiles". The reaction of North Korea was expected, but the U.S. creation of PSI was remaining limited to the interpersonal verbal argument than the physical conflict. With South Korea entering the PSI, the US and South Korea have strengthened relations under the Obama administration. The Bush administration has helped to set the course for the PSI to help deter North Korea from distributing weapons of mass destruction.¹¹⁰

4.3. Barack Obama foreign policy toward North Korea

President Barack Obama became the president of America in 2009. He served for America as a president for two-term since 2009 until 2017.¹¹¹ During the two-term of his presidency, the Obama team pursued the policy called "Strategic Patience" in response to the persistent pursuit nuclear program of North Korea country. As the time President Barack Obama came into the U.S. administration, Pyongyang committed a series of provocations, including a test of a long-range ballistic missile on April 5 and a second nuclear test on May 14. The United Nations Security Council unanimously, in response to the test Resolution 1874 passed in June 2009 implementing new trade controls on North Korea, for example, authorizes

¹¹⁰ Andrew Derewiany, "U.S Foreign Policy Toward North Korea : 1945 to Present," 2011. http://etd.fcla.edu/CF/CFH0003766/Derewiany_Andrew_O_201105_BA.pdf.

¹¹¹ "President Barack Obama," National Archives and Records Administration (National Archives and Records Administration), accessed August 10, 2020, <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/administration/president-obama>.

UN member states to examine its freight and destroy any products accused of being connected to its nuclear program, and to extend the arms embargo.¹¹²

According to the secretary of state, Hillary Clinton, she indicated that the clear goal of the Obama team was “To end the North Korea Nuclear Program, both the plutonium reprocessing program and the highly enriched uranium program, which there is reason to believe exists, although never quite verified.”¹¹³ The Obama team said North Korea's problem would be addressed rapidly and responsively. The resolution could be done through bilateral talk as well as the Six-Party Talk, initiated by the Bush administration.

4.3.1. Strategic Patience

Coping with the North Korea crisis, the Obama administration had been introduced the Strategic Patience to formulated and held to North Korean's provocation. The key stance of strategic patience emphasized the role of the U.S. toward North Korea, in which the U.S. would not take any action or participated in a talk with North Korea unless Pyongyang has shown the concrete evidence of committing denuclearization. Based on such a policy, Washington demanded that Pyongyang should first “take concrete, irreversible denuclearization steps toward fulfillment of the 2005 Joint Statement of the Six-Party Talks,” as a precondition for direct talks.¹¹⁴ Strategic patience potentially means waiting for North Korea to change to changes its behavior and come back to the table while still maintaining economic sanctions against North Korea. Jeffrey Bader, Director of Asian Affairs at the National Security Council,

¹¹² 21. The UN Security Council, “Security Council, Acting Unanimously, Condemns in Strongest Terms Democratic People's Republic of Korea Nuclear Test, Toughens Sanctions,” June 12, 2009, <https://www.un.org/press/en/2009/sc9679.doc.htm>

¹¹³ Kim, Hong Nack. "U.S.-North Korea Relations under the Obama Administration: Problems and Prospects." *North Korean Review* 6, no. 1 (2010):. Accessed August 13, 2020. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/43898183> 20-36

¹¹⁴ U.S. Department of State Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, “U.S. Relations with North Korea,” October 18, 2016, <https://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2792.htm>.

told the press, “We don’t want to go down the old road and repeat the experiences of the past. We’re looking for behavior change by North Korea.”¹¹⁵

The policy was included working progress with the U.S. allies, the Republic of Korea (ROK), and Japan to prevent and take action against North Korea's provocations, and pressuring Pyongyang through the multilateral United Nations. And unilateral sanctions for stopping and abandoning its nuclear program. The policy as well as to convinced China, a long-standing ally and main trading partner with North Korea, to place further pressure on the North Korean government to end its nuclear weapon program and military provocations.¹¹⁶ The purpose of the policy has to resolve the problem in North Korea through a multilateral method based on Six-Party Talk. For this purpose, the first mandate of the administration was devoted its diplomatic effort to bring back North Korea to the diplomatic table, however, the strategic patience did not achieve its goal. North Korea refused to roll back nuclear activities and continue to develop a more powerful long-range both nuclear weapons and missile materials.

The North Korean behavior caused a huge concern on the Obama administration regarding them to continue on nuclear production. As a result of North Korea failed to halt its nuclear program, and North Korea continued to create “facts on the ground.”¹¹⁷ During this period, North Korea conducted a second nuclear test and test-fired missiles a couple of times. It also built a uranium enrichment plant and started to construct a new nuclear reactor. Thus, the denuclearization in North Korea required a U.S. diplomatic resolution. The U.S. disengagement with North Korea caused a major impact on East Asian’s instability and

¹¹⁵ "U.S. Considers Possibility of Engaging North Korea," New York Times, August 181, 2010.

¹¹⁶ Emma Chanlett-Avery et al., North Korea: U.S. Relations, Nuclear Diplomacy, and Internal Situation. CRS Report, Congressional Research Service. January 15, 2016, 6 — 7.

¹¹⁷ James E. Goodby and Donald Gross, Strategic Patience Has Become Strategic Passivity. Policy Forum Onlinet December 22, 2010.

prosperity. Since the strategic patience was no longer viable, it was time for the Obama administration to re-engage in a diplomatic talk with North Korea.

4.3.2. Diplomacy Negotiation

The Obama administration intended to retain sanctions on North Korea before the country followed its promises to denuclearize. US officials noted that the simple return to the Six-Party Talks was not enough for Washington to lift the restrictions.

Nonetheless, by late 2011, following a break of nearly two years, the Obama administration decided to resume a diplomatic talk with Pyongyang. The Obama administration thought the lack of communication would let North Korea completely isolated itself from the world to work on its nuclear development. The US commitment to North Korea's re-engagement was focused on the assumption that doing so would require Pyongyang to withdraw from further aggressive behavior, like nuclear research and rocket tests, as long as conversation drags on.¹¹⁸

Bilateral talks between US and South Korean negotiators and their North Korean counterparts late 2011 and finally early 2012 pushed to a "Leap Day Agreement" short-lived dated February 2012.¹¹⁹ However, the Pyongyang government was not fully cooperated with the agreement. The Obama administration could not make North Korea abandon its nuclear weapons, moderating its provocative behavior, obeying international law, or improving its abysmal human rights practices than the day it entered office. Instead, during the Obama administration, North Korea once again conducted nuclear and long-range missile tests twice

¹¹⁸ Bruce Klingner, "Obama's Evolving North Korean Policy," North Korea Bulletin, last modified July 2012, file:///C:/Users/USER/AppData/Local/Temp/silo.tips_obama-s-evolving-north-korean-policy.pdf.

¹¹⁹ The agreement—actually parallel press releases—promised that North Korea would suspend uranium enrichment and allow the return of International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors back to the Yongbyeon nuclear facility and not conduct additional nuclear or long-range missile tests in return for 240,000 tons of U.S. nutritional assistance.

conducted deadly acts of war on South Korea, and flaunted its repeated violations of UN resolutions.

4.3.3. Trilateral Security Cooperation: ROK, Japan, and the U.S

In March 2014, President Barack Obama had conducted that trilateral security summit with the Republic of Korea and Japan. The topic of the summit is “The Nuclear Security Summit”, aims to deter the nuclear and proliferation weapon provocation by North Korea.¹²⁰ The three countries that came together under the one goal is to prevent the further nuclear activities of Pyongyang. After the meeting, Obama said, “Pyongyang’s “provocations and threats” will be met by a united response. Over the last five years, close coordination between our three countries succeeded in changing the game with North Korea: our trilateral cooperation has sent a strong signal to Pyongyang that its provocations and threats will be met with a unified response.”¹²¹ With the adoption of Security Council Resolution 2270, which is North Korea's toughest sanctions resolution to date, the resolution must be strictly implemented so that North Korea understands that it cannot guarantee its survivability unless it abandons its nuclear ambitions. In effect, Korea, the United States, and Japan have agreed to coordinate closely not only in enforcing the Security Council resolution but also in implementing our respective individual sanctions on North Korea, all while further strengthening our solidarity with the international community to ensure that the international community effectively increases its pressure on North Korea.

¹²⁰ “03/31/16 Remark by President Obama, President Park Geun-Hye of the Republic of Korea, and Prime Minister Shinzo Abe of Japan After Trilateral Meeting,” U.S. Embassy & Consulate in the Republic of Korea, accessed August 23, 2020, https://kr.usembassy.gov/p_rok_033116/.

¹²¹ Thomas Escritt, Steve Holland, “Obama brings U.S. allies South Korea and Japan together for talks,” Reuters, last updated March 26, 2014, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-japan-korea-trilateral/obama-brings-u-s-allies-south-korea-and-japan-together-for-talks-idUSBREA201OT20140325>.

4.4. Donald Trump foreign policy toward North Korea

President Donald Trump currently is the fourth president who inherited these ongoing issues from the previous administration. Shortly after taking office, President Trump unleashed "fire and fury" on North Korea and cautioned that the US would "destroy" the regime while characterizing the pursuit of a diplomatic settlement as a "waste of time."¹²² When the president Donald Trump took an office on 20 January 2017, North Korea performed its sixth nuclear test on September 3 and carrying out multiple ballistic missile tests until September, including launching two Hwasong - 14 intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), for the first time, capable of reaching the U.S. mainland in July and two intermediate-range ballistic missile tests in May and August.¹²³ As a fact, the provocation from North Korea, the Trump administration has decided to settle on the new North Korea policy, while they have to deal the defensive measure to enhance the deterrence against North Korea.

After a two-month analysis, the Administration adopted at mid-April a proposed North Korean strategy, called "strategic accountability," which will rely on "maximum pressure and engagement" to denuclearizing the Communist system.¹²⁴ President Donald Trump first agreed in 2018 to hold a summit with North Korea Leader Kim Jong Un to discuss the North Korean Nuclear and Missile programs. The Trump administration has emphasized an intensive point about the dialogue leader-to-leader relationship. Therefore, this results in a better way than a large group meeting employed by the previous administration. Trump and Kim have held three meetings together in Singapore (June 2018); in Hanoi (February 2019); and in Panmunjom

¹²² "North Korea's Nuclear Program," Foreign Policy for America, accessed August 25, 2020, <https://www.fp4america.org/north-korea-nuclear>.

¹²³ David E. Sanger and Choe Sang-hun, "North Korean Nuclear Test Draws U.S. Warning of 'Massive Military Response'," The New York Times (The New York Times, September 3, 2017), <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/03/world/asia/north-korea-tremor-possible-6th-nuclear-test.html>

¹²⁴ Ibid

(June 2019).¹²⁵ In June 2019, President Trump made a trip to South Korea following the G-20 summit in Osaka, Japan that included a brief meeting with Kim Jong Un at the Korean Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). President Trump became the first serving U.S. president to step his foot in North Korea during this partnership.¹²⁶

There are three different alternatives that the Trump administration has been used under the establishment of “strategic accountability” including, 1) unilateral and multilateral economic sanctions, 2) multilateral diplomatic cooperation, 3), military consideration.

4.4.1. Unilateral and Multilateral Economic Sanction

First, the policy of strategic accountability was used to respond to North Korea's provocation called “maximum pressure”. The policy was mainly based on increasing unilateral and multilateral sanctions is consistent with the realist prescription of taking punitive measures against hostile regimes, as a part of carrot-and-stick diplomacy, in the face of their recurrent noncooperation and provocations. For instance, during his first in the office, President Trump ordered the Treasury Department to block any international company or person that promotes exchange with North Korea as part of the administration's policy from the U.S. financial sector. The sanctions targeted anyone that providing the nation with crude oil and other good supplying North Korea’s military and rogue program. These became the first unilateral acts in reaction to two ICBM launches by Pyongyang in July. The latest legislation also bans ships operated by the Republic of North Korea or any government that does not cooperate with U.N. Security

¹²⁵ “Diplomacy with North Korea: A Status Report,” Congressional Research Service, last updated June 19, 2020, <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/IF11415.pdf>.

¹²⁶ “Trump's Foreign Policy Moments,” Council on Foreign Relations (Council on Foreign Relations), accessed August 25, 2020, <https://www.cfr.org/timeline/trumps-foreign-policy-moments>.

Council resolutions docking in the United States and prohibits products manufactured by North Korean personnel overseas from reaching the United States.¹²⁷

4.4.2. Bilateral Diplomatic Cooperation

Besides, using the unilateral and multilateral sanctions toward, the Trump administration wishes to repairing and strengthening its alliances, which are essential to any successful approach toward North Korea. Washington has urged China to fully cooperate implement multilateral U.N. sanctions targeting the Kim Jong-un government. As a consequence, Beijing seemed to adjust some of its stance of restrictions against Pyongyang and thereby was more able to enforce U.N. sanctions. A partnership with China, on which the new policy relies, corresponds with a Realistic stance promoting a carrot-and-stick commitment strategy diplomacy. Donald Trump administration wish to enhance bilateral cooperation with Beijing to take a more constructive part in combating the North Korean nuclear issue, President Trump has reportedly offered more favorable trade terms to Chinese President Xi Jinping in return for Beijing's assertive role in addressing it at its April 2017 summit.¹²⁸

Despite the efforts to cooperate with China, Trump also accepted the invitation from the president of DPRK, Kim Jong Un, to hold a bilateral talk together to bring a resolution for the problem. The first summit was held in June 2018, in Singapore. This was the first time that a serving US president met with North Korea's president. And the summit produced a very short, joint statement saying that the US and North Korea will strive on a new bilateral partnership, establishing peace on the Korean Peninsula.¹²⁹ However, at the end of the summit, the two

¹²⁷ "Trump endorses new sanctions on North Korea," The Korea Times, August 3, 2017, http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/nation/2017/08/103_234105.html

¹²⁸ "Trump Says He Offered China Better Trade Terms in Exchange for Help on North Korea," The Wall Street Journal , April 12, 2017, <https://www.wsj.com/articles/trump-says-heoffered-china-better-trade-terms-in-exchange-for-help-on-north-korea-1492027556>

¹²⁹ "U.S.-North Korea Summit," Council on Foreign Relations, last updated June 13, 2016, <https://www.cfr.org/conference-calls/us-north-korea-summit>.

parties did not make agreed to what they had discussed. As a result, the second summit in Hanoi happened in February 2019. During the meeting, North Korea offered something that unacceptable and grossly for the U.S. According to the North Korean Foreign minister speech at the press release, Pyongyang proposed the complete demolition of a portion of nuclear material manufacturing facilities at the Yongbyon Nuclear Research Facility in return for a 'moderate removal' of sanctions, including the sanctions levied in 2016 and 2017 on the North export sectors, which also restricted oil imports.¹³⁰ This request would cost billions of dollars, which the Trump disagreed with the idea, but Trump to offer a peace declaration and a liaison office instead. Finally, the meeting was ended up without getting results back for both countries. Until now, the two countries have not held a bilateral again, and in the future, there is still uncertainty.

¹³⁰ “Deep Freeze and Beyond: Making the Trump-Kim Summit a Success,” Crisis Group, July 26, 2018, <https://www.crisisgroup.org/united-states/001-deep-freeze-and-beyond-making-trump-kim-summit-success>

CHAPTER V: The U.S. and U.N SANCTION, CHALLENGES IN IMPLEMENTING THE SANCTION, AND THE U.S-NORHT KOREA FUTURE RELATIONS

5.1. The U.N and U.S sanction on North Korea

5.1.1. The United Nation Resolution on North Korea

Several countries and internationally particularly the United State have imposed many sanctions against the Democratic People Republic of Korea for more than a dozen years to pursue its denuclearization.

The reasons why the DPRK face any sanctions from the international and the U.S for its activities related to the development of a broad range of the nuclear weapon, ballistic missiles, regional disruptions; terrorism; narcotics trafficking; undemocratic governance; and illicit activities in international markets, including money laundering, counterfeiting of goods and currency, and bulk cash smuggling.

The United Nations Security Council has established nine majors sanctions against North Korea since 2006 to respond to the DPRK's nuclear and missile activities.¹³¹ Each resolution was adopted to call for the denuclearization and ease the illicit activities that violated human rights and international laws. In addition to imposing sanctions, the resolutions also call upon North Korea to rejoin the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which it joined in 1985 but later withdraw from it in 2003 after the U.S. found out that that the country was pursuing an illegal uranium enrichment program.¹³² Following North Korea launched a nuclear test in 2006, the UN Security Council member imposed sanctions on Pyongyang. The "targeted"

¹³¹ "UN Security Council Resolutions on North Korea | Fact Sheets & Briefs," UN Security Council Resolutions on North Korea | Arms Control Association, Last modified April 2018, <https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/UN-Security-Council-Resolutions-on-North-Korea>.

¹³² Abid.

restrictions include an embargo on luxury products and strategic and technical resources, as well as a variety of financial restrictions. Therefore, the committee of the UN Security Council was established under resolution 1718 (2006) on 14 October 2006 to oversee the relevant sanctions measures relating to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK). Additional tasks were assigned to the Committee in resolution 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2371 (2017), 2375 (2017) and 2397 (2017).¹³³

The purpose of UNSC Resolution 1718 was to halt the development of nuclear weapons in North Korea and to change the policies of the North Korean regime in a way that North Korea people would not suffer. The purpose of UNSC Resolution 2270 was to apply pressure to the North Korean leadership ostensibly to bring them back to the negotiation table on denuclearization while reducing the suffering of the North Korean people. These sanctions were more targeted. The states drafting the resolution understood the outcome of these sanctions would not be denuclearization because Kim Jong Un refuses to negotiate denuclearization unless US policies that Pyongyang perceives as provocative, such as the joint US-ROK military exercises, are terminated (KCNA, 2016).¹³⁴

1. Resolutions 1718 (October 14, 2006)

Under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the Security Council consistently forced sanctions on North Korea due to Pyongyang's nuclear test. After intensive negotiations, the establishment of resolution 1718 was set up a ban on military and technological materials, as well as luxury goods, but does not include the reference to military intervention as the US proposed initially.

¹³³ "Security Council Committee Established Pursuant to Resolution 1718 (2006) Security Council," United Nations (United Nations), accessed September 1, 2020, <https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/1718>.

¹³⁴ Victoria Kim, Surface, "The Effectiveness of UNSC Sanctions: The Case of North Korea," Syracuse University, last reviewed Spring 5, 2017, https://surface.syr.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2041&context=honors_capstone.

Furthermore, the resolution demands the freezing of North Korea's financial assets except for funds necessary to meet basic needs.¹³⁵

The resolution set up a committee consisting of the Security Council's 15 existing representatives to act as a control agency to evaluate and change the restrictions placed and the restrictions violations. The committee was to comment every 90 days on the state of the enforcement of the sanctions.¹³⁶

2. Security Council Resolution 1874

Resolution 1874 was adopted by the Security Council on 12 June 2009. The resolution 1874 was created due to North Korea's in violation of resolution 1718(2006) and in reaction to the danger that it poses to peace and stability in the region and beyond.¹³⁷ Sanctions in Resolution 1874 also set up many steps originally indicated in Resolution 1718. The resolution broadened the weapons embargo by restricting all weapons imports and exports, except small arms (which included approval by the Security Council).

Resolution 1874 formed an advisory panel of seven representatives to assist the Sanctions Committee in implementing the Resolution and overseeing compliance. The group was initially given a one-year mandate, known as the 'Panel of Experts,' and was required to report on possible violations and recommendations for improved implementation to the Sanctions Committee regularly.¹³⁸

¹³⁵ Administrator, "Sanctions Against North Korea," Sanctions Against North Korea, accessed September 1, 2020, <https://www.globalpolicy.org/security-council/index-of-countries-on-the-security-council-agenda/north-korea.html>.

¹³⁶ Ibid.

¹³⁷ The Security Council, "Resolution 1874," United Nation, last reviewed June 12, 2009, [https://www.undocs.org/S/RES/1874\(2009\)](https://www.undocs.org/S/RES/1874(2009)).

¹³⁸ Ibid

3. Security Council Resolution 2087

The Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 2087 on January 22, 2013, after a successful North Korean satellite launch on December 12, 2012. The launch was a violation of Resolutions 1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009), which prohibited any further development of technology applicable to North Korea's ballistic missile programs.¹³⁹ No new monitoring mechanisms were included in Resolution 2087.

4. Security Council Resolution 2094

The Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 2094 on March 7, 2013, in response to North Korea's third nuclear test on February 12, 2013. The new resolution greatly enforces the international sanctions on North Korea to prevent the development of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Furthermore, resolution 2094 introduced a new set of measures to freeze the financial transaction and restricted trade connected to any kind of illicit activities of North Korea.

The resolution also targets individuals and institutions explicitly linked to the North's WMD program, strengthens measures to restrict the transfer of WMD technology by land, sea, and air, and also prohibits the transfer of luxury commodities to the North, such as jewelry, yachts, and cars.¹⁴⁰ The resolution expanded the panel of experts that assesses the implementation of UN Security Council sanctions on North Korea to eight people.

5. Security Council Resolution 2270

The Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 2270 on March 2, 2016, after

¹³⁹ "Security Council Condemns Use of Ballistic Missile Technology in Launch by Democratic People's Republic of Korea, in Resolution 2087 (2013) | Meetings Coverage and Press Releases," United Nations (United Nations), accessed August 28, 2020, <https://www.un.org/press/en/2013/sc10891.doc.htm>

¹⁴⁰ "Security Council Strengthens Sanctions on Democratic People's Republic of Korea, in Response to 12 February Nuclear Test | Meetings Coverage and Press Releases," United Nations (United Nations), accessed August 28, 2020, <https://www.un.org/press/en/2013/sc10934.doc.htm>.

North Korea's nuclear test on 6 January 2016 "in violation and flagrant disregard" of the relevant resolutions, thus posing a challenge to the Nuclear Weapons Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and peace and stability in the region and beyond.

Through overwhelmingly implementing Resolution 2270 (2016), the 15-member Council has denounced the rocket test of DPRK on 7 February 2016 utilizing ballistic missile technology and called on it to comply with its legal obligations immediately.¹⁴¹ No new monitoring mechanisms were included in Resolution 2270.

6. Security Council Resolution 2321

The Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 2321 on November 30, 2016, following North Korea's fifth nuclear test on September 9. Resolution 2321 significantly expanded sanctions on North Korea.¹⁴² Resolution 2321 imposed new sanctions on North Korea in various sectors such as the exporting of minerals (copper, nickel, silver, and zinc). Prohibit the selling or moving of iron and iron ore except for livelihood purposes. North Korea was limited to the transaction of coal under the limitation.

Resolution 2321 adopted a standard reporting method for North Korea's coal purchases to monitor imports against the limit set out in the resolution. The resolution also ordered the Panel of Experts to hold meetings aimed at resolving regional issues and developing the capacity to enforce the 2321 steps and other sanctions against North Korea.¹⁴³

7. Security Council Resolution 2371

On 5 August 2017, the Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 2371 in

¹⁴¹Park Whon-il, "UN Resolutions Concerning North Korea," koreanlii.or.kr, Last modified August 5, 2019, http://www.koreanlii.or.kr/w/index.php/UN_resolutions_concerning_North_Korea?ckattempt=3.

¹⁴² "Security Council Strengthens Sanctions on Democratic Republic of Korea, Unanimously Adopting Resolution 2321 (2016) | Meetings Coverage and Press Releases," United Nations (United Nations), accessed September 1, 2020, <https://www.un.org/press/en/2016/sc12603.doc.htm>.

¹⁴³ Ibid.

reaction to North Korea's two ICBM tests in July. The U.S. believed the latest sanctions would prohibit North Korea from raising more than \$1 billion a year, though some analysts raised skepticism.¹⁴⁴

The principle resolution sanctions 2371 was prohibited North Korea on the massive exporting of weapon material, and enforce the Pyongyang government to return for Six-Party Talk. Resolution 2371 asks Interpol to publish Special Notices on listed North Koreans for travel bans. It also gives the UN Panel of Experts additional analytical resources to better monitor sanctions enforcement.

8. Security Council Resolution 2375

Following North Korea's sixth nuclear test on September 3, 2017, the UN Security Council unanimously adopted UNSCR 2375 on September 11. The resolution, which primarily targeted North Korean oil imports, textile exports, and overseas laborers, contained the strongest yet sanctions against North Korea, according to the U.S.¹⁴⁵

Provides more instructions for states to carry out bans, without the use of coercion, whether the Member States have cause to suspect that the vessel contains banned freight. Where a suspicious vessel avoids inspection, the flag state must guide the vessel to a port approved for inspection or fear of asset freeze or refused port entry.

9. Security Council Resolution 2379

The UN Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 2397 on December 22, 2017, in response to North Korea's ICBM launch on November 29. This resolution's

¹⁴⁴ "Security Council Toughens Sanctions Against Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Unanimously Adopting Resolution 2371 (2017) | Meetings Coverage and Press Releases," United Nations (United Nations), accessed August 28, 2020, <https://www.un.org/press/en/2017/sc12945.doc.htm>.

¹⁴⁵ Resolution 2375, accessed August 28, 2020, <http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/doc/2375>.

mechanism equates countries to capture and enforce ships detected smuggling of illegal goods, including oil and coal.

5.1.2. The U.S. sanctions on North Korea

The U.S sanctions against North Korea began on 28 June 1950, when the U.S. invoked a total embargo on export to North Korea based on the U.S. Export Control Act of 1949.¹⁴⁶ The U.S. has imposed a unilateral sanction on North Korea to restrict more economic activities and individual business outside North Korea particularly in China and Russia for supporting its weapons program. It has also fined companies for violating U.S. export controls.¹⁴⁷

U.S. economic sanctions (2016-2020) are enforced on North Korea, resulting in the following effect on both U.S. law provisions and executive branch decisions to exercise discretionary authority:

- **Trade is limited** medicine, and other humanitarian products, all requiring a permit. Imports from North Korea are prohibited as of June 2011; exports to North Korea of most of the goods, services, or technology in the United States are prohibited as of March 2016. U.S. individuals are further forbidden from participating in transactions related to trade in metal, graphite, energy, or software with the Government of North Korea or the Korean Workers' Party. Luxury products traded are also banned. Commerce department refuses export licenses for nuclear proliferation purposes, missile technology, U.N. The criteria of the Security Council, and international terrorism.
- **Arms sales and arms transfers** are fully denied.

¹⁴⁶ CHANG, SEMOON. "THE SAGA OF U.S. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AGAINST NORTH KOREA." *The Journal of East Asian Affairs* 20, no. 2 (2006): 109-39. Accessed August 25, 2020. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/23257941>.

¹⁴⁷ Eleanor Albert, "What to Know About Sanctions on North Korea," Council on Foreign Relations (Council on Foreign Relations, Last updated July 16, 2019), <https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-know-about-sanctions-north-korea>.

- **Blocking Property and Certain Transactions concerning North Korea** are prohibited. All the possession that is controlled by the U.S. person of the Government of the DPRK is blocked and cannot be transferred, paid, export, and otherwise dealt in. More importantly, the U.S. prohibited the transaction of any kind of goods, services, and technology to North Korea.¹⁴⁸
- **North Korea** is classified by the Treasury Department's Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) as a primary money laundering concern, warning of criminal activity in North Korea;
- **U.S. new investment** is forbidden in the transportation, mining, electricity or financial sectors of North Korea is prohibited. Also, North Korea is unable to engage in any U.S. government program that offers credit, loan guarantees, or investment guarantees.
- **U.S. foreign aid** • U.S. foreign assistance is narrow and mainly limited to refugees fleeing North Korea; national broadcasting; NGO services devoted to the promotion of democracy, human rights, and governance; emergency food aid; and the costs of rebuilding the remains of the United States. Personnel in the Armed Forces. In past years, aid has been made available for the disabling and dismantling of the country's nuclear weapons program. By law, U.S. members in the International Financial Institutions (IFI) are expected to vote against any support offered to North Korea due to its plans for nuclear weapons and international terrorism.
- **U.S.-based assets** are blocked for North Korean people, companies, aircraft, and vessels approved by the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) Department of the Treasury; U.S. individuals are forbidden from dealing and transacting.

¹⁴⁸ “U.S. Department of the Treasury,” Sanctions Programs and Country Information | U.S. Department of the Treasury, August 14, 2020, <https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-sanctions/sanctions-programs-and-country-information>

- **Kim Jong-un, the Korean Workers’ Party, and others**—banks, shipping companies, seagoing vessels, state agencies, and other individuals affiliated with the state’s security regime—are identified as being among those engaged in illicit and punishable activities, includes nuclear or ballistic missile systems that threaten cyber-safety, surveillance and the enforcement of sanctions. As a result, their properties are frozen under U.S. law and U.S. individuals and companies are forbidden from engaging in commerce and dealings with the named individuals.
- **U.S. travel to or through North Korea** requires a special validation passport issued by the State Department. Such passports are reserved only for travel in the U.S. Public importance is meant for qualified reporters, officials of the American Red Cross or the International Red Cross Committee or others with "compelling humanitarian" justifications.¹⁴⁹

5.2. Challenge in Implementation

Last February in 2020, US President Donald Trump met in Hanoi with North Korean President Kim Jong Un and South Korean President Moon Jae-in.¹⁵⁰ The meeting was unsuccessful and subsequently President Kim “condemned those who impose sanctions as 'hostile forces.’”¹⁵¹ Almost a half-century, the approaching to North Korea is still difficult even this state was experiencing a lot of pressure from the international community especially the United State, it still challenging to impose effective sanctions against North Korea. There are two major issues with assessing the efficacy of sanctions in this particular case.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid.

¹⁵⁰ Stephen Noerper, *From Hanoi to Hiatus*, 21 Comp. Connections 37, 38 (2019).

¹⁵¹ Noerper, *supra* note 8, at 39.

The first is that the multilateral sanctions issued by the United Nations are “unevenly enforced.”¹⁵² The United Nations has imposed of separated 14 resolutions extending back 13 years. These resolutions were produced to restrict the state from interacting with North Korea in a wide variety of diplomatic, military, and economic operations, including trade in its largest import and export markets, foreign direct investment, weapons sales, financial services, and scientific and technological cooperation. Despite the comprehensiveness of these UN measures, the resolution requires extra unilateral sanctions by the various state such as the United States, European Union, Japan, and others to be associated with the U.S trade embargo. However, the implementation of the UN resolution has been proven challenging to enforce effectively against North Korea. According to the latest U.N Panel of Experts reports revealing that the U.N. sanctions on North Korea are prone to "rampant violations,"¹⁵³ Veto-wielding China and Russia have both stated that they do not accept more U.N sanction on North Korea and have also supported the removal of such sanctions instruments.¹⁵⁴

The second issue is the difficulty of obtaining any data from inside a country appropriately known as the “hermit kingdom.”¹⁵⁵ Since the world knows that North Korea is an untrustworthy state, there on one can predict what they going to do after the lifted sanctions. North Korea is unlikely to give up its nuclear arsenal even though sanctions are lifted, analysts believe that rising isolation and sanctions compliance would lead Pyongyang to focus on its

¹⁵² Ben Kesling & Alastair Gale, *Trump's North Korea Obstacle: Sanctions Are Unevenly Enforced*, Wall Street Journal, last updated April 25, 2017, <https://www.wsj.com/articles/sanctions-on-north-korea-arent-universally-enforced-diplomat-says-1493106632>.

¹⁵³ “Reports Security Council,” United Nations (United Nations), accessed August 29, 2020, https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/1718/panel_experts/reports.

¹⁵⁴ Al Jazeera, “Russia, China Propose Easing N Korea Sanctions, US Says Premature,” Russia News | Al Jazeera (Al Jazeera, December 17, 2019), <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/12/russia-china-propose-easing-korea-sanctions-premature-191217003946641.html>.

¹⁵⁵ Patrick M. Cronin, “Transcript: Understanding the Hermit Kingdom: Assessing North Korea's Future,” by Patrick M. Cronin, accessed September 1, 2020, <https://www.hudson.org/research/15991-transcript-understanding-the-hermit-kingdom-assessing-north-korea-s-future>.

nuclear program. According to Joseph Bosco, an East Asia expert at the Institute for Korean-American Studies (ICAS) stated that “I do not believe North Korea would give up its nuclear weapons if sanctions are lifted,” “Instead, they would increase their demands.”¹⁵⁶

5.3. The Future Relations of the U.S.-North Korea

The future of the relations between these two countries is as yet unpredictable. There are many debates across the world about future United and North Korea relations after October 10, the Worker's Party of Korea (WPK)'s 75th founding anniversary, and the actual result of the United States election. Relations between the US and DPRK may grow in very different directions in 2021 and beyond based on who the president is. This said, if Trump is re-elected, U.S.-DPRK ties are more likely to step in the right direction, and political dialogue with North Korea is more likely to remain on the international policy agenda of the U.S. president.

For the North Korean side, it is still hard to guess the intention of its leader, Kim Jong Un, whether or not he is continuing to pursue or abandon his nuclear weapons strategy. Nonetheless, as a result of the breakdown of the 2019 Hanoi Summit, Pyongyang re-adjusted his approach to minimizing the burden of the embargo, not by negotiating but by developing his self-reliant economy than by creatively circumventing the sanctions system. For example, we can look recently at how Pyongyang fights the Corona Pandemic, the country has closed its biggest part of the trade border, China. In this regard, North Korea could be showcasing its most sophisticated missile capabilities, which could be used as part of a long-range delivery system rather than a nuclear device or ICBM itself. Accordingly, during the Workers' Party Foundation Day celebrations on October 10, such latest technology-based provocations may

¹⁵⁶ Christy Lee, “Experts: Sanctions Relief Will Not Make North Korea Denuclearize,” VOA (VOA Cambodia, Last modified February 7, 2020), <https://www.voacambodia.com/a/5278126.html>.

feature in attempting to manipulate potential talks with the Trump government or the latest incoming administration.¹⁵⁷

On the US side, the Trump administration seems to have moved attention away from North Korea, even as part of President Trump's re-election effort to assert progress in de-escalating tensions. The president downplayed North Korea's short-range missile launches as "very standard" and tweeted Kim Jong-un well after the media reportedly Kim Jong-Un fell into a health condition that keeps him apart from the public appearance. The Trump administration has shown the desire to keep the U.S.-DPRK relations on the back burner. Nevertheless, to anticipate the relations between is much more complicated with the Democratic in the office would be more difficult. The opposition party opposes Donald Trump re-election is Joe Biden, the only potential challenge to Trump's campaign, has voiced strong criticism of Trump's North Korean strategy. Unlike Donald Trump's campaign in 2016, Joe Biden does not indicate to meet with the Kim Jong Un for diplomacy talk. In reality, his position on North Korea remains a question, alluding only indirectly to the possibility that pressuring China will hold Pyongyang in line (because it worked very well in the past). Additionally, it still unclear what is the next plan for the Trump second term in the office. Although Trump would like to leave behind a sustainable foreign policy legacy upon leaving office, it is uncertain if this would have anything to do with North Korea and what its real goals would be.¹⁵⁸

¹⁵⁷ Sangsoo Lee, "Sangsoo Lee Writes Op-Ed on North Korea's Nuclear Ambitions," Institute for Security and Development Policy, Last modified May 2020, <https://isdpeu/publication/north-korea-nuclear-ambitions-status-quo-show/>.

¹⁵⁸ Gabriela Bernal, "The Future of U.S.-North Korean Relations Hangs on the 2020 Election," The National Interest (The Center for the National Interest, Last modified May 14, 2020), <https://nationalinterest.org/blog/korea-watch/future-us-north-korean-relations-hangs-2020-election-154136>.

CONCLUSION

Negotiations regarding nuclear non-proliferation with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea are still a long way to go for the United States and the international community. North Korean ambition of building a state as self-reliance is a strong desire of this country's leaders. This main goal has led the country to pursue the weapon of mass destruction which it can use to succeed in its goal as a bargaining chip and have control over its sovereignty. As North Korea is isolated itself from the outside world, it can be difficult for foreign powers like the US to choose the appropriate methods of negotiation to deal with North Korea's provocative behavior. The entire past of foreign policy against North Korea has been full of aggression, uncertainty, and incompetence for the US administration since the first creation of the DPRK nuclear and missile programs until today.

The study reported a foreign policy implementation strategy among all the four U.S. administration including President Bill Clinton, George, in this thesis paper. W. Bush, Barack Obama, D. Trump. This research study is an answer to the proposed question "What are the four U.S. foreign policy toward a nuclear weapons crisis in North Korea?"

First, starting with President Bill Clinton had the option of bilateral strategy, rewards and sanctions, and the international regimes (IAEA & NPT). The load road to make a successful talk with North Korea is unforeseen, even the country had demonstrated its willingness to agree to what they had been spoken at first, but later on, the state changed his mind. When Clinton came to power, his approach to the case with North Korea was entirely indirect diplomatic negotiation. After two more months of bilateral negotiations, the Agreed Framework was concluded on 21 October 1994, during which time North Korea agreed to suspend its nuclear reactors and authorized the IAEA auditor to follow up on the implementation phase. In return, the US agreed to provide relief, assistance, oil, and two light-water reactors for civilian sanction.

However, as it turned out, the agreement between Bill Clinton and the leader of the DPRK failed to fulfill its obligations as agreed in the agreement. As a result, the threat of the nuclear weapon remained, and Bill Clinton's administration managed to make further efforts to pursue the nuclear deal by using trade and economic sanctions along the way, with the assistance of enforcement by the countries of the allies and the international regime.

Moving forward into the Bush administration, the US's foreign policy has a new system from bilateral diplomacy to multilateral diplomacy. By conducting a new diplomatic negotiation called "Six-Party Talk", after the Bush team acknowledged the failure of the Agreed Framework. The Six-Party Talk is a multilateral political negotiation that is joined by six countries including China, Japan, North Korea, Russia, South Korea, and the U.S. to end North Korea's nuclear development of nuclear weapons. Therefore, each round of the discussion ended with limited success for the U.S. and other participating countries, because the stance of North Korea is always opposed to the provision of the talk. Since the North Korea confrontation is a primary vision for the US to end, the Bush administration has been asking its diplomatic allies to join and impose sanctions on North Korea. A more sanction can have an impact on Pyongyang, but under this potential impact, Pyongyang still manages to survive, as North Korea's main trading is China, not the U.S., which renders the progress of the sanction seems slow on North Korea.

Switching from bilateral and multilateral negotiations to President Barack Obama's "Strategic Patience" during the early years of his presidential term. Obama's administration continues to impose sanctions on North Korea while patiently waiting for North Korea's first proposal for negotiations and demonstrating concrete evidence of nuclear disarmament. Indeed, Obama's first strategy seems to potentially cause a lot of impacts and East Asia, as well as taking risks to U.S. security. Then, following the establishment of the "Leap Day Agreement,"

Obama decided to reengage with North Korea. North Korea once again failed to obey the agreement's provisions, North Korea continued to conduct nuclear and long-range missile tests twice conducted deadly acts of war against South Korea, and flaunted its repeated violations of UN resolutions.

After the failure of the last three administrations to roll back the advanced nuclear weapon in Pyongyang, the time President Donald Trump took office, Trump inherited the ongoing provocation from the Democratic People of Korea. Despite numerous attempts by previous administrations to force Pyongyang to abandon its nuclear weapons or negotiate that outcome, North Korea has continued to expand its nuclear arsenal and to develop ever-longer-range ballistic missiles. The Trump administration, in response to North Korea's provocation, adopted a proposed North Korean strategy, called "strategic accountability," which will rely on "maximum pressure and engagement" to denuclearize the Communist system. Besides, historically, during the DPRK summit between the two leaders, President Trump has become the first U.S. serving who steps his foot on the North Korean land. The two nations seem to have difficulties to figure out a way to settle the crisis in a limited outcome, all of the three summits together. However, with the US attempt to sanction North Korea, China and Russia blocked U.S.-led United Nations efforts to investigate Pyongyang's compliance with sanctions. The two countries have never met each other again since the last summit in June 2019 and there is plenty of question about whether or not there is a possible future diplomatic negotiation between the two again? Recently, from the side of the Trump administration, he seems to show his interest in a future negotiation with the Pyongyang leader. Additionally, Trump also tweeted a good wish for the health recovery of Pyongyang leader, Kim Jong Un, after the reportedly rumors of health trouble.

In conclusion, the thesis primarily focused on the implementation of the four U.S. president's foreign policy during their term in the office from 1945-2020. Each U.S. president's approach attempted to deal with a nuclear crisis in North Korea that can be seen in the many different stages. From bilateral diplomatic negotiation to multilateral diplomacy, then from political engagement to enforcement sanctions policy. The sufficient result was slowly gained from the foreign policy that seeks to impose North Korea, however, there will be more progress in the future.

RECOMMENDATION

The future configuration of North Korea's nuclear weapon remains unclear. Whether the Pyongyang government continues to maintain advanced nuclear technology or manages to join the international community for the country and the world to shake. If North Korea continues to practice its illegal activities, however, this can have an impact on international peace security, and stability among the countries of East Asia, particularly the United States. In fact, due to the nature of the DPRK government being quite a secretive state, it would have been difficult to find a speedy response to resolve the case.

However, from the U.S. administration's past failures to bring an end to the proliferation of nuclear weapons, there could be another way for the U.S. administration to deal with North Korea's provocation in the future, and to establish a new relationship with North Korea, and build a peace regime. The United States should consider the following option to fulfill its historic desire at the DPRK:

- New open door for the bilateral: even though the recent summit between the U.S. president, Donald Trump, and Kim Jong Un has ended without getting the result. However, the U.S. administration still needs to recreate a new diplomatic dialogue with North Korea again because this will help the two to talk openly about its different perspectives toward the case. North Korea's isolation would lead to an unpredictable proliferation regime and soon lead to a regime transformation.
- Multilateral strategic alliances: the U.S. should consider conducting multilateral missile negotiations with more associated countries, particularly with North Korean border countries such as South Korea, Japan, Russia, and China. Because of the shared border countries support US policy, it will make it possible for North Korea to interact with the international community and be open to the outside world.

- Strengthen enforcement of sanctions under the UNSC resolution provision: the U.S. and the other Member States should reinforce enforcement against North Korea under UNSC resolutions to prevent North Korea's future cargo from exporting advanced nuclear technology material.
- Strengthening cooperation with China: knowing that China is North Korea's main trading partner if China agrees to join the US, the spread of denuclearization could be faster. The country as a whole will reach a financial breakthrough once China cut off all trading partners' ties and stopped providing financial assistance. As a result, North Korea may be attempting to change its provocative behavior or willingness to denuclearize its nuclear weapon for its nation's shake.

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